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Household decisions about how much to save and how much to work are central
to many important policy issues. Amongst these we note:
(i) Keynesian policies for short run management of the economy depend
critically on how much households change their consumption if governments change
disposable incomes by changing income taxes;
(ii) cuts in tax rates on unearned income that are designed to stimulate
saving and hence long run rates of growth depend on how responsive household saving
is to changes in the interest rate;
(iii) the effects of changes in old age pensions that are designed to decrease
poverty amongst old people depend on how responsive savings and the date of
retirement are to such changes;
(iv) the design of an efficient unemployment insurance scheme needs a
measure of how much labour supply changes consequent on changes in entidement and
levels of benefits;
(v) the availability of maternity leave and subsidised child care may affect
the number and timing of children and the levels of education and training that women
choose.
The common thread that runs through all these issues is that individuals and
households must make decisions that have both short run and long run implications.
The most widely used framework within which economists analyse such decisions is the
life-cycle model. This framework takes as its starting point the proposition that at any
point in time households arrange their affairs so as to maximise a lifetime utility
function subject to a lifetime budget constraint using all current information as
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efficiently as possible. The most important implication of this premise is that agents
seek to keep the marginal utility of (discounted) expenditure constant from period to
period. This is a very powerful organising principal since, along with supplementary
assumptions, it provides predictions about the short run (high frequencylbusiness cycle)
and long run (low frequency~life cycle) behaviour of consumption and labour supply (as
well as all other life-cycle decisions such as schooling, fertility, occupation choice,
portfolio allocations and retirement).
It is critical to recognise that the life-cycle model is only a framework. Without
importing more structure we cannot make any predictions that put constraints on what
we might observe. Thus all models within this framework (that is, all life-cycle models)
can be characterised by the additional assumptions used. For the purposes of this
thesis it is necessary to delineate four sets of assumptions that are used. The strongest
set of assumptions is the following:
MODEL A. Agents have perfect foresight; preferences can be represented by
a utility function that is additive over time; agents have access to perfect capital
markets.
There are several ways to relax these assumptions. The most natural replaces
the perfect certainty assumption with an assumption of rational expectations and
expected utility:
MODEL B. Agents face an uncertain future and have rational expectations;
preferences over uncertain outcomes satisfy the postulates of the expected utility
model; the VN utility function is additive over time; agents have access to perfect
capital markets.
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Further weakening can be achieved by dropping the assumption that the VN
utility function is additive over time:
MODEL C. Agents face an uncertain future and have rational expectations;
preferences over uncertain outcomes satisfy the postulates of the expected utility
model; agents have access to perfect capital markets.
Or by dropping the assumption-of~erfect capital markets:
MODEL D. Agents face an uncertain future and have rational expectations;
preferences over uncertain outcomes satisfy the postulates of the expected utility
model; the VN utility function is additive over time.
Chapter 2("A Profitable Approach to Labor Supply and Commodity Demands
Over the Life-Cycle", co-authored with Angus Deaton and Margaret Irish) presents
some novel theoretical analysis and some empirical results based on UK data.
Throughout the paper it is assumed that the conditions of Model B hold. Under these
assumptions we derive various theoretical implications of the model. The derivations of
these results are greatly facilitated by the use of an alternative preference representati-
on to the direct utility function. This alternative representation is called the profit
function representation. As the paper demonstrates, the use of this representation
makes the analysis much easier. Indeed, the principal point of the first half of the
paper is to illustrate the use of the profit function representation.
The second half of Chapter 2 presents some results on labour supply and
consumption using UK Family Expenditure Survey (FES) data. The empirical analysis
of inter-temporal models strictly requires the use of panel data; that is, data that
follows the same households over a number of time periods. Unfortunately no such
data is available for all consumption items. Many authors have used aggregate time
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series data but the conditions required to justify the use of such 'representative agent'
models seem far too strong to be plausible.
In this paper we propose an alternative way around the absence of panel data
on individual households. This alternative uses the FES that is conducted each year in
the UK. This survey collects information on the consumption of a comprehensive list
of goods by individual households as well as a great deal of other information about the
household. Since each household is surveyed only once this seems to rule out any
analysis of intertemporal allocation. To illustrate how we overcome this problem
consider the derivation of a time series for consumption. We take all agents aged 20 to
24 inclusive in 1970 and take the mean of consumption. We then take all agents aged
21 to 25 inclusive in 1971 and take the mean of consumption and so on until 1976 (for
agents aged 26 to 30). We then treat these series of seven cohort means as the
consumptions over seven periods by the same agent. Such data is known as synthetic
cohort or quasi-panel data. The rationale for this procedure is that although the
sample varies over time the population does not (ignoring death and migration) so that
the sample means in each period are consistent estimators of the population mean. We
then show that the theory applies to the population means.
This procedure is critically different from a representative agent approach in
two ways. First, since we have the individual data we can take means of functions of
the data. For example, if the theory requires us to work with log consumption then we
take logs at the individual level and then take means. If we have only aggregate data
we can only take the log of inean consumption. Since the difference between the mean
of logs and the log of the mean is an index of inequality the procedure using the
aggregate data can only be justified if we assume that changes in inequality are
uncorrelated with changes in the mean of consumption. The second difference is that
in the representative agent approach the main difference between the population in
1970 and 1971 is that some younger people have 'entered' the population and some
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older people have 'left'. Even very moderate economic growth will mean that younger
people are a good deal better off in lifetime wealth terms than older people. The
effects of this on aggregate consumption and savings were the principal focus of the
first generation of life-cycle studies (in particular, those of Modigiliani and his co-
authors). If the focus of interest is individual behaviour, however, then these changes
in the population make inference about individual behaviour from aggregate data
impossible unless we impose the most implausible conditions.
The use of quasi-panel data also has an advantage over genuine panel data and
that is the absence of attrition. Since each survey is conducted in the same way as the
previous one this allows us to build up very long time quasi-panel data sets. For
example, recently the 1990 FES became available so that we can now follow the same
cohort for 21 years. This allows us to analyse both life-cycle and business-cycle
variations in consumption and labour supply. Since the introduction of the quasi-panel
method in the first paper in the thesis several authors have investigated the theoretical
econometric properties of this estimator and have used such data. It turns out that the
method is a generalisation of the Wald 'grouping' estimator that can be used to
overcome errors-in-variables problems. As such the quasi-panel method is an Instru-
mental Variable (IV) estimator and can be justified in that way.
The final part of Chapter 2 uses the theoretical methods introduced in the first
part to generate a parameterisation for the model that can be estimated using quasi-
panel data. We apply this to male labour supply and consumption. The male labour
supply data replicate the stylised facts found by others: for manual and non-manual
workers there is a marked synchronisation of hours worked and discounted wages over
the life-cycle. This is one of the predictions of the simple life-cycle model. The implied
intertemporal substitution elasticity is similar to that found in studies using US data. A
closer examination reveals some problems. First, there is clear evidence that the model
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does adequately account for the year to year changes in hours worked. Thus although
the model seems to do well for the life-cycle it does not do so well for the business-
cycle. The second problem is that in the hours equation it seems that leisure and
consumption are complements whilst in the consumption equation they are substitutes.
Fotmally, this implies a rejection of the symmetry condition which is one of the
principal implications of the simple theory model.
Given its central position in the consumption and labour supply literature the
simple life-cycle model has been the subject of intensive testing. In Chapters 3 and 4
("Eating, Drinking, Smoking and Testing the Life-Cycle Hypothesis" and "A Non-
Parametric Test of the Life-Cycle Rational Expectations Model", respectively) I present
two further sets of tests. The first is more informal than most whereas the second is a
good deal more formal and dispenses with the need for specifying a parameterisation
for preferences.
In Chapter 3 the alternative to the life-cycle hypothesis is a rather ill-defined
model of allocation in which households meet their 'needs' in each period and then use
any current income left over (so-called supernumerary income) for the purchase of
'non-essentials' and saving. The usual justification given for such a model is that
although all households would like to behave as life-cycle hypothesis agents some ace
liquidity constrained. Consequently, current consumption is set equal to current
income (that is, Model D above). An alternative justification would be that households
behave this way and the life-cycle model is simply wrong.
Consider a family that uses such an allocation procedure and that experiences
the birth of a child. This has two effects on income and expenditures. First, one of the
parents may drop out of the labour force to care for the child. This will lead to a fall
in current income. Second, 'needs' rise since children bring with them unavoidable
costs. These two effects together work to reduce supernumerary income. The
implication is that expenditures on non-essentials like tobacco and alcohol will fall.
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This conclusion is reinforced if we also assume that parental preferences change in such
a way that they drink and smoke less even if they can still afford it. The predictions for
a'Model B' household are very different. If agents can borrow and lend freely (and
preferences over tobacco and alcohol are additively separable from other goods and
children) then we would expect to see parents maintaining their previous level of
consumption of alcohol and tobacco after the birth of any children. To do this they
would either borrow or run down savings.
Thus the informal model and the simple life-cycle model give radically dífferent
predictions about the effects of children on the consumption of tobacco and alcohol. In
the second half of this paper the quasi-panel data developed in Chapter 2 is used to
implement the test. We find that children have no effect on the consumption of
tobacco and only a small negative effect on the consumption of alcohol. Although
hedged about with considerable reservations this seems to provide some support for the
simple version of the life-cycle model in which agents face a perfect capital market and
maximise the expected value of an intertemporally addi[ive utility function.
One of the weaknesses of all the tests of the life-cycle model that appear in the
literature is that they assume a particular parameterisation for preferences. In Chapter
4 I develop the non-parametric (or revealed preference) implications of the simplest
life-cycle model, model A. The specific condition generalises the prediction for the
single commodity case: demand is a negative function of discounted price. The
generalisation to several goods leads to a set of conditions that can be applied to any
time series of purchases, discounted prices, hours of work and discounted wages. The
interest rate used to discount prices and wages is, of course, the single interest rate that
is assumed to hold in the perfect capital market posited in the assumptions. The set of
conditions include Varian's GARP conditions as a subset. This is not surprising since
these are required for intra-period 'rationality' whereas the conditions for consistency
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with the life-cycle model require intra- and inter-temporal 'rationality'. Finally, it is
shown that the non-parametric conditions aggregate perfectly; that is, if they hold for
each agent then they hold for the aggregate data as well.
These conditions are applied to aggregate time series data from the LTK for
1952 to 1985. Although the conditions are rejected for the whole data period they are
not rejected for long sub-periods. Moreover, if we allow for 'surprises' in the early
1970's then the non-parametric conditions hold for the whole period. This is of
considerable interest since parametric tests of the life-cycle hypothesis on similar data
typically reject strongly. The non-rejection of the non-parametric conditions suggests
that the rejections reported in the literature may be more a matter of imposing
inappropriate parameterisations than of rejecting the hypothesis per se.
Although this looks encouraging for the simplest fonn of the life-cycle model
the specific rejections of the non-parametric conditions over the whole period do point
in some specific directions. For example, in each case where the conditions are
rejected it is because consumption does not fall as much as predicted by the theory.
This suggests a'ratchet' model of consumption along the lines first discussed by
Duesenberry in the late 1940's. Alternatively, we can view the periods for which the
non-parametric conditions fail as being those in which agents are liquidi[y constrained.
All of this indicates that the life-cycle model (with some habits or capital market
imperfections) does a very good job of characterising the aggregate time series data.
What of the principal informal alternative, namety a'Keynesian' model in which we
assume that current total expenditure is an increasing function of current total income
and that agents then allocate this total expenditure using stable preferences. In the
final section of Chapter 4 it is shown that the data used are also exactly consistent with
such an hypothesis. The final conclusion, then, is that the aggregate time series data
are virtually worthless for testing the life-cycle model.
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The final paper in this thesis (Chapter 5, "A Simple Nonadditive Preference
Structure for Models of Household Behavior Over Time") deals with preferences that
are not additive over time (that is, it considers Model C above). Introspection and
much of the formal evidence on the life-cycle model suggests that preferences are not
additive over time. Some goods are habit-forming and others are satiating. These
considerations are obvious and lead to a plethora of non-additive models in the early
1950's at the same time that the empirical analysis of consumption decisions itself
began ~Ta~~~all Ye model came tn dnminate- The reason ic not
that it gave as good a fit to the data as non-additive models but that it is an order of
magnitude easier to handle. The reason is the following. If present preferences
depend on past choices then when modeling current demands we have to take account
of past purchases. This is not too difficult. However, if the past affects the present
then the present will affect the future so that we also need to take into account future
prices. To illustrate, consider tobacco. This is habit forming and someone who smokes
now will be sensitive to projected future changes in the relative price of tobacco. If the
government announces that it is going to increase the price of tobacco in the future
then forward looking agents will cut back now. It is this twin dependence of current
demands on past quantities and future prices that make the structural modeling of non-
additive preferences so difficult.
A variety of models have been suggested to deal wi[h inter-temporal non-
separabilities. From an econometric point of view the simplest model would have
current demands depending on one period lagged quantities and one period lead prices.
This cuts down on the number of leads and lags and has the lead variable being
exogenous. In Chapter 5 it is shown that unfortunately there is no way such a model
can be reconciled with a utility framework (unless, of course, preferences are additive).
Indeed, it can be shown that if we wish to include only one period lagged quantities
then current demands will depend on all future prices. Of course, we could overcome
this by making ad hoc assumptions about the future path of prices but this runs against
the modern tide of minimising such ad hoc assumptions about future variables.
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Conversely, it is shown that if we include only one period lead prices then we need to
include all lagged quantities. Once again, this can be overcome by making ad hoc
assumptions but this is is also unpalatable.
The approach in Chapter 5 is to derive the simplest possible generalisation of
additivity where 'simple' refers to the data needs. A preference structure is developed
that allows current demands to depend on current prices and one period lead and lag
prices. I characterise the preferences that satisfy this condition and term it a Simple
Non-Additive Preference (SNAP) structure. The first section of Chapter 5 develops
some of the implications of a SNAP structure in a world of perfect certainty. It is
shown that it includes the standard durables case as a special case. The second section
shows how to extend the framework to allow for uncertainty. The most important
result there is that if SNAP is be empirically useful then either we have to restrict
preferences significantly or we must assume that agents have point expectations about
future prices.
In the following two sections the SNAP model is applied to some UK aggregate
time series data. The particular parameterisation chosen includes the Almost Ideal
demand model of Deaton and Muellbauer (1970) as a special case. The SNAP
generalisation introduces only a few more parameters (strictly, one less than the
number of goods being modeled). When applied to the UK data we find that inter-
temporal additivity is rejected. Significantly, however, the inter-temporal dependencies
are mostly 'concentrated' on durables which is hardly a surprise. In fact, it seems all
other goods (with the possible exception of fuel which displays some problems anyway)
are intertemporally 'separable' (in a sense made exact in the paper). Thus it seems
that most of the apparent non-separabilities seen in past demand studies can be
attributed to the exclusion of durables from such systems. Since the demands for other
goods are not separable form durables this lead to an apparent need to allow for inter-
temporal non-separabilities in, say, food or services.
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CHAPTER 2
A PROFITABLE APPROACH TO LABOR SUPPLY
AND COMMODITY DEMAND OVER THE LIFE-CYCLE
reprinted from Econometrica, 53(3), May 1985, pp. 503-543.
A PROFITABLE APPROACH TO LABOR SUPPLY AND
COMMODITY DEMANDS OVER THE LIFE-CYCLE
BY MARTIN BROWNING, ANGUS DEATON, AND MARGARET IRISH~
The paper presents a general theoretical framework for the analysis of integrated
life-cycle models of consumption and fami(y labor supply under uncertainty. Profit functions
are used to represent intertemporally additive preferences and to yield convenient charac-
terizations of "constant marginal utility of wealth" or "Frisch" demand functions. Condi-
tions on preferences are derived that allow additive fixed-effect specifications for the Frisch
demands. Data from the British Family Expenditure Surveys from 1970-77 are used to
derive panel-like information on male labor supply and consumption for several age cohorts
vvertime-These áata-repraduee starrdard-lifeeyek-pat;er~rx af~teurs-attd-wages; butrtnere-
detailed analysis shows that the theory is incapable of offering a satisfactory common
explanation of the behavior of hours and wages over both the business cycle and the life
cycle. Similarly, although the theory can explain the life-cycle behavior of hours and
consumption separately, the same model cannot explain both, essentially because of a
failure in symmetry.
INTRODUCTION
OUR OBJECT IN THIS PAPER 1S t0 pCOVlde a general thCOCetlCal frameWOik fOC the
empirical analysis of integrated life-cycle models of consumption and family
labor supply. We also use data from the 1970 to 1977 Family Expenditure Surveys
ofthe United Kingdom to estimate life-cycle models of male hours and household
consumption. The way in which we combine time-series and cross-section data
allows a simultaneous analysis of behavior over both business and life cycles.
We find that, although much of our evidence is broadly interpretable in terms
of life-cycle theory, the theory is not capable of offering a common explanation
of the business cycle and the life cycle, nor of consumption and hours, even
though each can be explained in isolation.
Previous British studies of labor supply have not taken a life-cycle view. The
studies referenced in the survey by Greenhalgh and Mayhew [24] use either
aggregate data from time series and industrial cross-sections or micro data from
household surveys and are based on the standard static model of labor supply.
Typically, such studies find backward sloping supply curves for prime-age males
together with small negative effects on labor supply of assets or unearned income
or proxies for them; it is not always clear that the implied substitution elasticity
is positive as required by theory. Indeed, in studies using the Family Expenditure
Survey, unconstrained regressions tend to produce backward sloping supply
~ We should like to thank the SSRC for financial support under Grant No. HR7637 "The Economics
and Econometrics of Consumer Behavior." We have received helpful comments from Orley
Ashenfelter, Tony Atkinson, Cliff Attfield, Gary Becker, David Card, Larry Epstein, Terence Gorman,
Jim Heckman, Constantino Lluch, Bob Lucas, John Muellbauer, John Pencavel, Bob Pollak, Nick
Stern, and two unusually helpful referees. We also wish to thank the Atkinson~King~Stern project
stati for generously allowing us access to their version of the FES tapes.
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curves together with zero or positive income effects, clearly contradicting theoreti-
cal presupposition; see Atkinson and Stern [6] and Deaton [12]. Of course, there
are severe difficulties in obtaining good data on unearned income in any household
survey and there are serious conceptual problems in applying the static model
to such data as exist. In a life-cycle context, assets and asset income are not
exogenous vaiables but evolve systematically with the labor supply and spending
decisions of the household. It is easy to imagine the same household at different
points in the life cycle first working long hours with low assets, then working
long hours with high assets and yet later working short or no hours with low
assets. The only truly exogenous asset variables are inherited assets on the one
hand, and asset "surprises" on the other; these are not recorded in standard
household surveys. There are similar problems interpreting wage responses in
the standard static model. It is reasonable to suppose that a fully anticipated
wage increase wili have different effects from an unanticipated change since the
latter changes the individual's perception of life-time resources while the former
does not. Similarly, most households are not surprised when their children attain
an age at which their financial demands on their parents becomes very large, so
that such events must begin to influence labor supply and savings plans long
before they occur. All these phenomena require an explicitly life-cycle perspective
as well as a proper integration of labor supply and consumption behavior.
These issues have been recognized in the American literature for some time,
aithough the static model is still the dominant framework of analysis. Mincer's
[40] model of female participation is explicitly set in a life-cycle background, but
modern developments in life-cycle labor supply begin with Heckman's [28]
Princeton doctoral thesis; see Heckman [29 and 30], and with Ghez and Becker
[18]. Ghez and Becker make much of the important distinction between antici-
pated wage changes along the life-cycle wage profile and unanticipated changes
which shift the profile itself. Smith's [45] paper is in this tradition but, like Ghez
and Becker's work, the analysis is hampered by lack ofpanel data, so that averages
of workers at specified ages (synthetic cohorts) are assumed to represent behavior
along a single profile for all workers. Heckman's analysis provides the basis for
an appropriate theoretical treatment by showing that the supply functions required
for the analysis are neither those holding wealth constant nor those holding utility
constant, but those that hold marginal utility constant. This is the starting point
for much of the analysis in this paper. Marginal utility constant demand functions
also turn out to be central in the analysis of intertemporal choice under uncertainty
and provide a bridge between the labor supply literature and the "rational
expectations" consumption function models of Bewley [9] and of Hall [25] which
trace back ultimately to the intertemporal arbitrage conditions of the finance
literature. The final important development is due to MaCurdy (see Heckman
[31], Heckman and MaCurdy [32], and MaCurdy [37]). This is the realization
that, at least in certain specifications, the essentially unobservable marginal utility
is constant over the lifetime of the consumer and so, given panel data, can be
treated as a fixed effect in the econometric analysis.
In this paper, our first aim is to develop the full theoretical basis for marginal
utility constant demand functions and to relate them to standard concepts in the
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theory of consumer behavior. In particular, we discuss the relevant duality theory,
an appreciation of which gives great advantages, not only in understanding, but
also in ease of selecting functional forms and of relating empirical observations
to the forms of preferences thereby implied. The key to the analysis turns out to
be the life-cycle profit function, first discussed (in the context of the Rotterdam
model) by Gorman [22]. The concept is identical to that used in production
theory (see, e.g., McFadden [38]), and in the same way it has demand functions
as partial derivatives, in this case the marginal utility constant demands, or as
we call them here, the Frisch demands. In the life-cycle context with uncertainty,
the Frisch demands neatly separate anticipated from unanticipated effects, not
only of wages on labor supply and participation, but also of commodity prices
and demographic structure on both labor supplies and commodity demands. The
close link between demands on the one hand and profit and cost functions on
the other allows us to use standard techniques from demand analysis to incorpor-
~te-rrt a-systematrc ~tay-the-presenee ~~f-cb''~..-~;~u-to-predtet~~~,ts-c3f the- -
demographic life-cycle on male and female labor supply and household com-
modity demands.
The first part of the paper takes up these issues in turn. Section 1 is a general
discussion of additive preferences and of the characterization of consumer prefer-
ences by profit functions; only a summary is given and a fuller analysis can be
found in Browning [10]. Section 2 applies the results of Section 1 to the life-cycle,
derives life-cycle and age-specific profit functions and gives the general results
governing labor supplies, participation, and commodity demands in terms of the
Frisch demands. Section 3 introduces uncertainty into the intertemporal choice
problem and links the Frisch demands to the literature on the consumption
function, particularly to Bewley [9] and Hall [25]. Section 4 contains some simple
exercises in comparative statics and dynamics designed to illustrate the power
of the model to generate testable hypotheses and to tell "stories" about home
economics. For example, under plausible assumptions, anticipated increases in
men's wages cause their wives to work more. Similarly, the birth of an additional
child may cause the husbands of nonparticipating wives to work longer hours
but have no effect on the hours of those men whose wives continue to participate
in the labor market after the increase in family size.
The second part of the paper is concerned with the selection of appropriate
functional forms and with empirical implementation on Family Expenditure
Survey data. Section 5 takes up MaCurdy's suggestion of treating the marginal
utility as an unobservable fixed effect. We derive the general restrictions on
preferences that allow such a formulation and propose from within the class a
set of flexible functional forms that permit the testing of a number of important
restrictions on behavior. These include separability of husband's and~or wife's
leisure from each other and from goods, in addition to the usual symmetry
restrictions of demand theory. Section 6 discusses an important device that allows
us to use the Family Expenditure Survey to generate what are effectively panel
data. In the United Kingdom, we do not have genuine panel data on incomes,
hours, and commodity demands. However, we are unusually fortunate in having
a continuous household survey, the FES, that generates random samples of the
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population in every year. With complete enumeration, i.e., with census data, we
could follow cohorts through time. With a continuous random sample, we can
follow cohort means through time to the extent that sample means are good
estimates of population means. Although we cannot follow individual households
through time, we can look at the average behavior of 25 year olds one year, of
26 year olds the next, and so on, thus following actual, not synthetic cohorts.
Such data even have certain advantages over panel data, notably the preservation
of randomness through the absence of attrition. Section 6 explains exactly how
the data were extracted from the FES; the means used in the study although
based on nearly 50,000 original observations, make up a relatively small data set
which is listed in the Appendix. Section 7 contains the results of an application
of our model to both male labor supply and to aggregate household expenditures.
The hours data replicate the stylized facts found by others, that for manual and
nonmanual workers there is a marked synchronization over the life-cycle between
hours worked and discounted wage rates with workers working longest hours
when it is most profitable to do so. On such evidence alone, the elasticity of
weekly hours to anticipated wage changes is around 0.15, a figure in accord with
MaCurdy's [37] estimate for the United States. However, more detailed analysis
casts considerable doubt on the simple life-cycle explanation. In particular,
sensible positive responses between hours and wages are only consistently
obtained when year to year changes are separately allowed for by dummy
variables. Secondly, the characteristic hump-shaped patterns of both hours and
real consumption, though explicable in terms of life-cycle wage variation, can
be explained as well as or better by other factors, particularly by the demographic
composition of the household. Hence, life-cycle patterns could be interpreted as
the response of credit-constrained consumers to the variation in needs accompany-
ing the birth, growth, and departure of children. Finally, a life-cycle interpretation
of consumption expenditures requires that consumption and leisure be substitutes,
while our estimates of male labor supply imply almost as strongly that leisure
and consumption be complements. Overall then, we find a considerable amount
of evidence that is contrary to the simple life cycle story.
PART ONE: THEORY
I. ADDITIVE PREFERENCES AND PROFIT FUNCTiONS
Consider first a quite general model of consumer choice with additive
preferences. We write this
n
(1.1) max ~ v;(q;) subject to p~ q-x
9~ ;-~
where q; is the quantity purchased of each of n goods, p; is the corresponding
price, and x is the predetermined expenditure total. If we assume convexity of
preferences, all but one of the subutilities must be concave (see Yaari [46]); we
assume further that all the subutility functíons v; are strictly concave and twice
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differentiable. We temporarily make the assumption of internal solutions; these
are characterized by first-order conditions
(1.2) v~(q,)-.IP~-P~~r
where A is a Lagrangian multiplier representing the marginal utility of x, given
that utility is normalized by taking the explicitly additive form. The quantity r,
which plays a key role in what follows, is de6ned as the reciprocal of ,~, i.e., as
the marginal cost of utility or better, as the price of utility. Since each v;( ) is
strictly concave, v;( ) is monotone decreasing so that ( L2) can be inverted to give
(1.3) q~-.Í~(P,~r)
for monotone decreasing functions f,( ).
Ragnar Frisch [16] was one of the first writers to systematically use additive
preferences to measure the marginal utility of money, and following Browning
[10], we refer to the demand functions (1.3) as Frischdemands. Under the additivity
assumption, Frisch demands characterize quantities purchased in terms of a single
quantity, the ratio of the commodity price to the price of utility. Such demands
should be distinguished from the usual uncompensated or Marshallian demands
that relate quantities to prices and total outlay, as well as from the compensated
or Hicksian demands that relate quantities to prices and utility. The Frisch
demands can be transformed into Marshallian demands by solving for r in terms
of p and x by applying the budget constraint to (1.3), i.e., from
(1.4) ~P~f(P,~r)-x,
or into Hicksian demands by expressing r in terms of u and p through
(1.5) ~ P,.Í~(P~~r) - c(u, P)
where c(u, p) is the cost or expenditure function corresponding to the original
preferences. The conceptual experiment corresponding to a Frisch demand is
one in which consumers are money compensated for a price change until their
price of utility returns to its original value. But a more useful and natural
interpretation will appear in the life-cycle context.
The analysis clearly extends to "block" additivity or strong separability where
the subutility functions are defined over groups of goods rather than single goods.
Problem (1.1) becomes
(1.6) max u -~ vc(qc) subject to ~ pc . qc - x
G
where qc and pc represent price and quantity vectors for group G. The solution
follows the same lines and the Frisch demands are, for good i in group G,
(1.7) qc~ -.Íc;(Pc~ r)
so that demands in the group depend only on prices in the group relative to the
price of utility.
Utility is an "output" for the consumer so that Frisch demands can be thought
of as relating optimal inputs to the prices of output and the inputs. In production
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theory such demands arise in the analysis of a profit maximizing firm and this
familiar apparatus turns out to be conveniently adaptable to the consumer context.
Hence, define the consumer's profit function as the maximum profit attainable
from selling utility (to him or herself) at a price r, subject to the technology of
utility production, i.e., the utility function, and the prices of the inputs. For a
general utility function v(q), we write this
(l.8) -rr(r,P)-max{ru-p-q;u-v(q)}.
u,q
The existence of ~r(r, p) for all p~0 requires that v(q) be strictly concave and
co-finite; see Rockafellar [44] and Lau [36]. Note that, by its de6nition, -rr(r, p)
is convex and linear homogenous in (r, p), increasing in r and decreasing in p
(see McFadden [38]). An alternative derivation of the profit function that is
frequently useful is
(1.9) -rr(r, p)-max{ru-c(u, p)}.
~
In many applications it is easier and more convenient to place structure on the
cost function so that (1.9) is useful in deriving the corresponding structure for
the profit function.
At a formal level, ~r(r, p) is (minus) the concave conjugate of rv(q) with respect
to q and the convex conjugate of c(u, p) with respect to u; see Rockafellar [44]
for a discussion of conjugacy. Since the original functions are the conjugates of
their own conjugates, utility and cost functions can be retrieved from the profit
function using the two identities
(1.10) c(u,p)-max{ru-a(p,r)},
r
(1.11) rv(q)-min{p- qf-rr(p, r)}.
P
At an economic level, the profit function represents consumer preferences as
a function of the price of utility and the prices of goods just as, for example, the
cost function represents preferences in terms of utility and goods' prices. For the
latter, demands can be obtained by differentiation, and the same is true for the




- - 9~ -.Í~(r, P),ap; - ap;
a ~r
ar - u -.io(r, P).
Hence, just as the cost function is the potential function for the Hicksian demands,
the profit function is the potential function for the Frisch demands. These
relationships allow us to derive the general properties of Frisch demands as well
as providing the link between preferences on the one hand and the empirical
analysis on the other.
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We conclude this section by noting the properties of Frisch demands that we
shall require in the subsequent analysis.
(A) Frisch demands are zero degree homogenous in r and p. This follows
immediately from the linear homogeneity of ~r(r, p) and the derivative property
(1.12). See also ( 1.3) and (1.7).
(B) Frisch demands have symmetric derivatives, i.e.,
(1.14) af,~ap; - af;~ap;.
The derivative matrix is simply minus the Hessian of the profit function so that
symmetry follows by Young's theorem. This symmetry is similar to but not the
same as Slutsky symmetry. The relationship between Frisch and Slutsky responses
is derived by writing
- l .15 - c ~rr (~ P~,~~ - - - - - -- -
where c; is the derivative of c(u, p) with respect to p; and ~ro that of ~rr(r, p) with
respect to r. Differentiation with respect to p; and rearrangement gives the




where s;; is Slutsky substitution, f; is Frisch substitution, and
(1.17) ~-alnr~alnx
is Frisch's [17] income flexibility of the marginal utility of money. Equation (1.16)
decomposes substitution effects into "specific" substitution effects (the f;) and
"general" substitution effects ( terms coined by Houthakker [33]); see also
MaCurdy [37]. Note that conjugate functions have Hessians which are mutual
inverses so that the Frisch substitution matrix is proportional to the inverse of
the Hessian of the utility function; see the expressions for f; in Barten's [7]
"fundamental matrix equation of demand theory."
(C) Frisch demands slope downwards. By its defintion ~rr(r, p) is convex so
that its Hessian, where it exists, is positive semi-definite. Since the (f,;) matrix is
the negative of this Hessian, it is negative semi-definite. Hence
(1.18) af~ap;~0
or more generally, for price vectors p' and po,
(1.19) {l(r,P~)-I(r,Po)}.{p'-po},0.
(D) Additive (or block additive) utility is equivalent to additive (or block
additive) profits. It is intuitively clear that additive utility functions allow decen-
tralization of utility production provided each production unit produces output
(utility) at the same price, in this case r. Formally, take the strongly separable
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case ( l.6). Then
(L20) zr(r,p)-max{ru-~Pc'9c:u-~vc(qc)}u, v
- max {r ~ uc -~ pc' 9c: uc - vc(9c)}~~,.vc




Hence, the overall profit function is the sum of the individual pro6t functions
corresponding to each subutility function. Overall profits are the sum of branch
profits; input prices are branch specific but the output price is the same for all
branches and provides the (only) link between them.
Differentiation of (1.20) yields branch Frisch demands which are a function
of group prices and the price of utility alone, i.e., of the form (1.7). The Hessian
of (1.20) is block diagonal as is the Hessian of a strongly separable utility function.
The eflect of additivity is thus to set to zero all cross-branch specific substitution
effects. In the next section we shall see how useful this is in the context of
intertemporal choice.
2. THE LIFE CYCLE, PROFITS, AND DEMANDS
We begin with the case of perfect certainty and assume that family life-cycle
preferences can be represented by the utility function
L
(2.1) u -~ v~(1~~, ~z~, 9~)
0
where t- 0, ..., L indexes age, l„ is leisure of the type 1 worker (husband), Izr
is leisure of the type 2 worker (wife ), and q, is a vector of household consumption
levels. The period subutility functions v~( ) are indexed on age t; this could
reHect intertemporal discounting of utility (if such a phenomenon is thought to
be sensible), but more importantly the variation with t recognizes the modifying
role played by the presence of children and their changing demands over the
family life cycle. The intertemporal strong separability that is assumed by (2.1)
is a crucial element in all of our analysis and only a limited number of our results
hold without it. The fact that additivity is an almost universal assumption in
work on intertemporal choice does not suggest that it is innocuous.
For the moment, assume that utility is maximized under perfect certainty in
which case the life-cycle budget constraint, discounted back to age 0, can be
written
L L L L
(2.2) ~P~'9~f~wi~~i~}~wz~~z~-Aof~(wi~Ti~fwz~Tzr).
0 0 0 0
In this expression w„ and w,, are the wages of husband and wife at age t, Ao is
the present discounted value at 0 of nonhuman assets, and T„ and T,, are the
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age t time endowments for the husband and wife respectively. A caret over a
price or wage indicates that the variable is discounted to its present value; for
age t, the discount factor is the product of all single period discount factors from
0 to t. Explicit formulae are considered later.
The problem we are concerned with is the maximization of (2.1) subject to
(2.2) with 1,,, Izr and q, as ínstruments. We implicitly assume that the household
has already made its fertility and human capital plans; however this has been
done, the optimization problem is still correct although the wage rates and the
numbers and ages of children cannot be taken as parametric. Allowance for these
effects must therefore be made as necessary in the econometric work.
The intertemporal additivity assumption allows decentralization over time
(age). Each period of life is regarded as the site for an independent utility factory
and lifetime utility is the sum of all the individual plant outputs. The link between
periods is the discounted price of lifetime utility, i.e., the reciprocal of the marginal
~tilit~of-lifetirne~ealth (n~rtco-me).-Define-thPn~kte-ag~ t~rofi~functianby
(2.3) ~t(r, w~t, wzt,Pt)- max {rufwit(Tit-lit)
u.~i ~.~zr,4~
f w,t(Tzt-~zt)-Pt' 9t; vt(lit, ~zt, 9t) - u}.
Profits accrue from sales of utility and sales of the two kinds of market labor





- hit -f~t(r, Wit, wzt, Pt),c3w~t
a ~r,
a Wzr
- h2t -f2t(C, w lr, w2t, pt),
a~r, ,I,
- - qit - Wit(r, w ln w2b Pr),
aPti
where h„ and hzr are the hours of market work supplied by each type of worker,
f„ and f, are the Fcisch supply functions for labor, and ~;,, i- 1, ..., n are the
Frisch demand functions for commodities.
These equations show immediately the benefit of working with Frisch demands.
As emphasized in the work of Heckman and of MaCurdy, labor supplies and
commodity demands are a function of immediately observable within period
variables such as prices and wages while all the variables from outside the period,
many of which are unobservable (future prices, wage rates, and so on), are
represented by a single "sufficient statistic" r which, at least under perfect
certainty, does not vary from period to period. Such equations are the perfect
answer to the difficulties facing the econometrician who attempts to estimate
life-cycle models. However, there is still a number of difficulties to be faced both
in this section and the next.
Note first that the formulae (2.4) to ( 2.6) assume internal solutions for the
labor supplies and commodity demands. The constraints q,;10 and T„ ~ h;, ~ 0
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have been ignored although in practice some are likely to be binding. We illustrate
for the case of nonparticipation by the wife, i.e., for hzr - 0. The same principles
apply to the other inequality constraints ( although large numbers of regimes are
hard to handle). Note first that if h, ~, hZ, and q~; as given by ( 2.4) to (2.6) are all
nonnegative, then these values are optimal and there is nothing more to be said.
Consider then the case where ( 2.5) yields a value of fzt c 0. Since the Frisch
demands are the inverses of the first order conditions, fzr c 0 implies that at zero
hours, a decrease in home time is worth more than the wage earned, so that hzr - 0
is optimal. Hence, as might be expected, positive Frisch labor supply functions
correspond to positive hours worked while negative Frisch supplies indicate
nonparticipation. This is the familiar Tobit specification for censored distribu-
tions. Even so, when the wife does not participate, the husband's labor supply
and household commodity demands will generally be different since the optimiz-
ation must allow for the effective ration at hzt - 0. The analysis of this situation
requires a restricred profit function for age t in which hz, is set to zero. The
details are essentially identical to those given for restricted cost functions in
Neary and Roberts [41] and Deaton [11] and the solution is characterized by the
following equations:
~2.7) hi~-fi~(r, wi~, w~,P~),
~2.8 0-fz~(r, w i~, w~,P~),
~2.9 q~~-~,~(r, w i~, w~,P~).
In equation ( 2.8) w~` is defined as the wage rate that causes the wife to wish to
work zero hours at age t; it is her reservation wage ( sometimes shadow or virtual
wage). Note that ( 2.8) yields a unique solution for w~` since fzt( ) is monotone
increasing in w,;. Husband's labor supply and household consumption demands
have the same functional form as before with the wife's reservation wage replacing
the actual wage. This has important implications. Consider, for example, a variable
that in ( 2.4)-(2.6) affects only wife's labor supply, for example the presence or
absence of an infant. Once the wife ceases to participate, (2.8) becomes relevant
and changes in the variable will alter w~ and hence the husband's labor supply
as well as the commodity demands.
From an econometric point of view (2.4)-(2.6) and (2.7)-(2.9) should be
regarded as two systems of equations with endogenous switching determined by
whether or not fz, is negative. Note that the presence of nonparticipation at some
point in the life cycle does not affect the constancy of r; the price of utility is a
datum for the life of the family and it is not altered as behavior switches from
one set of equations to the other.
3. THE TREATMENT OF UNCERTAINTY
We begin by rewriting the life-cycle Frisch demands under certainty. We take
the male labor supply equation (2.4) as representative:
(3.1) h,,-fi~(r, W i~, Wz~,P~);
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omitting the others merely saves space. The wage rates and prices in this equation
are discounted back to age 0; hence, taking p;r to illustrate:
r-~
(3.2) P~r-Pub(t,~)-pu ~ (l~-ir)-',
0
where S(t, 0) is the discount factor to be applied to period t in period 0 and ir
is the nominal rate of interest linking period T with period T f l. Since (3. I) is
zero degree homogeneous, we can divide through by S(t, 0) to give
(3.3) h~r -.f~r(rn w~n wzr, Pr)
where r, - r~S(t, 0) is the price of utility in period t, or, more precisely, the price
of lifetime utility in terms of period t's money. Because of the discounting, r„
unlike r, is not constant with age but, by definition, evolves according to
- -~3:4~~~-rftfi~~ - - - -- ----
This equation guarantees that r,S( t, 0), the discounted price of lifetime utility, is
the same at all ages ( periods). Equations (3.3) and (3.4) taken together are
precisely equivalent to the original (3.1) and provide a convenient characterization
using only currently dated magnitudes.
Choice under uncertainty is here characterized by expected utility maximization
with continuous replanning. Labor supplies and commodity demands at t are
thus chosen to maximize
L
(3.5) vr(lln lzn qr)~Er ~ vk(llk, lzk, 9k)
tt 1
where E,( ~ ) is the expectations operator conditional on information available at
time t. By taking this form, we assume that the same explicitly additive form of
utility can be used to characterize both intertemporal separability and the additiv-
ity over states that is implied by the conditional preference axiom of choice under
uncertainty. There is no automatic guarantee that this should be so; nevertheless
we believe that the characterization embodies the most reasonable interpretation
of intertemporal additivity under uncertainty. To summarize the argument, start
from the sure-thing principle without intertemporal separability, so that preferen-
ces can be represented by an additive function ~-rrSG(95, 9s, .-., 9s), with ~rs
the probability of state s, and qs ( temporarily) representing the vector ofconsump-
tions and leisures in period t and state s. The crucial question is exactly what is
meant by intertemporal additivity in this context. A minimum requirement is that,
under certainty, utility be additive, or equivalently, that within any given state,
utility be additive. In terms of basic preference orderings, we require that for
given s, the conditional ordering over any pair {qs, qs} must be independent of
T for T ~ t, t'. This implies that utility can be represented by the form
~~rrSF{~ v,(qs)}. One could reasonably stop at this point, but we feel it is more
appropriate to require that preferences be simultaneously additive over periods
and states. Without restriction on F{ }, conditional orderings over, for example,
{qs, qs.} are not independent of qs and gs- for all T ~ t. In consequence, my
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preferences over picnic~sun versus movie~rain tomorrow are not independent of
all my future consumption levels in future states that encompass sun or rain
tomorrow. We prefer not to characterize such preferences as being intertemporally
additive and instead to require simultaneous additivity, so that the conditional
ordering of {q;., q~.} be independent of q; for all r~ t, t' and ~~ s, s'. By the
application of Gorman's [20] overlapping separability theorem, such simul-
taneity requires that F be at most an affine transformation and that preferences
can be represented by the doubly additive form, as in (3.5). Some of the further
complications introduced by recognizing the sequential resolution of uncertainty
over time are discussed by Gorman [23].
The maximization of (3.5) subject to the life-cycle budget constraint requires
the usual recursive substitution from L back to t that is characteristic of stochastic
dynamic optimization; for a good exposition see, for example, Epstein [15]. Note
first that the life-cycle utility function (3.5) still has a two period intertemporally
additive structure between "now," period t, and the "expected future," from t t l
to L. Consequently, all the previous apparatus of Frisch demands goes through,
i.e., we can write exactly as before
(3-6) hi~-.ii~(r~, wi~, wz~,P~)
for the period t male labor supply, conditional on r„ the price of expected lifetime
utility as perceived at t. The only difference between certainty and uncertainty is
the process controlling the evolution of r„ and it is this that is derived from the
dynamic optimization. To simplify notation, define period r"full" expenditure as
(3.7) xr-w,rl,r-~w,rl,rtP-' 9~,
let rG,(x' w,,, wZ„ pr) be the period T indirect subutility function, ~,. -
w,rT,rf w,rT,r period r's endowment, and Ar assets at the beginning of T. The
evolution of assets is given by
(3.8) Ar},-(A,.~-cor-x,)(I-~i?).
Let ~,~(Ar) be the sum of current and expected future utilities as perceived at
age T given assets A, inherited from age T-1. At the end of life at age L we have
(3.9) ~i(Ac) - ~c(AL } ~Li wi c, wzc, P~),
while for any other r c L, optimization over period T full expenditure gives
(3.10) ~r;`(Ar) - max {~rr(x, w,,, wz„ pr)
z
f E,[tlr~t, ((At t cer - x)(1 f ir))]}.
In particular, ( 3.10) holds for the present, T- r, so that the first-order condition
is
(3.11) c3~i,~~7x - E,{(1 t i,) r3~i;~,~~3x}.
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But ~~r,~~x is simply the marginal (lifetime) utility of period t's money, or the
reciprocal of the undiscounted price of utility. Hence, (3.1 l) becomes
(3.12) E,{(1 f i,)r,~r,ti} - l.
This equation is the counterpart of (3.4) in the certainty case; under certainty,
(3.12) holds without the expectation. Thus, provided we work with Frisch demand
functions, the incorporation of uncertainty is straightforward. The Frisch
demands, in undiscounted form, are unchanged, but the price of utility follows
a stochastic rather than a deterministic process. Equation (3.11) or (3.12) is the
standard stochastic Euler equation of intertemporal equilibrium, familiar from
the theory of stock-market prices or from optimal accumulation under uncertainty.
It is also the basis for Bewley's [9] and Hall's [25] versions of the permanent
income model.
Recent work by Hansen and Singleton [27] has provided an econometric
procedure for direct estimation of the Euler equation together with the other
first-order conditions ( i.e., the Frisch demands). The procedure has also been
used by Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers [39] to study aggregate consumption
and labor supply in a paper with similar aims to the current one. Our own
approach is to write ( 3.12) as
(3.13) (]ti~)~r~ti-l~r,te~ti, E~(E~ti)-~,
and then to take logarithms and approximate to give
(3.14) in r,~, -1n r, t ln (1 f i, )-~ ,~,t,
with ~,ti--r,s,t~ and E,(~,t,)-0. This technique, unlike Hansen and
Singleton's, requires an approximation that clearly removes some of the theoreti-
cal sharpness deriving from the rational expectations modelling. The compensat-
ing advantage is that the simple structure of the Frisch demands under certainty
is preserved, and that the model has the certainty model as a special case when
~7,f,-0. In consequence, we shall be able to deal below with the uncertainty
case by straightforward differencing and instrumentation of the standard
regressions that will represent the model under certainty.
We now have a clear interpretation of life-cycle Frisch demands. With perfect
foresight and no uncertainty, consumers track along their predetermined life-cycle
trajectories of labor supply and consumption demand. With uncertainty, new
information is constantly coming to hand. If the new information leaves r
unchanged, or permits (3.12) to hold exactly ( not just in expectation), it is as if
there had been no new information, and the consumer continues along the
predetermined path. The price and wage derivatives of the Frisch demands are
derivatives with the utility price constant and so are the derivatives of this
predetermined path. It is perhaps not misleading to call them derivatives with
respect to anticipated changes, although in this context fulfilment of expectations
is defined by r,}, -( l f i,)r,. The great advantage of the Frisch demands is that
they separate out the effects of movements along the path (which occur with or
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without perfect foresight) from those movements of the path itself caused by new
information.
There is another important issue that has not been sufficiently emphasized in
the literature and which has been brought to our attention by Larry Epstein.
Consider equation (3.1), the male labor supply equation under certainty. Now it
is possible to produce other supply functions under quite different assumptions
that look very like (3.1). For example, assume that preferences are implicitly
additively separable so that the life-cycle cost function takes the form
L
(3.15) c(u, Pi, Pz, .... Pc, wi. wz) -~ cr(u, wi~. wzf, P~)
~-o
where u is lifetime utility. Such preferences are not equivalent to the additively
separable preferences of (2.1) and have quite different behavioral consequences;
see Gorman [21, 22] and Deaton and Muellbauer [14, Chapter 5]. Male labor




Under certainty, u is fixed for the whole life cycle so that, apart from the
substitution of u for r, (3.16) and (3.1) are identical. Hence, if we follow
MaCurdy's suggestion and treat r in (3.1) as an unobservable fixed effect, we
have no means of knowing whether we are estimating Frisch demands as in (3.1)
or Hicksian demands as in (3.16) even though the interpretation of the results
would be diflerent in the two cases. Other cases can also be generated.
Under uncertainty, it is more difficult to think of alternative sensible models
that generate the Frisch demands together with the behavior of the utility price.
For instance in the example of (3.15), intertemporal preferences are Leontief so
that, under uncertainty, an individual who consumed too little early in life would
throw away much of his or her later wealth. Indeed, it is difficult to think of any
simple characterization of intertemporal choice under uncerainty without inter-
temporal additivity. Even so, the fact that there may exist alternative interpreta-
tions of our equations does not threaten their validity. If our life-cycle model is
correct, our equations are the appropriate ones to estimate and if they cannot
describe the data, then the theory is false. If they do describe the data, the model
may be true or something else may be true; this is the normal situation.
4. COMPARATIVE STATICS, DYNAMICS, AND THE ROLE OF CHILDREN
Many of the general characteristics of the class of models discussed here are
familiar from the work of Ghez and Becker. Here we look only at those results
that are useful later. We also give examples of how one might develop profit
functions suitable for empirical implementation. We look first at "cohort effects,"
differences in behavior predicted for households of different ages at a single
moment in time, turning secondly to the analysis of individual life cycles.
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Individuals born at different dates face different economic environments
throughout their lives. In the models here, these cohort effects show up as
diflerences in r, the price of lifetime utility. In general, we think of younger
consumers as being better-off; they typically face higher real wages than did their
parents at the same age and they inherit or expect to inherit more assets. Given
concave utility, being better-off drives up the price of utility. On the average then,
we should expect r to increase as we move from older to younger households.
These effects are worth noting formally. They all derive from the budget identity
for the Frisch demands, i.e., from
(4.1) L witllt(r~ w lh w24Pr)}L w2tJ2tlrr w lt, w2hPt)t t
f~Pt' ~t(r, w it~ wzt,Pt)- Wo
-t - -
where Wo is assets at birth, that is, the present discounted value of present and
future time endowments and of future assets to be inherited. This identity implies:
(a) Growth in real wages increases r. It is clear, given zero homogeneity, that
this lowers the effective price for goods, thus increasing real consumption
throughout the life cycle. The net effects of w„~ r and wzr~ r depend on exactly
how wages rise and on the value of assets. Hence, as one would expect, the effect
of increasing real wages on labor supply is not theoretically predictable. In this
between cohorts context, the analysis is the standard one with offsetting income
and substitution effects.
(b) Fully anticipated inHation is neutral if assets at birth are indexed. Otherwise
there are real balance effects of the traditional kind.
(c) Increases in inherited assets increase r and so decrease both participation
and hours and increase real consumption given the normality of consumption
and leisure. We should thus expect older workers to have lower lifetime consump-
tion expenditures because of their lower lifetime real wages and asset levels at
birth. If there is real asset accumulation over time we should also expect them
to work more lifetime hours than their younger counterparts.
(d) Growth in wz~ w, is likely to increase female participation and hours relative
to male participation and hours. We can thus expect higher participation rates
among younger than among older female workers.
Consider now the evolution of family labor supply and consumption over the
life cycle. At the general level note the usual life-cycle model disassociation of
income and consumption. Adults work hardest when (discounted) wages are
highest, typically somewhat before the peak in lifetime wage rates, and not when
they have the greatest need for income. The presence of children affects consump-
tion and the time allocation of the parents only in so far as children's time and
goods requirements are typically age specific and are not substitutable across
periods. Whether or not the births of children are unanticipated, their subsequent
development most surely is so that the general income effects of children are
captured by the lifetime utility price. Parents work hard to support their children,
but in a world without market imperfections, there is no need to do so at the
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precise moment when the children are the greatest financial burden. It is much
better to earn and save when the wage is highest, or to borrow against that period.
A fairly general example illustrates many of these points. Write the period [
profit function in the form
(4.2) 7rr(1', Wln WZn pr) - a(~i wlrr W2ri p~(ar)) -~(r, w~r~ W2r, pn ar)
where a, is a vector of demographic characteristics of the household at time t.
For example, the vector might comprise two elements, a,, the number of small
children, and a2 the number of large (older) children. The ~3( ) function
represents the costs imposed on the parents by the presence of children, in terms
of both time and goods. The wage rates w„ and wZr in ~3 emphasize the children's
requirements for parental time; one reasonable specification would make hus-
band's and wife's time substitutes in child care so that, for example, all child
care would be assigned to the partner with the lowest market wage after correction
for "efficiency" in child care. The prices of goods enter costs through needs for
child-related commodities; we might specify that older children are commodity
intensive and younger children time intensive. Combining these ideas suggests
(4.3) ~3-{B,(r)a,fBz(r)az}min(w,,,~w,r)fF~i(r,P)aifliz(r,P)az
for eflïciency parameter ~ and with 9, ~ 6, and ~.~, c~e~. The presence of r allows
the costs of children to vary with the lifetime welfare level of the household.
Note that this does no[ imply that child costs are not real costs. The household
with high life time resources may feel constrained to buy private education for
its children; the fees still come out of the parental budget.
The a( ) function represents the positive side of family life; it is the value
of parental pleasures and parental leisure. Here one might expect l,r and 12r to
be complementary, at least if the parents enjoy each other's company. If l,r is
separable from l,r, the parents enjoy their leisure separately, and the a( )
functions is additive in w„ and w,, (note that profits are additive if utility is).
The p~`(ar) function indicates that the presence of children alters the eflective
price faced by parents for adult goods. We have in mind the Barten [8] model
in which
(4.4) P~(ar)-Ptrm~(ar)
for scaling factors m;(a,); see Deaton and Muellbauer [14, Chapter 7] and Pollak
and Wales [43] for further discussion. To give a concrete example, the cost of a
trip to the cinema is increased by the cost of a babysitter when small children
are present. Hence, the presence of children not only has direct effects through
the costs a( ) but indirect effects acting through "pseudo" relative price changes
on adult consumption patterns. In this sense, the model (4.2) is an application
of Gorman's [22] formulation of child costs to the life-cycle context.
It is of considerable interest to work through the full set of derivatives for (4.2)
and thus to trace out the effects of wage and price change and of family
development on labor supply and consumption patterns over the life cycle. Here
we limit ourselves to two brief examples.
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(a) If the wife is allocated all the child-care duties and still participates in the
labor market, the complementarity assumption in a( ) implies, for anticipated
wage changes,
(4.5) ah,~aw, - ahz~aw, ~ 0.
The equality is by symmetry. An increase in w, results in longer hours for the
husband; his absence from the home devalues his wife's leisure and she works
more hours in the market. The "independent leisures" assumption would set both
derivatives to zero. In most studies of female labor supply based on the static
model ~hZ~aw, is found to be negative. But this is an income effect following
from the increase in welfare after the wage increase. In the current context, the
wage change is anticipated so that there is no income effect.
(b) The reservation wage of the wife, w;`, defined by (2.8) varies positively
-witlr-~h~number--ef~rrlall-elri~rer~-i~:;~w~`J~s,~ff: I~ene~~n-inerease3n the-- -
number of infants will decrease hours of women who continue to participate in
the market and will increase the probability of nonparticipation. More interesting
is the behavior of the husband's hours. Firstly, there is a direct effect through
the Barten prices on goods consumption and thence on labor supply if goods
and male leisure are not separable. Ignore this for the moment on the assumption
that there is such separability. The direct time cost of the infant falls on the wife
and, provided she continues to participate in the labor market, there is no effect
on husband's leisure or market hours. Given (4.2) and (4.3) with ~wzt c w,,, the
husband's Frisch labor supply function is independent of a, (except through the
Barten effects). However, once the wife ceases to participate, the effects of a, on
w~` enter the husband's labor supply function. Given the "loving couple" com-
plementarity assumption, ~3h,~r3ai 10, i.e., the additional (anticipated) infant
causes the husband to work longer hours. Essentially, when the woman cannot
adjust her hours in the market, extra infants cause her to adjust her hours in the
home. The extra time spent with the children leaves less for her husband who
responds by working longer hours. It is clearly not necessary to invoke credit
restrictions and the need to feed the extra mouths to explain the finding of greater
male labor supply in response to an increase in family size.
PART TWO: [MPLEMENTATION
5. FUNCTIONAL FORMS
Our selection of useful functional forms is partly guided by the usual criteria:
(a) that they be ftexible up to the first derivatives of the demands and (b), that
they allow simple parametric testing of important hypotheses, particularly sym-
metry and separability restrictions between the types of labor and individual
commodities. However, we also have an additional requirement, that it be possible
and convenient to treat the price of utility as an unobservable fixed effect, with
or without random parts. Fixed eflects can most easily be dealt with by differenc-
ing, provided that they appear additively in the demand and supply functions,
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i.e., we require Frisch demands of the form (again using h, as an example)
(5.1) t(hi~)-Yi(r)~~li(wi~,wz~,P~)
where r is some monotone parameter-independent transformation (e.g., a
logarithm) and y,( ) and ,~,( ) are suitable functions. This formulation is also
useful for the uncertainty case since ln r differences to give a sum of an observable
and a well-defined stochastic term (see (3.14)) so that y,(r) will do the same, if
not exactly then as an approximation.
In principle, there are a number of choices for the [( ) function. Heckman
and MaCurdy [32] and MaCurdy [37] use logarithms but this has disadvantages.
If log hours is the dependent variable, it is hard to analyze participation since
the predicted hours can never be zero or negative; effectively such a choice
assumes preferences in which hours are essential. Log leisure is better, but leisure
is not directly observable. In practice it is measured by subtracting hours worked
from available hours (e.g., 168 hours per week) but assigning a value to this is
essentially arbitrary and the results obtained are not invariant to the assignment.
The same difficulty applies to budget shares as dependent variables. In this sort
of model, the denominator of the shares is "full income" which, like leisure,
requires knowledge of available hours. Hence, the eflective choices for the
dependent variable are hours or hours multiplied by the wage rate, i.e., earnings.
We analyze both.
To ease notation, we temporarily use the vector q to denote all demands
and supplies, i.e., commodities and labor supplies. Similarly the vector p is a
vector of the two wage rates and the n commodity prices. For Case 1, with
hours~quantities the dependent variable, we require
a 9,(5.2) -.fi(P)
aPi





be independent of r.




Now ~r;(r,p) is given by (5.4) so rr;o-~;(r) which must be homogeneous of
degree -1, i.e., ~r;o - -~,;~ r for positive constants ~.;. This implies ~; ( r) -
-~.; In r f ri;. Differentiating with respect to r gives rro- a'( r) -W . p~ r which is
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zero degree homogeneous, i.e., a'(r) - a, so that the profit function takes the form
(5.6) rr(r,P)-arf~(P)}~(~,-Il;lnr)p;.
Rewrite this as
(5.7) ~r(r, P) - arf d(P) }~ I~kPk In (Pkl`rJ
where d(p)-~(p)t~,7kpk-~t~kpklnpk. Provided d(p) is chosen to be linear
homogenous, ~rr(r, p) is linearly homogenous and is the profit function that we
want; it represents the most general set of preferences yielding (5.2), i.e., hours
and commodity equations that contain r only as an additive effect. The (Frisch)
demands corresponding to (5.7) are
~~) 4~ --d~(P~ la,; ]n (P,~r)--~t~- - - -
Since vro - u, we have period utility u- a- Fr. . p~ r, so that substituting for r in
(5.8) we have the Hicksian demands corresponding to (5.8):
(5.9) 9~--d,(P)-N-~ln(P,~N-'P)-l.c;{1-r-ln(a-u)}.
Since the final term in brackets on the right-hand side is monotone in u and does
not contain p, it is clear that (5.9) is a system of demands corresponding to
quasi-homothetic preferences. Hence, the treatment of r as additive in the hours
and quantities demanded implies intraperiod quasi-homotheticity, i.e., that for
a single consumer hours and expenditures are linearly related to within period
full income.
A similar analysis applied to Case 2, with expenditures~earnings as the depen-





The Hicksian demands for within period utility u are easily calculated and once
again yield quasi-homothetic preferences. Both cases are therefore restricted in
this way. Note, however, that, in the context of ftexible labor supply, quasi-
homotheticity does not imply linear Engel curves for goods in terms of either
income or total expenditure.
There is little obvious reason to choose one of these forms rather than the
other, though the constant marginal propensities to spend in (5.11) may be more
familiar than the constant marginal propensities to consume in (5.9). However,
neither formulation is more ftexible than the other and arbitrarily, we have chosen
to work with Case 1 and the profit function and Frisch demands given by (5.7)
and (5.8). For the linear homogenous d(p) function in (5.7) we choose
(5.12) d(P) - -~ ~1kPk -~ ~ BkjPk~~pji2
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for parameters ~7k and Bk; - B;k. This choice of d(p) is clearly a second-order
Hexible functional form.
Substituting into the Frisch demands, reverting to the original notation, and
using the forms (3.3) to deal with both the certain and uncertain cases, gives the
system (with both partners participating)
i~2 ~tz iiz





wlr(5.14) hzr - azr f~z ln wzt - B21 w










where the a's and ~3's bear obvious relationships to the n's, t~'s, and 9's, and
where, for convenience, the commodities have been renumbered from 3 to n f 2,
i.e., male and female labor supply are commodities 1 and 2. The t subscripts on
the a's reflect variation in variables other than p, w, and r.
These equations are linear in the parameters and in the ln r, and so can be
straightforwardly used for estimation and testing. In particular, the following
hypotheses are of interest:
(a) Svmmetry: Frisch symmetry requires 6;; - B;; for all i, j- 1, 2, ..., n~- 2.
(b) Additivity: Types of leisure and~or goods are additively separable within
the period if 9;; - 0. Of particular interest is whether or not 9, z- BZ, - 0, i.e.,
whether husband's or wife's leisure is separable. For other purposes, e.g., for
many aspects of optimal tax theory, we wish to test separability between specific
goods and leisure. In the current context, this can be tested by testing B,; - 0 and
Bzi - 0.
(c) Intertempora! Subsritutability: Unlike MaCurdy's formulation, elasticities
are not parametrized. However (3,~h„ is the estimated elasticity of current hours
with respect to anticipated wage changes and is one of the magnitudes on which
we focus.
These functional forms can be modified to account for children and other
socio-demographic characteristics in a number of ways. The simplest is to make
the a;'s functions of these variables allowing also for an "idiosyncratic" error
term. Better would be to explicitly model the effects of children through the
Barten-type effective prices and through their time costs, as in the previous section.
Participation of the wife can be modelled by analyzing (5.14) as a fixed-effect
Tobit as implemented by Heckman and MaCurdy [32]. However, (5.14) does not
yield an explicit solution for the wife's reservation wage w~` nor therefore does
it yield explicit solutions for the male labor supply and commodity demand
functions when the wife does not participate. Note, however, that if B, z- 0, the
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wife's participation status has no effect on her husband's labor supply. In this
case, male hours can be analyzed without reference to female participation.
In the rest of this paper, we shal] ignore female labor supply and assume it to
be additively separable from both goods and male labor supply; we therefore
estimate (5.13) together with an aggregate version of (5.15).
Note finally that while it is convenient to work with demand functions with
additive fixed-effects such as those discussed, the choice of such forms is not
costless. In particular, both profit functions derived here implicitly involve a
particular "normalization" of the within period subutility or felicity functions.
These essentially determine the allocation of lifetime wealth between periods so
that our choice of form results in a complete specification of lifetime preferences.
b..-CRFATiNG PANFL DATA
The Family Expenditure Survey is not a panel; individual households are not
followed through time. However, the survey is in continuous operation so that
it provides a random sample of the population each year (subject to the exclusion
of certain groups; see Kemsley, Redpath, and Holmes [35]). Currently, we have
access to data for the seven tax years (April Sth to April 4th) 1970~1, 1971~2,
1972~3, 1973~4, 1974~5, 1975~6, and 1976~7. Hence although we cannot track
individual households, we can track groups of households. In particular, if we
take age as age of the household head, we can look at the average behavior of,
say, 25 year olds in 1970~1, of 26 year olds in 1971~2, ending up with 31 year
olds in 1976~7. If we take the first group to be a random sample of all 25 year
olds in 1970~ 1, of 26 year olds in 1971~2, ending up with 31 year olds in 1976~7,
then the tracking through the surveys produces a series of random samples from
the same cohort. Given linear in parameter functional forms such as (5.13)-(5.15),
mean cohort behavior reproduces the form of individual behavior and the cohorts
can thus effectively be treated as individuals. If the price of lifetime utility is
constant for each member of the cohort from one year to the next, then its mean
is constant for the cohort as a whole. Hence, the sample mean from the survey
will be a consistent estimator of the same quantity from year to year, with a
precision determined by the sample design. Similarly, if the (log) utility price
follows equation (3.14) for each household, so does its mean. Hence, for all
practical purposes, the cohort means can be treated as panel data. Indeed the
constant random resampling eliminates the problems caused by attrition in
genuine panels and one can evisage very long "panels" created in this way.
Although the empirical analysis proceeds entirely in terms of cohort means, it
is important to note how essential are the individual household data. First, the
functional forms in the previous section are linear in parameters, not in data, so
that to obtain cohort means, it is necessary to obtain the average of log wages
or (w,~p)'~'`, not the functions of the averages. All such means are straightfor-
wardly obtained from the individual household data. Second, the sample means
are subject to sampling errors and the individual data may be used to provide
estimates of these errors. Since covariances as well as variances can be obtained.
35
M. BROWNING, A. DEATON, AND M. IRISH
TABLE I
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS IN EACH COHORT IN EACH YEAR
Cohon no. 8c
age 1970~1 70~1 71~2 72~3 73~4 76~5 75~6 76~7
Manual
1 18-23 - - 201 244 269 303 3l3
2 24-28 276 257 269 235 266 278 250
3 29-33 204 247 231 239 259 257 247
4 34-38 258 258 267 248 243 259 237
5 39-43 263 282 264 242 219 265 238
6 44-48 266 310 267 254 271 281 254
7 49-53 230 297 268 248 230 216 205
8 54-58 236 240 248 238 209 191 2l4
Nonmanual
1 18-23 - - 79 108 130 168 167
2 24-28 105 147 148 156 I58 l75 163
3 29-33 119 154 l41 I15 148 143 159
4 34-38 122 136 133 137 160 118 137
5 39-43 123 159 156 132 l31 137 116
6 44-48 121 I55 l43 l55 160 134 107
7 49-53 l44 116 I30 128 l04 127 135
8 54-58 90 107 105 Il3 90 104 78
Totais 2557 2865 3050 2992 3046 3156 3020
we are in a uniquely favorable position to implement errors in variables estimators.
In practice, one year cohorts yield samples that are too small to give accurate
estimates of the sample means. Consequently, we use five-year age bands sub-
divided as to whether the head-of-household is a manual or nonmanual worker.
We also limit ourselves to households with heads aged 18-58 in 1970~ 1 who are
then aged 24-64 in 1976~7 so that all are in the normal working span in all of
the surveys. The sample is also selected in other ways. We look only at households
containing married couples, one of which is listed as a head-of-household. We
also eliminate those men who are not employees, who are listed as not in work
last week, or who have wives listed as self-employed. The elimination of the
unemployed is potentially the most serious problem since we are effectively
assuming that the unemployed are a random sample of all participants; we plan
to extend the analysis to do better than this in further work, for example by
treating the unemployed as voluntary nonparticipants. Note that including the
unemployed in the regressions would not be correct, even if the choice of
unemployment is voluntary, since zero hours is a corner solution and must be
handled as such. Our exclusion procedure means that our analysis of business
cycle effects is confined to variations in hours of those who remain in work;
fortunately it is well-known that such variations move parallel with variations in
employment; see Pencavel [42]. Table I gives the age bands for each cohort in
the first year 1970~ 1, together with the number of househólds sampled from each
cohort in each of the seven years. Ideally, since we are sampling from the same
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underlying cohorts through time, we would expect to get the same size samples
from each survey. In practice, this does not happen for a number of reasons.
The cohorts themselves will change somewhat through death, emigration, and
immigration. More importantly our sample selection criteria do not act randomly,
particularly with age. This appears most dramatically for the first two cohorts,
particularly nonmanual workers, where selection on marriage and employment
status excludes a higher proportion of younger workers. Hence the observed
sample sizes increase with age, by about 50 per cent for manual workers and
about 100 per cent for nonmanual workers. Even this understates the problem
since we have excluded the first cohort in the first two years in an attempt to
limit unrepresentativeness. There is also a suggestion of declining sample sizes
in the oldest cohort as it approaches retirement in the last few years. Presumably
this is partly a result of early retirement, though the FES response rate is known
~g- decllne-iÏlg-nptllnjCaj)y ~tj~h ~ge-; c~P.-~P KamclPy~~dT~thrr nr ngt ~e~
sampling effects bias our results will ofcourse depend on the relationship between
the selection criteria on the one hand and labor supplies and commodity demands
on the other.
We note finally that in constructing cohort samples there is a trade-off between
cohort size and the number of cohort means. If we had taken one year cohorts
from Table I, there would have been five times as many "observations" although
each would have had about one fifth the number of observed households. Smaller
cohort size implies less precise sample means so the essential trade off is between
the number of observations and the accuracy of each. If errors-in-variables
estimators are used, it is possible to optimize on this trade off and thus to determine
an optimal cohort size. This turns out to be a substantial research project in its
own right and the results are reported elsewhere; see Deaton [13]. For the rest
of this paper, we shall treat sample cohort means as if they were population
cohort means.
7. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR MALE LABOR SUPPLY AND FOR CONSUMPTION
In this paper, we deal with male labor supply and aggregate consumption only.
Results on female labor supply and on disaggregated commodity demands will
be presented elsewhere, but even the limited task here is complex enough.
Subsection 7.1 is concerned with preliminaries of data construction for the
empirical models. Subsection 7.2 deals with the relationship between male hours
and wages, both under perfect certainty and under uncertainty. Finally, subsection
7.3 is concerned with the joint analysis of consumption and male hours.
7.1. Preliminaries
We begin from the version of (5.13) in which male leisure and consumption
are additively separable from female leisure and in which there is a single
aggregate commodity q. Write the demand and supply equations under certainty
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where i is the individual household, "born" at time c(the cohort identifier) and
observed at time t. The "1" subscript on male hours has been dropped. In theory
B, - 92i by symmetry, and we shall be interested to test this. Note that r; is the
individual's price of lifetime utility discounted to birth and does not have a t
subscript. The first step is to average over all i belonging to c which removes the
i subscript; (7.1) and (7.2) then hold for cohort means. Note that the means
involved are the sample averages of the variables in the equations, not of their
components; i.e., the right hand side variables in (7.1) are the means of the
logarithms of the discounted wage, of the square root of the price-wage ratio,
and so on. To the extent that cohort sample means are error-ridden estimates of
the cohort population means, there will be biases in estimation. In particular, it
should be noted that samples with abnormally high wages will tend to have
abnormally high lifetime utility prices and thus low hours if leisure is normal,
so that if 6, - 0, treating ln r` as time independent will tend to bias downwards
the estimates of ~3, if the model is correct.
The second step is to change to a practical method of discounting. As written
above, w` and p` are discounted back to the beginning of cohort c's life, i.e., to
c, and this date is different for different cohorts. A more convenient procedure
is to write w; - w~S(t, T) where T is some fixed calendar date (we use January
1974), and w; is the current nominal wage. Clearly ln w` - In w; f In S(T, c), and




h; - a„-f~3, In w, f B, w~-~6, ln r`,
~
w`
q; - a,, -~32 ln p, - B, `t~i~ In r`.
P~
Note that p, has no cohort superscript since it is now a common price discounted
to a common date. The quantity r` does not vary with t. However r` must vary
with c since for later cohorts lifetime prices will on average be higher as will real
resources if there is economic growth. One possibility is that r` vanes with c as
r, varies with t, i.e., that r`}' -(1 -}- i~)r`, so that the price of utility increases from
cohort to cohort with prices and with the real interest rate. In this case, r` is
independent of c, and the last terms in (7.3) and (7.4) are absorbed into the
constant. We shall not impose this restriction however; in the implementation of
(7.3) and (7.4) cohort dummies will be included and their significance tested for,
while in the intracohort first-differenced forms all time-invariant cohort specific
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variables are differenced out. Note in particular that fixed date discounting would
lead us to expect no coherent pattern in cohort dummies if the model is true.
In the uncertainty case, we use undiscounted Frisch demands from Section 3.
Taking the labor supply equation to illustrate, we write
(7.5) h; -a„~-~i~ ln w;-I-B~ P~-~ii ln r;
w,
so that, differencing within cohorts and using ( 3.14), we have
(7.6) dh`-da f~3 d In w`~-9 d P` -~i~- i~ i ~ i W~ i~~
~
.~,ti;~h ;~ rtie-first differenze-o~(~~The-corres~onding~qvat.ioufor cnns~~mpiion - -
is the 6rst difference of (7.4), together with the term ~3,~,. Note that the innovation
,~, will generally be correlated with the right-hand side variables to the extent
that these contain unanticipated components. Instrumental variables are therefore
required in this case and natural instruments are available in the shape of
quantities known in period t or earlier. Our empirical procedure is therefore a
straightforward one. Equation (7.3) and (7.4) represent the model under certainty;
their first differences, estimated by instrumental variables, are the appropriate
equivalents under uncertainty.
Finally, we modify the equations to allow for the possible effects of variations
in household size over the life cycle. This is most conveniently done by treating
a„ as a variable to write
(7.7) h~-aafJ3,lnw;fBi w~-~3ilnr'`tYiiai~tYizaz~}Ui~,
~
(7.8) q;-aZ-~3zlnp,- ..,f~3zln r`-~yz~ait}Yzza;,fuz~,
P~
where a;, is the cohort mean number of young children (less than 5 years of age)
and a-, of older children (aged 5-15 in 1970 and 1971 and aged 5-17 from 1972
on). In the experiments in this paper we shall treat a, and a, as if they were
exogenous. This can be objected to on the ground that the timing, spacing, and
numbers of births is jointly endogenous over the life cycle with labor supply.
While acknowledging this in principle, we believe that the feedbacks from labor
supply are likely to be less important for male than for female labor supply. Note
also that we work with cohort means, where the patterns of young and old
children have relatively more to do with human biology and less with economics
than would be the case with individual data. It should also be borne in mind
that one of the most obvious alternative hypotheses to the simple life-cycle theory
of hours is that, in the absence of access to good capital markets, main earners
must work to support their offspring and that they therefore work the longest
hours when their needs are greatest.
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FIGURE 1
The cohort means of hours, discounted wages, prices, price-wage ratios, child-
ren, and age of household head are presented in the Appendix, where precise
definitions are also given. It should be noted that hours are "normal hours", the
definition of which is left to the respondent, while the wage is "normal" income
divided by normal hours. (Annual hours are not available in the FES.) The
division bias introduced by this construction will tend to impart a downward
bias to the hours~wage relationship; this should be offset against the upward
bias that results from the inclusion of some overtime in hours and in earnings.
7.2. Male Laóor Supply
We begin by making the temporary assumption that goods and male labor
supply are additive within periods so that B, - BZ - 0. The resulting relationship
between h and ln w is graphed in Figures 1 and 2 which show hours and discounted
wages against age for manual and nonmanual workers with each cohort shown
separately. As we move from left to right we follow the first cohort as it ages
from about 22.5 years in 1972~3 to 26.5 years in 1976~6. The line then breaks to
the first observation on the second cohort which in 1970~ 1 had an average age
of close to 26 years. This cohort overlaps with the first cohort for two age
observations and we follow them for seven years, breaking off and going back
two years in age to pick up the next (third) cohort, and so on. These figures
show, in rather noisy form, the traditional life-cycle wage~hours relationships,
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FIGURE 2
and conform to the stylized facts found for the U.S. by Ghez and Becker [18]
and by Smith [45], using cross-sectional data. Manual hours peak early in the
life cycle, at age 30-35 and decline fairly steadily thereafter, the total decline
being around 3 hours per week. Discounted wages (we use the consol rate) for
manual workers also peak early (but somewhat later than do hours) at around
35-40; the total decline is about 14 per cent. For nonmanual workers the pattern
is different but there is still a high degree of synchronization between hours and
wages over the life cycle. For these workers, hours rise for a longer period reaching
a peak around age 3S and declining thereafter; their wages do likewise. But these
early life-cycle rises in both hours and wages for nonmanual workers should be
treated with particular caution. Our selection criteria exclude such people as
students until they enter the labor force. Individuals with high lifetime wage rates
will therefore tend to be underrepresented in the earlier years. Even so, the
evidence is apparently consistent with the simplest version of life-cycle labor
supply. The higher hours by manual workers at all points in the cycle in spite of
their lower wages can straightforwardly be ascribed to the domination of income
effects between different life cycles, while, as the theory predicts, substitution
effects dominate within the cycle.
Table II presents somewhat more formal evidence. Regressions 2.1 and 2.6
confirm the simple correlations over the life cycle between hours and wages for
both manual and nonmanual workers. The corresponding (anticipated) inter-
temporal substitution elasticities, evaluated at the means, are 0.1 S and 0.14 respec-
tively, figures close to those calculated by MaCurdy [37] for the U.S. However,
these results are not very robust. For manual workers, the numbers of young and
older children are much more satisfactory predictors of life-cycle labor supply
than is the discounted wage; see Figures 3 and 4 below for the behavior of
children over the life cycle. The introduction of cohort dummies (the c column)
` n MANUAL
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TABLE II
LABOR SUPPLY REGRESSIONS: LEVF.LS
Parame[er Estimates F' ratios
constant In w a~ ai c y RZ d.w.
Manual workers
2.1 -0.08 6.99 - - - - .213 1.03
(1.86)
2.2 59:18 -2.37 2.2} 1.02 - - .701 L96
(1.72) (0.26) (. 0.18)
2.3 88.97 -7.06 0.29 1.34 0.97 - .742 1.99
(2.98) (1.30) (0.50) (7,43)
2.4 20.60 3.57 1.71 0.58 - 7.39' .851 1.74
(3.57) (0.34) (0.29) (6,44)
2.5 80.78 -5.84 0.11 1.35 1.47 7.50` .883 1.74
(5.22) ( L08) (0.50) (7, 37) (6, 37)
Nonmanual workers
2.6 0.98 5.95 - - - - .278 1.31
(1.33)
2.7 20.61 2.96 0.77 0.67 - - .384 1.31
(2.10) (0.41) (0.33)
2.8 47.55 - I . 07 I.79 2.61 2.72` - . 574 1.10
(2.28) (1.17) (0.75) (7,43)
2.9 6.47 5.07 0.82 0.42 - 1.21 .472 1.38
(2.30) (0.42) ( 0.35) (6,44)
2.10 29.09 1.63 1.10 2.54 2.60' 1.26 .646 L27
(2.76) (1.40) (0.80) (7, 37) (6, 37)
NOTES: Standard errors are in brackets beneath parameter estimates. Degrees of freedom beneath F ratios: a star indicates
significance at a 5 per cent level. Observations are weighted by the square root of cohort size.
has little effect except on the coefficient on a, ; not surprisingly, knowledge of a,
essentially identifies the cohort and vice-versa. However, year dummies are of
considerable importance as is to be expected given the clear cyclical effects on
both manual hours and w~tges in Figures 1 and 2. It is clear therefore that the
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intercohort variation in hours over the life cycle is consistent with the variation
in wages, it is much better explained by nonwage variables, such as cohort
dummies or, essentially equivalently, by life-cycle variations in household size.
The picture for nonmanual workers is similar with some variation in detail.
Children and cohorts are somewhat less collinear and business-cycle effects play
no role. Regression 2.8 with cohort dummies but no year dummies effectively
tells the story ; the joint inftuence of numbers of children and pure cohort dummies
leave no significant role for wages in the explanation of hours. For both sets of
workers, additional children, particularly older children, exert a consistently
positive effect on hours. Such a finding is, of course, explicable from a number
of different theoretical viewpoints.
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TABLE III
FOOLED LABOR SUPPLY REGRESSIONS: ALL wORKERS PARAMETER ESTIMATES
Constant In w a~ h'MD
F ratios
c R' d.w.
3.1 3.81 6.39 - - -5.89 - - .812 1.51
(l.tt) (o.al)
3.2 33.3 L67 L53 0.77 -4.15 - - .879 1.61
(1.30) (0.23) (0.17) (0.47)
3.3 41.9 0.265 3.05 2.04 -3.40 2.72` - .901 1.70
(1.27) (0.63) (0.41) (0.48) (7,96)
3.4 10.6 5.17 1.31 0.44 -5.35 - 6.31' .910 1.66
(1.38) (0.21) (0.17) (0.49) (6,97)
3.5 16.5 4.19 1.39 1.47 -4.87 2.41' 4.52` .924 1.67
(L54) (0.77) (0.40) (0.58) (7,90) (6,90)
3.6 -.306 7.29 - - -6.19 6.09' 8.13~` .913 1.58
(1.29) (0.44) (7,92) (6,92)
Table III gives results for pooling manual and nonmanual workers allowing
for a shift-term in the intercept only, shown in the table as NMD and taking the
value 1 for nonmanual workers and 0 otherwise. The covariance analysis does
not reject ttie restriction implied by pooling except, of course, for the highly
significant intercept dummy. These results are rather more favorable for the theory
although the year dummies are still significant; behavior over the business cycle
is not explicable in terms of life-cycle intertemporal substitution. However, in
these pooled regressions, and once year dummies have been allowed for, the
wage rate has a significant role to play in explaining variations in hours (lines
3.4 and 3.5). Once again, numbers of children have a significantly positive effect
on men's hours. Line 3.6 of the table shows the consequence of deleting the child
variables; although the restriction is rejected, the only effect is to increase
somewhat the wage elasticity as well as the added effect for being a manual worker.
Table IV reports the results of estimation in first differences, both by ordinary
least squares and with the wage variable instrumented using variables theoretically
uncorrelated with current innovations. These results are once again not par-
ticularly supportive of the theory.
Using OLS, the wage is only significant when negative, and only older children
and the year dummies retain their previous roles. Indeed, for manual workers
alone (not shown), there is a strong negative relationship within cohorts between
changes in hours and changes in wages; in the pooled sample, the sign remains
but the significance is lost. With instruments, only the year dummies remain
significant, although there is still some evidence of a positive influence for older
children. The major feature of the pooled first diflerences is that there is an
essentially random scatter between changes in hours and changes in discounted
wages. This could arguably be attributed to our sampling procedure for cohorts;
ficst differencing of sample means may generate an adverse signal to noise ratio
(a criticism, interestingly, that is often leveled against household panel data). But
this is not the whole story. Our data as presented in Figures 1 and 2 and in the
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TABLE IV
LA[30R SUPPLY INTRA-COHORT FIRST DIFFERENCE RF:GRESSIONS: ALL wORKERS
OLS Constant d In w da~ daZ NMD y RZ d.w.
4.1 -0.15 -4.13 - - 0.15 - .051 I.68
(O.13) (2.07) (0.20)
4.2 -O.18 -4.37 -0.29 I.58 0.13 - .103 I.80
(O.14) (2.06) (1.33) (0.73) (0.20)
4.3 -0.02 - I.28 -0.24 I.49 0.15 4.05' .281 1.71
(0.25) (2.23) (1.28) (0.70) (0.18) (5,82)
1E
4.4 -O.15 -4.08 - - 0.15 - .032 1.68
(O.I4) (2.80) (0.20)
4.5 -0.18 -4.53 -0.27 I.58 0.13 - .085 1.80
(0.15) (2.81) (1.35) (0.74) (0.20)
4.6 O.13- -- 3.77 ---0.42 1.42 0.18 2.80` .273 1.75
(0.27) (3.80) (1.33) (0.73) (O.19) (5,82)
NOTE: The d In w variable was instrumented using age, agr', and all one-period lagged prices and wagcs.
Appendix are consistent with those of other researchers, and such figures have
typically been cited as evidence in favor of life-cycle theory. However, Table IV
tells us that the figures essentially illustrate a simple positive correlation between
hours and wages across cohorts. As to behavior within cohorts, there is little or
no evidence in favor of the theory. Indeed the positive relationship between
wages and hours over the life cycle stands in contrast to the essentially negative
relationship revealed by year-to-year changes.
7.3. Labor Supply and Commodity Demands
The previous subsection imposed the restriction that goods and male labor
supply are additive within periods; we now relax the assumption. This allows us
to see whether allowing for intratemporal substitution affects the previous negative
conclusions concerning male labor supply and whether the behavior of consump-
tion itself is in accord with the theory. Once again, we start from the results under
certainty reported in Table V. These reveal a number of interesting relationships,
though few would strengthen our beliefs in the life-cycle theory. In interpreting
these results it should be borne in mind that, apart from minor variations in
interview dates, both the consumption price p, and the discount factor are the
same for all cohorts, varying only from year to year. In consequence, regressions
containing ln p, cannot also contain all the year dummies, and regressions that
contain ln w„ .~(p,~ w,) and year dummies are identified only by functional form,
that is essentially not identified.
Looking first at the hours results and comparing with Table III, note that the
term .~(p~w) is not significantly different from zero in either ( 5.1) or (5.2) nor
is there any evidence of the required positive intertemporal elasticity with respect
to wages. The regressions (5.3) and ( 5.4), which contain the year dummies, tell
45
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a different and apparently more attractive story. There is a significant intertem-
poral substitution elasticity of around 0.4 (holding the current period rativ p~w
constant), and there is a significant cross-price effect. By this, in periods when
goods are relatively expensive relative to leisure (i.e., the real wage is low), hours
(leisure) are rela[ively high (low); there is significant (specific) complementarity
between leisure and goods. However, all this is not hard to disbelieve. As before,
the presence of the year dummies absolves the economic variables from explaining
the year to year variations in hours. Furthermore, the equation is close to being
unidentified and the net elasticity with respect to wages, taking together the
effects of In w and J( p~ w) is only 0.007, in conformity with the previous results.
The lower part of Table V gives results for real consumption. Lines 5.5 through
5.7 detail the case where goods and hours are assumed separable. This is the
least interesting model since prices, unlike wages, do not follow any pronounced
life-cycle pattern. Even so price enters with a negative sign that is close to
significance when the child variables are included. Either these or the cohort
variables have a consistently important influence as is to be expected from the
patterns illustrated in Figures 3 to 5. The largest (negative) coefficient ( line 5.6)
on ln p suggests an intertemporal elasticity for consumption of around one-half.
However, note the persistent negative sign on a,. This is not consistent with the
notion that children carry with them certain age-specific needs. More likely is
the alternative explanation, inconsistent with life cycle theory, that current family
income should play some role in determining expenditures; a, is high when male
income is at its peak and a, is high when female income is low or nonexistent
so that their signs are consistent with income being a relevant omitted variable.
Lines 5.8 through 5.10 extend the story. The .~(w~p) variable is highly significant
and has a positive sign, so that, according to the consumption side of the picture,
leisure and goods are substitutes, not complements as is suggested by the hours
results. The introduction of J(w~p) also renders the price term positive and
insignificant. The effect of older children is also negated as we should expect if,
as argued, az is a proxy for male income which, in turn, is not unrelated to (w~p).
Note that while year dummies cannot be included in regressions together with
ln p, it is possible to compare the performance of (n p with a complete set of
dummies. Perhaps surprisingly, the year dummies are never jointly significant in
these regressions and the specialization required to represent all year effects by
the single price term cannot be rejected.
Finally in Table VI, the instrumented first-difference regressions are given for
both hours and consumption. Although there are minor differences as compared
with the levels, the overall pattern is the same. There is no coherent explanation
for hours that works both for life and business cycles. Once year dummies are
allowed however, some positive wage effects re-emerge even once intercohort
variations have been differenced out, while hours again respond positively to the
goods price. Once again, the identification of this equation is dubious. On the
consumption side, the price effects are barely significant, but once again, the
cross-effects operate in an exactly contrary manner to their operation in the hours
equation. This lack of symmetry in both levels and differences is more than an
47
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intellectual curiosum or an unimportant deficiency of the life-cycle story. The
intertemporally additive models used here have quasi-homothetic preferences
within periods so that Gorman [19] perfect price aggregation is possible. Hence
there exists, for each period, a goods~leisure aggregate that has an intertemporal
Frisch elasticity just as do its components, hours and goods. Taking lines 6.2 and
6.5 of Table VI to illustrate the point, the elasticities for hours and for goods are
approximately 0.4 and 1.l respectively. But we cannot talk about rhe intertemporal
elasticity because, without symmetry, no aggregator function exists.
In defense of the theory, one final point should be allowed. If uncertainty is
taken seriously (as it should be) only Table VI contains fully defensible results.
These support our contention that the theory is inadequate, but the standard
errors are inevitably large. Even with an initial data set containing nearly 50,000
observations, there is not sufficient information for a really convincing test.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have developed the theory of life-cycle labor supply and
commodity demands, making particular use of profit functions to represent
intertemporally additive preferences. These profit functions are used as "potential
functions" for the marginal utility compensated demand functions of Heckman
and MaCurdy, here rechristened Frisch demand functions. We show how the
profit and Frisch functions can be used to generate empirically tractable functional
forms under both certainty and uncertainty, and we derive the general representa-
tion theorems for preferences that allow the price of util`ity to be treated as an
additive fixed effect, as suggested originally by MaCurdy.
Our empirical results are based on seven years of the British Family Expenditure
Survey aggregated in such a way as to produce what is effectively panel data on
cohort means. Such data bridge the gap between micro and macro and allow a
simultaneous analysis of year to year changes (the `business' cycle) and of
variations over life cycles. The British data certainly allow us to tell a coherent
story of the life cycle; male wages are closely correlated with male hours and
consumption peaks at the peak of real wages, as it should if leisure and goods
are substitutes. While this broad sketch cannot be challenged, it does not bear
up under closer scrutiny. In particular, the short-run variations in hours are not
determined by the same factors as are long-term life-cycle variations; if the
life-cycle model is correct for hours, it is only so in the long run and workers
are somehow forced ofI their supply curves in the short run (for example, in an
implicit contracts story; see Abowd and Card [1]). Secondly, the behavior of
hours suggests that hours and goods are subsritutes; this is inconsistent with the
consumption story. Thirdly, the estimated consumption functions strongly suggest
at least a partial role for household income; the presence of young children is
associated with low not high consumption, and indeed the estimated complemen-
tarity of goods and hours is also attributable to alternative explanation in which
income plays a role. These results seem to us to be consistent with an emerging
consensus based on U.S. data from a wide variety of sources. MaCurdy [37],
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using the data from the Michigan panel study on income dynamics (PSID), comes
to different conclusions, but our reading of his results suggests only rather weak
evidence in favor of the model. Altonji's [3] study is based on the same data,
and is a careful attempt to control for the undoubted presence of major errors
of ineasurement. He finds (at best) small substitution elasticities with relatively
wide confidence intervals. Ham [26], like us, finds significant evidence of labor
market constraints. As Ashenfelter [5] points out, the "raw" data in the PSID is
inconsistent with the model; regressions of changes in hours on changes in wages
give persistently negative slopes (see also Ashenfelter and Ham [4]), while the
ratios of inean change in hours to mean change in wages vary widely from year
to year, and are as often negative as positive. Of caurse, sophisticated econometric
methodology can "improve" these results, but the confirmation of the hypothesis
is hardly transparent in the data. Aggregate time series tests fare no better; see
Altonji [2], Hansen and Singleton [27], and Mankiw, Rotemberg, and Summers
[39]; typically, estimated intertemporal elasticities have the "wrong" sign. Finally,
and perhaps most convincing, are the experimental results from SIME~DIME
negative income tax experiments quoted in Ashenfelter [5, Table 7]. Households
"treated" with artificial guarantees and tax rates reduced their hours relative to
controls, and those enrolled in the five-year program did so by more than those
enrolled in the three-year program. This is consistent with the existence of
life-cycle income effects as predicted by the theory. However, in both three and
five year programs, there is no continuing evidence of hours reduction beyond
the end of the treatment, contradicting the income effects explanation. It is far
from clear what theory would explain this evidence, but it is certainly not the
standard life-cycle one. All in all, we believe that these studies, together with the
evidence of this paper from Britain, cast a great deal of doubt on the simple
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APPENDIX
THE DATA
The tables below present the cohort averages for each variable for manual and then for nonmanual
men.
Definitions
hi: Normal weekly hours, FES code A220.
w~: Normal net weekly wage~salary divided by normal weekly hours all multiplied by the discount
factor, S.
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S: The inverse of Ihe product of monthly yields on consols, i.e.,
~-I l t
S,- r[ (Itr;~12) 1 -
where r, is the annual yields on consols in month i.
at: Number of children aged under S in households, codes A040 and A4041.
aZ: Number of children aged 5-17 (to 1972, 5-IS from 1973), code A042.
age: Age of head of household, code AOOS.
APPENDIX TABLE [
MANUAL MALES
Average weekly hours Teble AI
Year~Cohort I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70-I - 46.4 47.0 46.9 46.5 46.7 46.0 44.9
71-2 - 46.3 45.8 46.4 45.1 45.0 43.9 43.9
72-3 45.8 46.0 47.0 45.9 45.0 44.6 44.8 44.6
73-4 45.9 46.2 45.8 46.4 45.2 45.0 44.6 43.7
74-5 46.0 47.5 47.5 46.3 46.7 45.0 44.8 44.4
75-6 45.6 46.9 46.2 44.9 45.4 44.0 44.0 42.9
76-7 45.4 46.2 46.1 45.4 44.9 44.9 43.8 43.3
Average In (discounted wagesl Table A2
Year~Cohort I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70-I - 6.46 6.49 6.51 6.48 6.47 6.41 6.37
71-2 - 6.47 6.51 6.51 6.51 6.46 6.43 6.38
72-3 6.47 6.54 6.57 6.56 6.SS 6.50 6.47 6.38
73-4 6.51 6.55 6.58 6.58 6.55 6.52 6.47 6.43
74-5 6.55 6.57 6.60 6.61 6.56 6.50 6.48 6.41
75-6 6.56 6.64 6.66 6.66 6.59 6.57 6.50 6.46
76-7 6.SS 6.62 6.61 6.61 6.56 6.53 6.50 6.42
Average numbers o( small children Table A3
Year~Cohort I 2 J 4 5 b 7 B
70- I - .99 .87 .SO .33 .l S .07 02
71-2 - 1.00 81 .48 .23 . I 4 .07 02
72-3 .8S .99 .74 .37 .27 .07 .04 .O1
73-4 .88 .9S .57 .38 .19 .07 .04 .02
74-5 .89 . 8S .S1 .24 .11 .07 .03 .00
75 -6 .79 .74 .45 .17 .O8 .07 .03 .O l
76-7 .85 .64 .28 .1S .OS .OS .02 .00
Year~Cohort
Average numbers of older children Table .44
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70-1 - .32 1.07 1.83 1.65 LO8 .6S '8
71-2 - .49 1.22 1.85 1.61 1.05 S6 .19
72-3 .O8 .62 1.46 1.81 I .SO .92 .S4 .17
73-4 .10 .79 1.54 2.17 I.S2 1.03 .53 .20
74-5 .22 .88 1.56 2.01 1.41 .78 .34 .16
75-6 ?S 1.17 1.81 1.90 1.36 .79 .32 .?1
76-7 .38 1.28 1.89 2.00 I.II .61 .29 .14
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Average age Table AS
Year~Cohort I 2 3 4 5 6 7 6
70-I - 26.0 31.0 36.1 40.9 45.9 50.8 56.1
71-2 - 27.0 32.0 36.9 41.9 47.1 51.7 57.0
72-3 23.3 28.0 33.1 37.9 43.0 48.2 52.6 58.0
73-4 24.2 29.0 34.0 38.8 43.9 49.1 53.7 59.1
74-5 24.9 30.1 35.1 40.0 45.0 50.0 54.9 59.9
75-6 25.8 30.9 36.0 41.0 45.8 51.0 55.9 61.1
76-7 26.6 32.0 37.0 41.9 47.0 51.7 56.6 61.9
Average Real Ezpenditure Table Ab
Year~Cohort I 2 J 4 5 6 7 B
70-I - 37.9 40.6 42.1 45.8 51.4 49.9 43.1
71-2 - 38.1 43.0 46.6 47.7 50.2 49.7 42.4
72-3 39.1 40.9 44.0 47.1 51.1 54.8 55.0 45.7
73-4 41.3 44.8 47.8 51.0 56.5 55.7 54.4 43.5
74-5 43.5 44.3 47.0 54.4 57.6 54.2 52.2 43.2
75-6 38.9 44.7 48.4 53.8 53.8 54.6 47.9 41.8
76-7 39.7 44.7 46.9 58.1 54.8 52.3 48.0 37.4
Year~Cohort I
Average ( Price~Wage)~~' Table A7
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70-1 - 1.28 1.26 1.25 1.26 1.27 1.31 1.34
71-2 - 1.26 1.24 1.25 1.24 1.28 1.29 1.33
72-3 I.26 1.21 l.20 1.20 1.20 I.22 1.25 1.3 I
73-4 1.23 l.20 I.18 1.19 I.20 l.22 l.26 I.28
74- 5 1.22 1.2 I 1.19 1. I 8 1.21 1.2 5 1.26 1.3 I
75-6 I.25 1.21 l. I 9 I.20 1.24 1.25 1.29 I.32




Average weekly hours Table Ag
3 d 5 6 7 g
70- l - 41.0 41.8 42.2 43.0 41.3 42.3 42.8
71-2 - 40.3 42.1 42.2 42.4 41.3 42.1 41.0
72-3 40.2 41.4 43.1 41.7 43.2 41.9 41.7 42.1
73-4 39.7 42.4 42.2 41.9 41.9 42.3 42.4 40.9
74-5 40.2 42.1 42.8 42.5 42.7 42.3 39.9 39.3
75-6 39.4 42.0 42.3 42.0 41.7 41.1 41.7 40.4
76-7 41.8 42.7 44.3 41.4 41.0 41.8 40.8 38.1
YeadCohort I
Average In discounted wages
3 d 5 6
Table A9
7 3
70-1 - 6.58 6.84 6.86 6.89 6.87 6.81 6.74
71-2 - 6.73 6.81 6.96 6.88 6.95 6.86 6.90
72-3 6.60 6.75 6.86 6.97 6.91 6.88 6.84 6.72
73-4 6.62 6.83 6.90 6.98 6.94 6.93 6.90 6.83
74-5 6.67 6.86 6.90 6.91 6.98 6.87 6.83 6.80
75-6 6.73 6.89 7.00 6.98 6.97 6.87 6.79 6.76
76-7 6.73 6.86 6.90 6.93 6.90 6.85 6.76 6.73
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Year~Cohort I
Average numbers o( small children
2 } 4 5 6
Table AIO
7 8
70- l - .61 .87 .75 .28 .14 .03 .06
71-2 - .73 .79 .39 .2l .08 .03 .01
7 2- 3 .29 .69 .76 .29 .13 .07 .0 I .00
73-4 .37 .8 l .77 .3 5 . l7 .05 .02 .02
74- 5 .5 2 .71 .69 .25 .13 .04 .O 1 .0 l
7 5-6 .60 .85 .58 .23 .07 .01 .02 .03
76-7 .53 .57 .32 . I 3 .06 .04 .00 .00
Average numbers of older children Table AI 1
Year~Cohon I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70- l - .13 .51 1.38 1.58 .93 .53 .30
71-2 - .10 .68 1.58 I .51 .95 .37 .07
72-3 .0 I .24 .93 I .58 I .54 I .02 .37 .18
73-4 .04 .35 1.16 1.80 1.46 1.03 .38 .19
74-5 . I 8 .53 I. ( 5 1.98 1.60 .93 .40 .14
a5-(I- - :i-2 - ~~ cl 1--75 L.4~ -fiZ ,35- ,13-
76-7 .13 .88 1.60 1.88 l .23 .63 .28 .06
Average age Table A12
Year~Cohon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70-1 - 26.2 30.9 36.2 41.2 46.2 50.8 56.0
71-2 - 26.9 31.9 36.8 42.0 47.1 51.7 56.9
72-3 23.6 28.1 33.0 38.0 43.0 47.8 52.5 57.8
73-4 24.5 29.0 33.9 39.0 44.0 49.0 53.7 58.6
74-5 25.3 30.0 35.0 39.9 45.1 SO.I 54.9 59.7
75-6 26.2 30.9 36.3 41.1 45.8 51.1 55.6 60.8
76-7 27.0 32.0 36.9 42.1 47.0 52.1 56.7 61.9
Average Real Ezpenditure Table A13
Year~Cohort I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70- I - 41.4 50.2 51.3 59.0 61.2 64.9 62.9
71-2 - 43.9 49.6 59.6 64.2 62.6 71.1 6 L 1
72-3 51.7 49.5 57.1 60.4 71.5 66.1 64.5 64.9
73-4 45.2 54.6 63.5 60.8 64.1 69.2 66.4 58.2
74-5 45.4 53.5 56.8 62.0 76.2 69.5 63.9 61.6
75-6 46.1 50.2 57.1 6L5 70.8 63.5 62.4 54.9
76-7 46.4 56.1 60.4 60.8 66.7 61.2 55.3 57.1
Average (Price~Wage)~~2 Table At4
Year~Cohon 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
70- l - l. l6 I.06 1.05 1.04 1.OS 1.09 1.12
71-2 - 1.11 1.08 1.00 1.04 I.OI 1.06 1.04
72-3 1.17 1.09 1.04 0.99 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.13
73-4 1.16 I.OS 1.03 0.98 I.00 1.02 1.03 1.06
74-5 1.15 I.OS 1.03 1.03 0.99 1.05 1.08 1.09
7 5- 6 1. I 3 1.07 I.02 l.02 1.04 1.09 1.13 l. l 5
76-7 I.16 1.09 1.07 I.06 I.07 1.11 1. l 5 1.17
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CHAPTER 3
EATING, DRINKING, SMOHING AND
TESTING THE LIFE-CYCLEHYPOTHESIS
reprinted from the Quarterly Journal of Economics,
102(2), 1987,pp. 329-345.
EATING, DRINKING, SMOKING, AND TESTING
THE LIFECYCLE HYPOTHESIS'
MARTIN BROWNING
This paper presents some evidence on expenditure patterns over the lifecycle
that has a direct bearing on the question of whether households are significantly
credit constrained. Our particular test looks at the consumption of food, alcoholic
beverages, and tobacco to see whether the consumption of the latter two "goods"
falls as couples have children. The latter usually involves a decrease in household
current income and an increase in needs. If households are not credit constrained,
they should maintain their consumption of alcoholic beverages and tobacco. We find
no significant decrease in the consumption of these goods.
I. INTRODUCTION
The most important implication of the lifecycle hypothesis is
that the time path of consumption for an individual agent is
independent of the time-path of income, subject only to the lifetime
budget constraint that the latter imposes. The most widely held
caveat to this implication stresses the imperfection of capital
markets; many imperfections do lead to a direct link between the
time paths of income and consumption (see Hayashi [1985J for a
survey). This paper presents some evidence on expenditure pat-
terns over the lifecycle that has a direct bearing on this issue.
Consider the case of two young couples, one with children and
one without. Typically the former couple will have lower current
income if one partner has to drop out of the labor force to look after
the children. The couple with children will also have higher "fixed"
costs; children have specific needs for a variety ofgoods that have to
be met. Typically, then, couples with children have lower current
supernumerary income than couples without children.
As noted above, one implication of the lifecycle hypothesis is
that there is no direct link between current expenditure and current
supernumerary income (as long as consumption and leisure are
`This paper was presented at the Econometric Society World Congress in
Boston and at seminars at McMaster and Guelph Universities. I am grateful to
participants in these seminars for comments. I would also like to thank Angus
Deaton, two anonymous referees, and Professor Blanchard for their cemments. This
paper utilizes United Kingdom Family Expenditure Survey data made available by
the SSRC Data Archive to the SSRC-supported project "The Economics and
Econometrics of Consumer Behaviour" (grant No. HR ï637). This research was
supported in part by Canadian SSHRC grant No. 418504ï6.
O 1987 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
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separable). Under this hypothesis couples with children will main-
tain their consumption of such adult-only goods as alcoholic bever-
ages and tobacco; if necessary, they will run down savings or borrow
to achieve this. In contrast, alternative hypotheses that stress the
imperfection of capital markets predict that the consumption of
such goods will fall. In this paper we examine the consumption over
time of food, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco by some representa-
tive households in the United Kingdom. These data allow us to test
whether the consumption of alcoholic beverages and tobacco
changes as family composition changes.
In Section II we lay out the theoretical underpinnings of the
lifecycle hypothesis as we shall use it. This is then used to derive a
demand system for the consumption of food, alcoholic beverages,
and tobacco. Together these categories account for about one third
of total expenditure; restriction to these three goods is dictated by
our data.
Section III introduces demographic variables. There has been a
good deal of work on the question of the effect of such variables on
consumption (see Blundell and Walker [1984] for some recent
results and references). Without exception these studies condition
on total within-period expenditure. By contrast, we formulate here
an "intertemporal demand system." This does not have expendi-
ture on the right-hand side, so that we cannot compute conven-
tional expenditure elasticities, but it does allow us to derive
estimates of genuine "full" price and demographic elasticities.
These elasticities take account of intertemporal as well as intratem-
poral substitution.
We would like to estimate our system on panel data with good
consumption data. Unfortunately, these do not exist. We do have,
however, a continuous survey of family expenditure in the United
Kingdom, and we use this to construct synthetic cohorts that we
follow through seven years (1970-1971 to 1976-1977). Section IV
outlines the method used (it derives from Browning, Deaton, and
Irish [1985]) and takes an informal look at the data so constructed.
Although these data are noisy, they have some pronounced regulari-
ties.
In Section V we estimate the system of demand functions
derived in sections II and III. The theory gives us some testable
restrictions which the data do not reject. Our principal finding is
that our data do not reject the implications of the lifecycle model
which assumes perfect capital markets and rational expectations.
60
EATING, DRINKINC, SMOKINC
We do, however, have some reservations about our conclusions;
these are laid out in Section VI.
II. THE CONSUMPTION OF INDIVIDUAL GOODS
OVER THE LIFECYCLE
In this section we investigate the theoretical aspects of the
consumption of individual goods over the lifecycle. We shall main-
tain throughout the hypothesis that preferences can be represented
by an intertemporally additive utility function and begin our
analysis by assuming perfect foresight and perfect capital markets.
C~nsequently, we have a single lifetime budget constraint; let a be
the Lagrange multiplier associated with it. We then have the
first-order conditions for each period t:
(1) Ui (9`) - ~Pi, i - 1, 2, . . . , n,
- - - - -yy~}g~~.l ic tha nnrinrl ~~y~i-~n~ilOA~~-15-~3 YeCtQr-O~
quantities of goods in period t, p; is the discounted price of good i,
and the i subscript on u`(.) denotes a partial derivative. If we now
assume that u`( .) is strictly concave, we can invert the n equations in
(1) to derive "constant marginal utility of money" or Frisch demand
functions of the form,
(2) q` - f ` (P`, ~),
where p` is a vector of discounted prices.
The advantage of using Frisch demand functions to explore
lifecycle behavior is that we can characterize behavior in period t by
reference only to within-period variables and ~, which is a sufficient
statistic for all extra-period information. In this, of course, ~ is no
different from the utility level or expenditure in period t; in fact,
with a strictly concave subutility function and given prices, these
stand in a one-one relationship to each other. Expenditures or
utility levels will, however, typically vary from period to period,
whereas the variable ~ is constant. Thus, we can often treat the
marginal utility of expenditure as a fixed effect in econometric
work. This insight stems originally from Heckman [1974] and has
been widely exploited since.
Treating the marginal utility of expenditure as a fixed effect
will be particularly useful if we take a functional form for prefer-
ences that has demands as an additive function of ~. In this case we
can "difference ~ away." The class of preferences that allow such
Frisch demands is characterized in Browning, D~aton, and Irish
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[1985]. From that class we choose the parameterization,l
(3) Qih - aih f Ni ln Pi f~i ln Í`h f Qih, 1- 1, 2, ..., 1L.
In this parameterization the h subscript refers to household h. The t
superscript on the first term on the right-hand side of (3) will allow
us to take account of the demographic composition of the house-
hold; we discuss this in the next section. The final term in (3) is a
conventional white noise error term, assumed uncorrelated with the
other right-hand side variables.
The Frisch demand system given in (3) is rather unusual in
that it does not have total expenditure on the right-hand side.z
Thus, there are no "adding-up" restrictions. There is a homogeneity
restriction (the coefficients on In p; and ln ~ should be equal), but
we cannot test it, since ~ is unobservable. Attfield and Browning
[1985] show how we can use this homogeneity restriction to
estimate a Frisch demand system, despite the presence of the latent
variable ~. In this paper we follow a more conventional route.
If we drop the assumption of perfect foresight and assume
expected utility maximization with an intertemporally additive
V- N utility function, then ~ is no longer constant from period to
period. Instead the evolution of ~~, the marginal utility of
discounted expenditure, satisfies the following Euler condition:
(4) E~ {~~t,~a~ i - 1,
where E~( -) is the expectations operator conditional on the informa-
1. An earlier version of this paper included (n - 1) relative price terms (p,`~p;)'n
in each equation in (3). These terms allow for complementarity or substitutability.
between food, alcohol, and tobacco. These variables turned out to be jointly
insignificant in the empirical work; for the sake of expositional parsimony, we
present only the restricted system (that is, (3)). This restriction is equivalent to
assuming that intratemporal preferences are strongly separable (that is, v(.) is
additive).
2. To see the relationship between Frisch (constant ~) and Hicksian (constant
utility u) price effects, consider the Hicksian demand function,
9~ s ~ (P, u (P, ~)),
where the level of utility in any period is given explicitly as a function of prices and
the marginal utility of expenditure. Taking the partial with respect to p;, we have
a9~ a9~




The first term on the ríght-hand side of this equation gives the conventional




tion available at time t. We shall approximate (4) by
(5) ln ~tti - In ~t f et,i,
where Et (Ettl )- 0 incorporates our (rational expectations) assump-
tion that agents use all current information efficiently (see Hall
[1978]).
If we now take first differences through (3) and use (5), we have
the differenced-demand Frisch system:
(6) OQih - DIXih }~i 0 ln pi ~- ~eih } Ni Eht r
where Eht is uncorrelated with any of the anticipated components of
the other right-hand side variables. For the system given in (6) we
have only one set of theoretical restrictions: the intertemporal own
price effect for each good (that is, ,Q; ) should be nonpositive.
- -IIí:DElvtoeRnPHtc~F~ECTS~IV-DE~~ir - - - ---
~VER THE LIFECYCLE
The last section outlined how we might model the demand for
individual goods over time. Looking at (3) again, we see that if real
interest rates are positive (so that discounted prices are falling),
then we would expect to observe that the demand for any good rises
over time if Q; is negative. For individual households, however, the
composition of the household also changes over time. These
changes may induce rather different time paths for demands.
Our empirical work will be concerned with only three "goods,"
namely, food, alcoholic beverages, and tobacco. Formally, we
assume that each of these three goods is additively separable from
all other private goods, leisure, and public goods. We shall also
restrict our attention to households consisting of a married couple
for which the only demographic changes are the numbers of young
children, older children, and adult children. These are defined as
children aged less than five, between five and seventeen, and over
seventeen, respectively.
Changes in the composition of a household change demand
functions in two ways. First, there is a direct or "needs" effect.
Children increase the demand for things like food, toys, and other
goods in an obvious way. We assume that non-adult children have
no direct "needs" for alcohol or tobacco. A less direct route is that
suggested by Barten [1964]. Changes in demographics induce effec-
tive changes in relative prices. A classic illustration is that parents
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with young children must pay more to consume ice cream, since the
"price" includes the cost of giving their children ice cream as well.
We can now consider informally the possible changes in the
demands for the three goods that we have chosen to look at,
consequent on changes in our demographic variables.
Looking at food, we see that any increase in any demographic
variable increases the needs component, although economies of
scale in food preparation may reduce the actual effect of this. An
increase in the number of children is also likely to raise the
perceived price of food. This will be particularly so for older
children who are likely to eat much the same foods as their parents,
if on a somewhat reduced scale. This effective increase in the price
of food results in a substitution effect away from food. Thus, the net
result of the needs and Barten effects is ambiguous. We can see,
however, that if the substitution elasticity of food is low, then the
needs effect will dominate.
If we assume that non-adult children have no "needs" for
alcohol or tobacco, then changes in demographic structure can
affect the consumption of these goods only via Barten effects.
Alcohol can be consumed inside the home or outside (in restaurants
and pubs). If the latter is chosen, then the price of "going out" is
increased by the price of a babysitter. We note, however, that
baby-sitting services are a public good as far as the parents are
concerned; that is, a sitter can look after three children as well as
one. This suggests that it is the presence of a child that is important
and not the numbers. These consíderations suggest that alcohol
consumption may fall on the arrival of the first child but not
thereafter. There do not seem to be any demographic effects for
tobacco.
The predictions of the lifecycle hypothesis with perfect capital
markets on the effect of more children on drinking and smoking
stand in sharp contrast to those of more informal alternative
hypotheses. Consider a young couple with a new-born baby. We
could plausibly suggest that current income has fallen (as one
partner drops out of the labor force) and desired current expendi-
ture has risen due to the specific needs of the baby. The lifecycle
hypothesis with the supplementary assumption of perfect capital
markets predicts that the household will realize its plans by
borrowing against future earnings or by running down savings.
Hence the household can maintain its consumption of, among other
things, alcohol and tobacco. However, if the household cannot
borrow to finance current consumption, then current expenditure
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will be constrained by current income. Under these circumstances
we might expect to see a fall in the consumption of goods like
alcohol and tobacco which have no specific "child-needs" compo-
nent. This dichotomy between the predictions provides us with an
opportunity to test the lifecycle hypothesis.
There are, however, two caveats to this. First, people may
change their preferences during the pre-natal period or as children
are growing up. In particular, the consumption of tobacco and
alcohol may fall either from health considerations or from desire to
set a good example. In this case households that were not credit
constrained would behave as though they were credit constrained,
at least as far as the consumption of alcohol and tobacco is
concerned. Taking the perfect capital markets case as our null
hypothesis increases the power of our test. The second reservation
we must admit is that the timing of births is (to a certain extent) a
~heic~-v~riable. T-h~, ~~~ á~~z,~o~~i: :ás~ha~are ~ed~t ~onst~aineff rna3~
postpone having children until any credit constraint is ineffective.
This reduces the effective significance level of our test.
The discussion in this section does not give many predictions.
Indeed, about all we can say is that the consumption of tobacco
(certainly) and the consumption of alcoholic beverages (probably)
will be independent of the presence of non-adult children. It is these
"predictions" of the pure lifecycle model that we shall be interested
in testing. To do this, we shall let ~a~h in (6) be given by
a
7 ~ ~ ~( ) DIXh - ~i0 f ~ik ~akh r
where
k-1
aiti - number of children aged less than five,
a~, - number of children aged between five and seventeen,
aá,, - number of adult males (excluding the husband),
and a;h ~ number of adult females (excluding the wife)
in household h at time t. In these terms our predictions are
k~l -~;2 ~ 0 for i- alcoholic beverages and tobacco.
Equations (6) and (7) together lead to a model in which all
changes in demands are attributable solely to (discounted) price
changes and demographic changes. We do not allow any indepen-
dent age effects beyond the trend in (3) implicit in the constant in
(7), nor do we employ time dummies. The reason for the latter
exclusion is that prices within each year are the same across all
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households so that a system with time dummies would not be
identified. Age effects were not included, since our principal inter-
est is the effect of demographic changes on our three categories and
age and demographic composition are highly collinear.
IV. AN INFORMAL LOOK AT SOME LT.K. LiATA
The last two sections presented a framework for thinking
about the lifecycle consumption of specific commodities and also
indicated that the theory is rather deficient in specific predictions,
even when we make strong assumptions. In this and the next section
we examine some U.K. data to see whether we cannót answer more
specifically such questions as what happens to the consumption of
alcoholic beverages over the "lifetime" of a household.
The data we use are taken from the U.K. Family Expenditure
Surveys ( FES) for the tax years 1970~1971 to 1976~1977. From these
surveys we first select households that are headed by a married
couple who currently live together. Then we select households
where the head of household ( always the male in this survey) is
working outside the home. This latter is to allow us to determine
whether the head of the household is a manual or nonmanual
worker; previous work suggested that there are significant unmea-
sured permanent differences between these groups. In all that
follows, we refer to households headed by a manual (nonmanual)
worker as a manual ( respectively, nonmanual) household. We treat
occupation as an exogenous variable.
We construct a cohort by taking means of all of the households
with head aged t to (t ~- s) sampled in 1970~1971, aged (t f 1) to
(t f s f 1) in 1971~1972 and so on. For the first manual and
nonmanual cohort, we took a six-year band ( i.e., s- 5); for each of
the others, we took five-year bands. Thus, each cohort has a number
(cohort 1 is the youngest) and an occupation. We note in passing
that if we had taken age bands of 39 years width (that is, one cohort
per year), then we would have had conventional ( if rather short)
aggregate time series.
We have data for seven years on eight age bands and two
occupational groups. We shall treat the sample mean of any
variable in any year for each of these sixteen cohorts as though it is
an observation on a particular household. Thus, we can follow
sixteen "synthetic households" through seven years. The graphs of
demographic variables against age (not presented here) show an
unsurprising pattern: children are born, grow older, and finally
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begin to leave home. About the only things we have to remark on
our data on demographic variables is that nonmanual households
appear to start their families later and that there are more adult
male children than adult female children in older households.
Figures I to III give the lífetime consumption patterns of food,
alcohol and tobacco, respectively. Each figure also has an inset
displaying the path of discounted prices over the period 1970-1971
to 1976-1977. The interest rate used to discount prices is the yield
on 90-day Treasury bonds; the prices are the implicit price deflators
for the three goods. As can be seen, each of the three figures consists
of sixteen connected graphs. Each of these connected graphs tracks
the mean of the consumption of the particular good for one
synthetic cohort over seven years.
Our theory predicts that, ceteris paribus, the pattern of any of
the sixteen connected graphs should mirror the pattern of dis-
counted prices given in the inset in the sense that if, as for food, the
discounted price is risíng, then we would expect all the connected
graphs to be downward sloping. Lifecycle patterns may, however,
mask this. Suppose, for the sake of illustration, that we had only
three cohorts and that our theory is applicable. For a good with a
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FIGURE I
Food Consumption Over the Lifecycle
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FIGURE II
Alcoholic Beverage Consumption Over the Lifecycle
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FIGURE III
Tobacco Consumption Over the Lifecycle
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IVa. However, if there is also a lifecycle pattern as shown in Figure
IVb, then the net effect is as shown in IVc.
In Figure I, the path of the consumption of food, two things are
immediately observable. First, the patterns for manual and non-
manual households are very similar. Since manual cohorts are
poorer in lifetime terms than nonmanual cohorts, this suggests that
the elasticity of food consumption with respect to lifetime wealth is
small. Our estimates based on (6) and (7) "difference away" any
such permanent intercohort differences. However, undifferenced
estimates of our system (not presented here) indicate that nonman-
ual cohorts consume about 13 percent more than comparable
manual cohorts. If lifetime wealth for nonmanual cohorts is about
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Browning, Deaton, and Irish [1985]), this gives a lifetime wealth
elasticity of about 0.25. This estimate is not at variance with earlier
estimates; for example, Hall and Mishkin [1982] find a"marginal
propensity to consume lifetime income on food" of 0.11.
Second, there is a pronounced plateau at about ages 42 to 54
with a steady rise of about 60 percent from age 22 and a steeper fall
to age 62. The obvious explanation for this intercohort pattern is
that the positive needs of children for food outweigh the negative
Barten effects. Notice, as well, that correcting for any year-to-year
change due to the steadily rising discounted price would rotate each
connected segment counterclockwise which is consistent with the
lifecycle pattern. Thus, this figure does not reveal any conflict
between the intercohort and the intracohort patterns.
Looking at Figure II, for alcohol, we see first that there is some
indication that manual households consume more alcohol than
nonmanual households. This suggests either that alcohol is an
inferior good in lifetime terms or that preferences are different as
between the two groups. The second thing we note about Figure II is
that consumption rises from age 42 to about age 53. This is
consistent with a number of hypotheses. One would be that alcohol
is indeed an inferior good in lifetime terms and older cohorts are
poorer. A second explanation is the Barten-type effect given in the
previous section; by about age 40 people no longer need to hire
baby-sitters. Another explanation would be that younger cohorts
are credit constrained and cannot realize their desired consumption
of alcohol at the younger ages. None of these, however, can explain
the fall later in life. The final explanation is that the older cohorts
have adult children, and it is these who are increasing consumption.
Note, also, that the discounted price pattern would lead us to
predict an inverted-U shape for each connected segment.
The third observation we make on Figure II is that it looks like
younger cohorts drink more than older cohorts in the sense that
each connected graph ends at a higher level than the next connected
graph. As an example, it can be seen that a manual household aged
22 at the beginning of the sample consumes about 60 percent more
alcoholic beverage at age 26 than does a manual household aged 26
at the beginning of the sample at the same age (compare the end of
the first manual connected graph with the beginning of the second
manual connected graph). Undifferenced estimates of our system
reveal that these differences are significant even when we allow for
the increase in consumption over time attributable to the fall over
time of the discounted price of alcoholic beverages.
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Figure III gives the lifecycle pattern of the consumption of
tobacco. We see immediately that manual households consume
much more tobacco than nonmanual households. For both groups
consumption rises steadily from age 22 through 50 and fall thereaf-
ter. Without invoking strong cross substitution or complementarity
effects, it is difficult to reconcile the rise earlier in the lifecycle with
our theory. The lifecycle pattern within each occupation is, how-
ever, partially consistent with strong habit formation. With strong
habit formation the "user cost" of establishing a habit falls with
expected remaining life span. In such a model more and more
agents in a particular cohort would, ceteris paribus, initiate the
habit as time went on.
Before turning to a more formal analysis of our data, we must
issue a critical warning. It is well-known that the FES underreports
the consumption of alcohol and tobacco significantly (see Kemsley,
Redpath, and Holmes [1980]). In all of our work we shall ignore this
systematic error in our dependent variable. If the errors in reporting
ara ~~nrorrelatad-wit}~any~f our-indep~xi~~ariables,-then ihay--
will not cause any bias, although they will affect the standard errors
of our parameter estimates. However, if the underreporting is
correlated with, for example, the number of children, then our
estimates will be inconsistent. In this respect, we note that the
underreporting seems to be mainly due to the sample design; as it
happens, groups known to contain a high proportion of heavy
drinkers and smokers are not surveyed.
V. THE ESTIMATES OF OUR SYSTEM
In this section we present our estimates of (6) and (7); that is,
(8)
4
t t a C t
09~n - ~~o } ~ik Dakh } F~ ~ O ln P~ f u~h z- 1, 2~ 3,
k-i
where u~, is the composite error term from (6). In our estimation
procedure we shall assume that
E(u~h) - 0
and
E(u~,u;h.) - 0 for t ~ t' or h ~ h'
- a;; otherwise.
Thus, we rule out any correlation over time or between households.
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This latter is likely to be a poor assumption if the variance of ~3;Eti is
large relative to the variance of e;,, and some ofthe shocks implicit in
E,,~ are common across households. We have found it impossible,
however, to allow for common shocks. To see the problem, note that
we can break Eh~ into a common-across-cohorts component and a
cohort-specific component. The former component effectively adds
a time dummy to each equation; as we have already seen, this leaves
the system underidentified if we have a common price in each
equation. Thus, our assumptions on the covariance structure of u;h
are to be seen as identifying assumptions. Note, however, that we do
not assume that the errors are independent across goods.
We assume that the composite error term in (8) is uncorrelated
with any of the right-hand side variables. This is largely for want of
any reasonable instruments. This requires that any shocks in these
variables do not lead to revisions in the marginal utility of wealth
(although there may be revisions due to income shocks or other
surprises). For children already born there are no significant demo-
graphic surprises so the assumption is innocuous for Da~, to Da4h. Of
more concern is the assumption that there are no surprises in Dalh
or the own real rates. For the latter we might assume that any
surprises are transitory and do not have much effect on the
perceived marginal utility of wealth. For the number of young
children we cannot, of course, assume that any surprise is transí-
tory. Effectively, then, we must here assume that desired family
composition is predetermined and that family planning is 100
percent effective.
Table I presents the estimates for (8). Table II gives the
elasticities and increases in consumption implied by the parameter
estimates given in Table I.
The own-price elasticities are all significantly negative. Look-
ing at the other elements of the food equation, we see that older
children and adults significantly increase the consumption of food,
but young children have no significant effect. Although there is
some indication that adult females increase consumption by more
than adult males, the estimates for the two are not significantly
different. These results suggest that an extra adult male and adult
female double food consumption, as compared with a household
with just two adults. Two extra older children, on the other hand,
only increase consumption by about 50 percent.
Turning now to the other two equations, we recall that predic-
tions about the effect of young children on the consumption of
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sis and our (admittedly rather informally framed) alternative. Our
results indicate that children do not significantly reduce the con-
sumption of alcohol or tobacco. This is, of course, what the lifecycle
hypothesis with perfect capital markets predicts, but it is at
variance with the alternative hypothesis that links current expendi-
ture more closely to current income.
It is also interesting to note that we cannot reject the negative
influence of young children on alcohol consumption at a 12 percent
significance level, whereas the effects of older children on alcohol
consumption and younger children on tobacco consumption are
decisively rejected. These results provide some support for the
particular variant of the lifecycle hypothesis outlined in Section III.
The implied Barten scaling factor for the effect of young children
TABLE II
ELASTICITY ESTIMATES
Percentage increase for one egtra:
Intertemporal Young Older Adult Adult




-6 23 43 54
- 29 6.5 158 -11
4 12 75 -26
The bsse level for these calculetions is e cohort 4, menual household with no children.
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on the price ofalcohol is given by the percentage decrease in alcohol
consumption divided by the own price elasticity of alcohol. From
our estimates this is about 0.26; that is, young children increase the
price of drinking by about 26 percent.
Turning to adult consumption of alcohol and tobacco, we note
that our estimates may not be well determined due to the collinear-
ity between adult males and adult females. Our parameter esti-
mates indicate that an extra adult male drinks 50 percent more than
both parents and smokes 75 percent as much, while an extra adult
female does not increase the consumption of either good. The
parameter estimates for males and females are, however, negatively
correlated, so that we cannot reject (more plausible) higher values
for adult females and lower values for adult m~le~.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have examined the consumption of food,
alcoholic beverages, and tobacco over the lifecycle. A demand
system that explicitly allowed for uncertainty and changes in
demographic structure was estimated.
We feel that there are four principal shortcomings in this paper
that need to be addressed in the future. First, it would be desirable to
add more structure to the error term in (8). Second, the exclusion of
other private goods and leisure has no strict justification beyond
expediency. If our three goods and these other goods aze not want
independent, then we shall have conventional omitted variable bias;
this will only be zero if the omitted relative prices terms are orthogonal
to our explanatory variables. Third, the additive over time structure
for preferences may be particularly inappropriate for alcohol and
tobacco, since these are generally considered habit-forming. Finally,
our cohorts have not been chosen optimally; it might well be better to
have wider age bands and fewer "observations."
Given these reservations, we do conclude that young children
do not reduce the consumption of tobacco significantly and reduced
the consumption of alcohol only a little. This result is one of the few
predictions of our theoretical lifecycle model and stands in contrast
to alternative predictions. Thus, these results give some support for
the lifecycle hypothesis in this context. However, without a
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CHAPTER 4
A NON-PARAMETRIC TEST OF THE LIFE-CYCLE
RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS ITYPOTHESIS
reprinted from the International Economic Review,
30(4), 1989, pp. 979-992.
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REVIEW
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A NONPARAMETRIC TEST OF THE LIFE-CYCLE RATIONAL
EXPECTATIONS ITYPOTHESIS'
BY IVIARTIN BROWNINGt
In a world of perfect certainty and perfect capital markets agents allocate
expenditure in such a way that the marginal utility of discounted expenditure
is the same in each period. In this paper we present a test of whether any
particular series of discounted prices and quantities can be exactly reconciled
with a utility function and marginal utility of discounted expenditure that do
not change from period to period.
We find that UK, US and Canadian postwar aggregate da[a all reject our
condition, although it is not rejected for long sub-petiods. We show that our
results for the UK suggest particular modifications to the strong form of the
rational exoectations hy~othesis that our condition tests. In fact these da[a are
exactly consistent with a number of alternative hypotheses. From this we
argue that time series data are ill suited to parametric testing of any of the
competing hypotheses on the inter-temporal allocation of expenditure.
1. INTRODUCTION
The pure theory of the inter-temporal allocation of goods and time with perfect
capital markets and perfect fcresight is identical to the static demand case. There
is a single (lifetime) budget constraint and the allocation of expenditure to each
period is made so that the marginal utility of discounted expenditure is the same in
each period. Bewley (1977) and Hall (1978) have identified the life-cyclelrational
expectations hypothesis under uncertainty (REH) with the proposition that ex-
pected utility maximising consumers will allocate expenditures and time in such a
way as to try and keep the marginal utility of discounted money constant.
Given a set of time series on prices, purchases, wages and labor supply we can
ask whether these realised plans are consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis. In
this paper we propose a test that requires no ad hoc specification of functional
forms or error processes but rather gives an answer yes or no based on finite
mathematical techniques. The specific hypothesis we test is a strong form of the
REH viz that the marginal utility of discounted expenditure is constant over the
period of observation. For long time series this seems [o be an absurdly strong
hypothesis since it is effectively equivalent to assuming perfect capital markets and
perfect foresight with regard to all important variables. If, however, we can accept
this strong hypothesis for a particular data set then any test of the weaker forms of
the life-cyclelrational expectations hypothesis on this data set must be interpreted
' Manuscript received February I987; final revision June 1988.
~[ have received helpful comments from participants at seminars at Bristol, Princeton, McMaster,
Toronto, Michigan and from Angus Deaton, Hal Varian, Grayham Mizon and an anonymous referee. I
thank them for these whilst retaining responsibility for any errors. The research in this paper was partially
supported by Canadian SSHRC research grants 410.85-0476 and 410.87-0699.
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as testing the appropriateness of the functional forms used rather than the
hypothesis itself. The particular weaker tests we are thinking of are those that
follow Hall (1978), see Hall (1987) for a recent survey. As we shall see, US, UK and
Canadian data reject the strong form of the rational expectations hypothesis but
rather less often than we might expect.
The (very familiar) basic theory is presented in Section 2. Section 3 develops a
test of the strong form of the REH that can be applied to data on (discounted)
prices, quantities, (discounted) wages and hours of work. This test is a simple
passlfail one that does not require a particular parameterisation of the underlying
preferences. For this reason we follow Varian (1982) in referring to it as a
nonparametric test. It has little to do with traditional nonparametric s[atistics.
Section 4 applies the test to some postwar aggregate data sets for Canada, the US
and the UK. We find that none of these satisfy the criterion developed in the
previous section for the whole data period but that they do indicate some very
strong theory-coherent regularities in the data. In particular we cannot reject the
strong hypothesis for long sub-periods, particularly when we allow for shocks in the
1970's. We also find that a test of the SREH on the UK data for adjacent years is
rejected for only one pair of years.
Section 5 discusses the results obtained in Section 4 for the UK data. Although
these data reject the strong form of the rational expectations hypothesis over the
period 1952 to 1985, the rejection is informative. In particular we show that the data
can be exactly reconciled with weaker forms of the theory that allow for
uncertainty or imperfect capital markets or nonadditive preferences over time.
Furthermore we show that the data is also exactly consistent with a Keynesian
model that has a conventional Marshallian assumption for intra-period allocation.
Our principal conclusion is that aggregate time series data sets are ill-suited to
testing between alternative hypotheses on the inter-temporal allocation of expen-
diture (and time).
2. THE STRONG RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS ITYPOTHESIS
Suppose agents have perfect foresight, face perfect capital markets and have




where q` is a vector of n goods purchased and consumed in period t and v(.) is
concave and strictly increasing. Given a particular allocation of total expenditure to
each period we have the first order conditions for optimal intra-temporal allocation:
(2.2) v~(q`) - arP;, i- 1, 2, ..., n
where v;(.) is the partial derivative of v(~) with respect to q; , A, is the marginal utility
of discounted expenditure for period t and p; is the discounted price of good i in
period t.
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Inverting the n conditions in (2.2) gives demand curves that are functíons of
discounted prices and the marginal utility of discounted expenditure. We refer to
these as "Frisch demand functions" to distinguish them from Marshallian (prices
and parametric expenditure) and Hicksian (prices and parametric utility level)
demand functions.
[f expenditure in each period is determined arbitrarily then x, will vary from
period to period. Bewley (1977) and Hall (1978), however, identify the life-cycle
hypothesis with the proposition that consumers seek to keep ,1, (which is given in
discounted terms) constant from period to period. In our context this leads to the
following definition.
DEFINITION. Tlte time series of discounted prices and quantities {(p`, q')?
satisfy the Strong Rational Expectations Hypothesis (SREH) if there is some
concave, strictly increasing (utifity) function v(.) and a positive ,l such that
(2.3) v;(q`) - Ap;, for all i, t.
Clearly the SREH is equivalent to optimal intra-temporal allocation ( condition
(2.2) for all t) and constancy of A,. An alternative way of stating the SREH is that
in any period t the agent has no regrets about the choices made in periods 1 to
(t - 1). If it transpires that A, G A, for some r and s then the agent would, ex post,
have preferred to transfer expenditure from period r to period s.
If we are dealing with time-series data over long periods then the requirement
that ,1r be constant over time appears very strong. For short-run data, however, it
may well be more reasonable to assume that A, is constant. Indeed, Bewley (1980)
explicitly calls Frisch demand functions with a constant a"short-run demand
functions". This constancy is the reason for the original use of Frisch demand
function in Heckman ( 1974) as well as in, for example, the work of MaCurdy (1981)
and Browning, Deaton and Irish (1985).
A weaker version of the SREH is to require it to hold only for adjacent years.
This is the hypothesis that agents successfully forecast one year ahead. We shall
refer to this as SREH2. Clearly, SREH implies SREH2. The converse is not,
however, the case; it may be that the set of utility functions that "rationalise" the
data for (t - 1) and t and the set of utility functions that rationalize the data for t and
(t f 1) have no common elements.
If we allow for uncertainty then agents maximising expected utility and using all
currently available information set:
(2.4) Er- ~(ar) - xr- ~
where E,-t (~) is the expectations operator conditional on the information set at time
(t - 1) (see Hall 1978, or Browning, Deaton and Irish 1985). Appropriate tests of
this condition require statistical tests based on particular functional forms. The
SREH however, is amenable to nonparametric testing. In the next section we
derive such a test. Any discussion of the "meaning" of the results of this test are
postponed until Section 5, following the implementation of the test for a varied
assortment of aggregate data sets.
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3. A NONPARAMETRIC TEST OF THE STRONG RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS ITYPOTHESIS
In this section we derive necessary and sufficient conditions that a time series of
discounted prices and quantities must satisfy to be consistent with the SREH. To
derive the necessary conditions, suppose that {(p`, p')} do satisfy the SREH for
some v(.). Since v(.) is concave we have that for any (s, t):
(3.1) G(q')(q`' 9') ~ v(9~ - v(9~)
where G(.) is the gradient vector of v(.). If the SREH holds this is equivalent to:
(3.1)~ .lp'(q` - qJ) ~ v(4~ - v(q')
If we now take any subset of indices {s, t, u, ... z} we have the following
inequalities:
~P'(q` - 93)'- v(47 - v(q')
~p`(44 - q~ ? v(q~) - v(9~
aP'(q' - qz) ~ v(q') - v(q`).
Adding these, we have:
(3.2) pSq~ f p~q~ f....f p.qr ~ psqs } p~q~ {.... t pZp~.
DEFINITtoN. IJcondition (3.2) holds for any subset of indices tken we say that
the data set {(p`, q`)} satisfies cyclical mono[onicity (CM).
Thus we have shown that any data set that satisfies the SREH also satisfies CM.
In fact, if we allow multi-valued Frisch demand functions then CM also ensures that
there is some concave v(.) such that {(p`, q`)} satisfies the SREH for that v(.). The
equivalence of CM and the existence of a concave function v(.) such that G(q`) -
p` for all t is exactly Theorem 24.8 in Rockafellar (1970). A proof of sufficiency
would paraphrase the proof given there. The above establishes:
PROPOSrr1oN 1. CM and SREH are equivalent.
Trivially we also have that SREH2, the weaker form of the SREH, is equivalent
to CM holding for adjacent years.
CM ís an integrability condition. An important question is how it relates to more
standard integrability conditions in economics. To answer this we consider the
Generalised Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) given in Varian (I982). For the
relation between this axiom and other revealed preference axions the reader is
referred to that paper.
GARP gives the conditions under which we can rationalise a data set under the
assumption of inter-temporal weak separability with constant within period pref-
erences in each period. CM gives the conditions under which we can rationalise a
data set under the assumption of inter-temporal additivity with the same utility
function in each period and a single inter-temporal budget constraint. Since
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additivity with an unchanging utility function implies weak separability with
unchanging preferences we have:
PROPOSrr1oN 2. CM implies GARP.
For the sake of expositional parsimony all further proofs are deleted; interested
readers can obtain proofs from the au[hors.
Although GARP is not a sufficient condition for CM there is a weak inverse to
Proposition 2 that will be useful in our empirical work. This states that for any data
set that satisfies GARP we can always find discounting factors for prices such that
the data set satisfies CM.
PROPOSrrtoN 3. If GARP holds for {( p`, q`)} then there exist T positive numbers
{~c ~, . . . , }~T} such that CM holds for {(prp`, q`)}.
This result is significant since most aggregate time series demand data sets do
satisfy GARP. This suggests that the results of tests of the SREH on such data are
likely to be highly dependent on the interest rate we use to construct the discount
factors used to deflate prices.
CM is a test that can be applied to any subset of goods or periods. In particular
we could test CM for s single good over a period of time. From ( 3.2) we see that a
necessary condition for CM is:
pzqr ~ prqs ~ p:qs ~ prqr
which is more usefully written as:
(3.3) (p` - pj)(q` - q') ~ 0.
This is a monotonicity condition; it does not generally imply CM. For the single
good case, however, we do have an equivalence between (3.3) for each good alone
and CM for each good alone. CM for each good is also equivalent to a stronger fotm
of the SREH for which the within-period utility function is additive. In addition
each additive component of the within-period utility function is concave. This may
be useful in some contexts since to check the SREH with within-period additivi[y
we need only draw graphs of discounted price against quantity for each good. If
each graph ís downwards sloping (in the sense that no two points can be joined by
an upwards sloping line segment) then we cannot reject the very strong composite
hypothesis ofwithin-period additivity and the SREH. To see the force of this note
that if all own real rates of interest are positive and the consumption ofall goods are
rising through time then all the demand curves will slope downwards. Thus we will
only observe violations ofCM for data with negative (positive) real rates and rising
(respectively, falling) consumption in some periods. These observation are forma-
lised in the following proposition:
PROPOSITtoN 4. The following are equivalent:
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(i) the SREH holds for some additive within-period utility function (with
concave sub-utilin~ functions for each good ),
(ii) CM holds for each good individually,
(iii) (3.3) holds for each good; that is the demand curue for each good is
downward sloping.
The conditions in Proposition 4 are sufficient but not necessary for the conditions
in Proposition l. This is most clearly seen by considering (i) in Proposition 4 above
which is clearly sufficient but not necessary for the SREH (see also Rockafeller
1970, end of Section 24).
We can also extend our test for CM to allow for labour supply. Let I, be leisure
in period t, L be the time endowment, h, - L- 1~ be the labour supplied and wr be
the discounted money wage. If intra-temporal preferences are represented by the
concave utility function v(q`, l~) then the analogue to (3.2) is:
(3.4) (P`9r - x~sh~) f ... f (p'q' - w.h,)' (psqs - wshs) f ... ~- (P`q` - w,h~)
To test the SREH on data that includes hours of work and wages we need to
compare net expenditures (pq - wh) at different prices and wages rather than just
expenditures as earlier. Note, however, that if {(p`, q`)} and {(w„ hr)} satisfy CM
separately then we cannot reject the composite hypothesis for the SREH aiong with
want independence between consumption and leisure. The labour data {(w~, hr)}
fails CM if and only if there are two points in the graph of (w, h) that can be jointed
by a downwards sloping line segment, that is Frisch labour supply functions slope
upwards under the SREH and within-period additivity between leisure and o[her
goods.
All of the above has assumed interior solutions. If we have corner solutions then
we do not have an equivalence between CM and the SREH. Consequently our
techniques will not be applicable to micro-data with unemployment or non-
purchase of some goods.
Finally, we come to two aggregation issues: aggregation over households and
over goods. For the former we note that if we have many households facing the
same prices and CM holds at the micro level then it holds for the aggregate data. To
see this, simply add across households in the definition of CM (see also Green and
Srivastava 1983). We formalise this as:
PROPOStTION 5. If we have many households facing the same prices and CM
holds for each household then CM holds for aggregate (orper capita) demands and
the common prices.
This is a very powerful aggregation theorem. No restriction is put on the form of
preferences or on the heterogeneity of preferences in the population. This is in
marked contrast to aggregation theorems relating to parametric demand systems
(see Lau 1982, for example). Note, however, that it does not apply to labour supply
data where agents face different prices (wages). In this case CM at the individual
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level does not imply CM for, say, average wages, hours and quanti[ies and common
prices.
For theoretical and empirical work, some aggregation across goods is forced
upon us by the multiplicity of goods available to agents. At its most drastic this
takes the form ofassuming a single good. This is strictly only justified if preferences
are homothetic or all prices move together. In empirical work the typical way we
aggregate goods together is to sum, respectively, the expenditures in constant and
current dollars on the goods in the commodity category to be created. The former
of these sums is then taken to be the quantity; the (implicit) price (deflator) is then
the ratio of the sums ofcurrent to constant dollars. If relative prices vary over time
then CM at a fine level of aggregation neither implies nor is implied by CM at a
coarser level ofaggregation. Thus a collection of goods defined as a composite may
give the opposite result in a test of CM to the result for the composite.
4. SOME RESULTS FOR CANADA, THE UK AND THE US
- - ~n-this seetion-we shall ~alco ~~e aggregat~ data~r~anada; N~TiK-anà-the~3S
and see whether they satisfy GARP and CM. These data display some interesting
differences and may well comprise a representative "sample." In particular the US
data displays less absolute price variability but more relative price variability than
the UK data.
All our time series are annual data. In principle there is no reason why we should
not apply our tests to, for example, quarterly data. The problem here, however, is
that we do not generally assume that preferences are constant over the year.
Constancy of preferences, however, is a basic assumption for both GARP and CM.
Thus we would expect to reject GARP on quarterly data. Since GARP is a
necessary condition for CM this implies a rejection of CM as well.
We consider first UK per capita consumptionlprice data from 1952 to 1985 on
seven `goods': food, alcohol, housing, fuel, clothing, other goods and other
services. These data satisfy GARP for the whole period. To check CM, we discount
current prices using the "gross flat yield on 2 ll2q consols" as our nominal interest
rate; the interest rate for period t is the average rate between mid-(t - I) and mid-t.
We shall discuss other interest rates ín the next section.
Before testing CM for these goods together we consider them separately.
Remember that want independence within the period and the SREH would give
downwards sloping demand curves (see Proposition 4). In fact the graphs of
discounted price against quan[ity for all of our goods have upward sloping portions.
Thus we can reject the composite hypothesis of want independence and the SREH.
To test for the SREH we first test for CM for the years 1952 to I953. Given that
CM is not rejected for these two years we then test for the three years 1952-1954
and so on, until CM is rejected. Following this procedure we find that CM is not
rejected for 1952-1973 but it is rejected for the period 1952-1974. We thus restart by
testing for CM between 1974 and 1975. Although this procedure identifies sub-
periods within which CM is not rejected this identification may not be unique. It
may be, for example, that starting at 1974 and working backwards would reveal
different sub-periods within each of which CM is not rejected. We report results
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only for the "natural" experiment of starting from the beginning of the period and
working forwards.
When we apply the test for CM for the seven goods together we find that it is not
rejected for the sub-periods 1952 to 1973, 1974 to 1977 and 1979 to 1985. Our results
indicate that we can reconcile our data with the Strong Rational Expectations
Hypothesis if we allow for shocks or surprises in 1973-74, 1977-78 and 1978-79.
These can be viewed as years when revisions to "permanent" quantities were
required.
Testing the weaker SREH2 on these data we find that it is only rejected for the
adjacent years 1978 and 1979. Thus we find only one pair of adjacent years out of
the 33 pairs between 1952 and 1985 that rejects the hypothesis that agents manage
to forecast one year ahead successfully.
We also applied our test to Canadian per capita data on food, clothing, housing,
house operations, medical care, transportation, recreation and other services for
the period 1956 to 1981. The interest rate used to discount prices is the end of year
Treasury Bill rate. These data satisfied GARP for the whole period and satisfied CM
within the sub-periods 1956 to 1960, 1961 to 1969, 1970 to 1972 and 1975 to 1981.
Turning to US data on per capita consumption of food, clothing, gas, other
goods, housing, house operation, transport and other services for 1954 to 1979 we
find that we can accept GARP for the whole period and CM for the sub-periods 1954
to 19SS, 1957 to 1973, 1974 to 1976 and 1977 to 1979.
We also consider some data on aggregate consumption and hours ofwork for the
US. These data are similar to those used in Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers
(1985). Before testing for CM we tested for GARP and found that these data satisfy
GARP for the whole period. This is in itself significant since Mankiw et al. reject
their intra-temporal rationality conditions (marginal rates of substitution equal to
real wage within each period) on this data set. The fact that these data do noi reject
GARP suggests that the latter rejection has more to do with the particular
specification chosen than with the theory itself.
Turning to the test of the SREH on these data recall that want independence
between leisure and consumption and the SREH would result in a downward
sloping consumption graph and an upward sloping labour supply curve. We note,
however, that average hours have been falling throughout most of the post-war
period at the same time as (discounted) wages have been rising. Consequently the
graph of hours against discounted wages is largely downward sloping so that we can
reject want independence and the SREH. If, however, we apply the test for CM for
labour and consumption together then we find that we cannot reject CM for the
subperiods 1959 to 1972, 1973 to 1975 and 1979 to 1982. Since the graph of labour
supply against discounted wage is downward sloping for the period 19S9172 this
requires that we take leisure and goods to be (specific) complements for this period.
Note that this (constant marginal utility of money) definition of complementarity is
different from the Hicksian (constant utility) definition of complementarity (see
Houthakker 1960). One interpretation of these results is that the strong rise in
consumption over the period I959 to 1972 is overcoming the fall in leisure that
would otherwise have resulted from rising (discounted) wages.
Deaton (1985) also applies the CM test developed in this paper to adjacent years
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Tne~E I
Year Actual Rate (qo) Adjustment (oTo) Inflation Rate (olo)
I973174 12.65 tI.15 17.17
I974I75 I 5.135 t 8.3 23.7
1975176 14.035 t 1.3 15.975
1978179 12.79 t0.1 t3.48
1979180 13.75 t3.3 17.37
ofUS data on aggregate consumption and hours of work. This corresponds to a test
of the SREH2. Deaton finds that "violations (of CM) are more endemic than
occasional." As we mentioned below Proposition 3, the outcome of CM tests will
depend critically on the interest rate chosen. Deaton (1985) uses a net of tax rate
that gives negative real rates of interest for many periods; we shall illustrate below
how this typically biases us toward rejection of the CM condition.
Referring back to Proposition 3 we see that if a data set satisfies GARP then there
árérëvtstons-tó t~ie-átsotuTépricé tevërs inéach pén'o~c whic~i ensure~haT Thë-
revised data set satisfies CM. The p.,'s of Proposition 3 can be considered as
revisions to the discount factor R,. The non-rejection of GARP reported above
indicates that we can reconcile our data sets with the SREH by adjusting the
interest rates used. We shall use the UK demand data set to illustrate; lack of space
precludes an extensive examination of the other data sets considered above.
The revisions to interest rates for the UK data set were determined in the
following way. The data satisfies CM for the period 1952 to 1973 but not for 1952 to
1974. We took the data for 1952 to 1974 and found the smallest change in the interest
rate between 1973 and 1974 that would allow us to accept CM for this period. We
then adjusted this interest rate and tested CM for 1952 onwards until we find
another failure. Since this occurs in 1975 we then adjusted the interest rate between
1974 and 1975. This procedure was continued until the data with the revised interest
rate series satisfied CM over the whole period. These revisions are reported in
Table 1. We also report the "inftation rate" (strictly, the change in the log of the
implicit price deflator for non-durables) for each year for comparison purposes. In
the next section we discuss the possible significance of the fact that the "real rate"
is negative for each of the years in which a revision is necessary and that the
revision is always positive.
S. SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF THE UK RESULTS
In general the interpretation of the results of Afriat (1967)-Varian (1982)
nonparametric tests always poses something of a problem. Conventional notions of
power and significance do not sit well with yeslno type tests, although see Bronars
(1987). In our discussion we shall not try for generality; rather we shall use the
results of the CM test on UK data of the last section in a specific way. It is our
feeling that these results are informative but the conclusions we draw are
necessarily somewhat tentative.
All of the data sets looked at in Section 4 reject the SREH. This is not an
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unexpected result since the SREH is, in fact, a composite of (at least) three
questionable assumptions: perfect foresight, inter-temporal additivity with a stable
sub-utility function for.each period and perfect capital markets. We have also
ignored any possible inappropriate separability from other goods, any inappropriate
aggregation across time or goods, rationing, errors in variables and the possibility
that prices might be endogenous.
We shall not discuss any of these latter. We shall, however, examine in turn the
three major component assump[ions of the SREH in the light of the results
presented for the UK data. We remind the reader that all of these data satisfy
GARP so that we need only concern ourselves wi[h inter-temporal considerations.
We shall consequently organise our discussion around Table l; this does not mean
that we necessarily feel that we have the "wrong" interest rate ( although see
below). On the contrary, we believe that our results as presented in Table 1 are
suggestive of rather more interesting sources of failure of the life-cycle model that
are connected with the three subsidary hypotheses mentioned in the last paragraph.
Our examination will be helped by displaying the series for the marginal utility of
discounted expenditure implied by the revisions in Table l. To see how we derived
this marginal utility series refer to Table 1. To reconcile our data with the SREH the
discounted price for 1974 had to be discounted by R~31(1.1265 f. 01 IS) rather than
by R~~~(1.1265) (and similarly for the other interest rate revisions). Thus the
estimated marginal utility of discounted expenditure in 1974 ( using the unrevised
interest rate series) is given by:
A ~4 - 1.1265,1 73l (1 .1265 f .0115).
The consequent series of marginal utilities with ASZ set to unity is given in Table 2.
The major thing to note about this series is that it is non-increasing over time. The
monotonicity of the series given in Table 2 is, ofcourse, simply a consequence of
the fact that all of the adjustments in Table 1 are positive.
Perfect foresight over the period 1952 to 1985 is, perhaps, the most objectionable
of our assumptíons. If we weaken it to allow for uncertainty with eH~icient use of
current information then we have the WREH given in (2.4). The series for A
observed in Table 2 is not necessarily inconsistent with the WREH, suggesting as
it does that there were significant shocks in the 1970's. We could, for instance,
reconcile the WREH and Table 2 by assuming a series of upwards revisions to
(discounted) wealth which lowered the marginal utility of discounted expenditure
as shown. We feel, however, that this "pleasant surprises" interpretation is
inconsistent with the conventional perception of the events of the 1970's. It is also
possible to give examples of "unpleasant" shocks that are consistent with this
series; an obvious example is of a unanticipated rise in prices.
The wealth shocks line of reasoning given above hints at an alternative rationale
for the results presented in Table 1. At each of the revision points "the real rate of
interest" (the nominal rate minus the inflation rate) is negative. Under the SREH
"consumption" should fall over these periods. The fact that we have to revise the
nominal rate of interest upwards in each case to reconcile our data with the SREH
suggests that "consumption" is not falling by enough. This is consistent with a
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~L4BLE 2
Period 1952-73 1974 1975 197tr78 1979 198~1985
.1, I .987 .921 911 .910 .881
ratchet model as suggested originally by Duesenberry (1949). Such a model is, of
course, inconsistent with our inter-temporal additivity assumption with a stable
sub-utility function. In this model past consumption lowers the current marginal
utility of expenditure.
The monotonicity of the series in Table 2 is also exactly consistent with a
particular weakening of the third assumption, the existence of perfect capital
markets. Consider the extreme case where agents have perfect foresight and can
lend at a fixed rate of interest but cannot borrow. In this case the marginal utility
of discounted expenditure may fall from one period to the next but it will never rise.
~his-follow~sincPager,r~ can alw-,avs-carry~nr~vard-wealttLhut cannotse~llocate-
later income to earlier periods in which the marginal utility of expenditure may be
high. More generally, with borrowing rates that exceed lending rates, we have that
the marginal utility ofdiscounted expenditure (using the lending rate to discount) is
non-increasing (see Browning and Robb 1985).
Given the results alluded to in the previous paragraph, the hypothesis that agents
have perfect foresight and unchanging utility functions but face capital markets
with higher borrowing rates than lending rates is not inconsistent with the series as
given in Table 2. This interpretation requires us to regard the rate of interest we
have used as the lending rate and to posit that our representative agent was
borrowing between the years 1973174, 1974I75, 1975~76 and 1978179. :~Ithough
formally admissible, this interpretation is somewhat forced. In the population as a
whole there are people who are neither borrowing nor lending, others who are
lending or borrowing but not both and still others who are simultaneously
borrowing and lending. Given this, agents face different discounted prices and the
relationship between CM at the micro level and CM for the aggregate data is unclear
(see the discussion following Proposition 5).
For the sake of completeness we also look at what happens if we use a different
interest rate series. It is here that the CM test is most open to abuse since the results
given in Table 1 indicate very clearly what sort of interest rate will lead to rejections
of the SREH more often and which to rejections less often than the rate we used
(that is, the consol rate). If we could find an interest rate that equals the consol rate
plus the adjustments given in Table 1 then we could not, ofcourse, reject the SREH
for the whole data period. Failing such an interest rate we might note that all of the
adjustments in Table 1 revise the (negative) real interest rate towards zero. Thus
using the inflation rate as a nominal interest rate might well give fewer rejections of
the SREH than the consol rate. Using this "interest" rate is formally equivalent to
the commonly used assumption that the real rate of interest is equal [o the rate of
time discount (see, for example, Hall and Mishkin 1982).
Conversely we would expect that an interest rate series that is lower than the
consol rate, particularly in the 1970's (the 90 day Treasury Bill rate, for example)




Periods Within Which CM Is Not
Interest Rate Rejected
Consol I952-73, 74-77, 78, 79-85
Consol with 30o1a tax rate I952-54, 55, 56-65, óti-70, 71, 73, 73-77,
78, 79-85
Treasury Bitl 1952-54, 55-70, 71, 72-73, 74-77, 78,
79-85
Non-Durables Price [nflation 1952-73, 74-77, 78-83, 84-85
Alternatively we might assume a positive rate of time discount or a tax on capital,
each of which effectively lowers the nominal interest rate used to discount prices.
Table 3 presents the results for the consol rate with a constant 3OoIo tax rate, the
inflation rate and the Treasury Bill rate used as alternative rates to discount prices.
We also present again the consol rate results with no utility discounting for ease of
comparison.
The results here are much as we expected. The closer the interest rate to the
inflation rate, the fewer the rejections of the SREH. As noted in Section 4, Deaton
(1986) presents evidence for contiguous pairs of years that the SREH is decisively
rejected by US data on labour supply and consumption. This investigation uses a
net-of-tax interest rate and observes that condition (3.3) is not rejected so often if
we have a negative utility discount rate. This finding is consistent with ours;
generally utility levels seem to be "sticky downwards."
All of the interest rate series we have used lead to a rejection of the SREH.
However, a proponent of the rational expectations hypothesis could argue that
these results give a good deal of support for the hypothesis with the additional
assumption that agents set the rate of time discount equal to the real interest rate
or that the consol rate is the `correct' rate. In this latter view we only need
"surprises" in 1973174, 1977178 and 1978179. The problem with this view is that it
puts too much weight on the choice of interest rate and, more importantly, there
may be other hypotheses that are also exactly consistent with these data.
As we have seen above the data is not obviously at odds with the REH if we
allow for ( one of) uncertainty or some intertemporal dependencies in preferences or
some imperfections in capital markets. Yet another alternative is a crude Keyne-
sian-Marshallian hypothesis which posits that tota] expenditure is an increasing
function of disposable income and that intra-temporal allocation is made condi-
tional on that total expenditure.
If preferences are unchanging from year to year then there are two implications
of this hypothesis. First, the graph of current expenditure against current income
should be upwards sloping in the sense that no two (income, expenditure) points
can be joined by a downwards sloping line. The second implication is that the data
should satisfy GARP. We have already seen that our data satisfy this second.
condition. It is also the case that the graph of total expenditures on non-durables
against disposable income is upwards sloping. Thus our data are seen to be
consistent with this alternative which is, of course, at considerable variance with
the life-cycle hypothesis.
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Ó. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown how to test data on prices, interest rates and quantities for
congruence with a strong form of the rational expectations hypothesis (in fact, with
a composite of some widely used assumptions). This strong form is rejected by all
of the data sets we have employed although it is not rejected for (perhaps
surprisingly) long sub-periods of some of them (1952 to 1973 for the UK data, for
example). In the weak SREH2 form it is rejected only for one out of thirty three
pairs of adjacent years for the UK data.
We have also shown that the rejections of the SREH on the UK data are
consistent with a relaxation of any one of the three major components of the SREH:
perfect foresight, the existence of perfect capital markets and inter-temporally
additive preferences with an unchanging sub-utility function. We also show that the
results of our test are cri[ically dependent on the interest rate used.
We have also indicated that our data are consistent with at least one (Keynesian)
~}ternat~ve te-the life-cyele h~pothesis. ~he-lessorrwt`ciraw~rem-our investigatians
is, in fact, that tests of alternative hypotheses on such aggregate time-series data
lack power. As likely as not parametric tests of particular hypotheses on such data
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CHAPTER 5
A SIMPLE NON-ADDITIVE PREFERENCE STRUCTURE
FOR MODELS OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOROVER TIME
reprinted from the Journal of Political Economy,
99(3), 1991, pp. 607-637.
A Simple Nonadditive Preference Structure for
Models of Household Behavior over Time
Martin Browning
hfr.~1aster Universih
Intertemporal separability is an almost universal assumption in em-
pirical work on household behavior, but a good deal of recent work
on consumption and labor sup~ly suggests that it mav not be tenable. -- -
The traditional weakening of this assumption is to allow for habit
formation. I propose an alternative structure for intertemporal pref-
erences that nests intertemporal additivity in a simple way and yields
closed-form solutions for demand functions. This structure includes
the neoclassical durables model as a special case. I derive a demand
system that nests the almost ideal system as its time-separable coun-
terpart. This model is estimated on U.K. aggregate time-series data
for seven goods. Time separability is decisively rejected. Moreover,
I find that ignoring temporal dependencies leads to considerable
bias in the estimates of elasticities. Of the seven goods, durables
display the strongest nonseparable effect; the estimated reactions
are consistent with the neoclassical durables model.
I. Introduction
Intertemporal separability is an almost universal assumption in em-
pirical work on household beha~'ior. To formulate demand systems,
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one typically invokes intertemporal weak separability so that current
demands can be written as a function of current prices and current
total expenditure. To develop consumption functions and labor sup-
ply equations, one typically invokes the stronger assumption of inter-
temporal additivity for the utility function. This widespread use sug-
gests that intertemporal separability is a very convenient assumption.
The question is, Is it justified?
That preferences may not be intertemporally separable has long
been recognized. Perhaps the earliest explicit discussion appears in
Marshall (1890), which relates to habits. "Irreversible" demand func-
tions are also discussed, albeit somewhat sketchily, in Haavelmo
(1944, sec. 2). This early recognition that "choices depend on tastes
and tastes on past choices" (Gorman 1967) led to a number of at-
tempts to incorporate past choices into current demands (or con-
sumption) in empirical work (see Duesenberry 1949; Modigliani
1949; Farrell 1952; Stone 1954). Since then, the literature has grown
considerably. See Phlips (1983) for references and a discussion on
habits and Hayashi (1985), Novales (1985), Dunn and Singleton
(1986), Muellbauer (1986), and Pashardes (1986) for further studies
of consumption without the intertemporal separability assumption.
See also Heckman (1979, 1981), Eichenbaum, Hansen, and Singleton
(1988), Hotz, Kydland, and Sedlacek (1988), and Kennan (1988) for
empirical models of labor supply or demand. What is particularly
significant about these investigations is that they all reject the hypoth-
esis that preferences are intertemporally separable.
Actually these papers are unanimous in their conclusion that
household demand and supply functions display too much persis-
tence to be consistent with intertemporally additive preferences and
budgets. As Heckman (1979) notes, it is not obvious whether one can
identify the source of this persistence. Browning (1988) shows that it
is always possible to cake demands that are generated by nonadditive
preferences with additive (over time) budgets and find some other
model that gives exactly these demands with additive preferences and
nonadditive budgets. Sources of the latter would be imperfect capital
markets in consumption studies and human capital in labor supply
models. Throughout the rest of this paper I shall discuss nonsepara-
ble preferences; this is largely a stylistic convenience.
Another line of investigation that does not impose separability in
looking at consumption data is presented in Davidson et al. (1978)
and Anderson and Blundell (1984). The approach here is to seek
good, parsimonious descriptions of the data that have only long-run
congruence with theoretical constraints. Once again it seems that in-
tertemporal effects are critical in describing the data. Parallel to these
developments in the empirical literature, there has been an increasing
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readiness to allow for intertemporal nonseparability in preferences
to account for some of the stylized facts of aggregate time series (see,
e.g., Iíydland and Prescott 1982).
In Section II, I present a novel preference structure for intertem-
poral preferences that includes additivity as a special case. I gener-
alize intertemporal additivity by considering weaker structures on
"dual" representations for preferences rather than on the primal
(utility function) representation. I do this since they lead straightfor-
wardly to corresponding structures on demand functions. I present
a proposition that gives what is, in effect, the weakest generalization
of additivity; I call such preferences simple nonadditive preferences
(SNAP). The resultant demand functions depend on one-period
lagged and one-period lead prices as well as current prices.
The SNAP structure allows that a particular good might be a substi-
tute or a complement for itself in the periods immediately before
and after the current one. To facilitate discussion of these matters, I
introduce the term"autocomplementary" for a good that is a specific
complement to itself in the previous period (and similarly for substi-
tution and independence). I show that goods that are physically dura-
ble or satiating will be autosubstitutable, whereas habit-forming goods
are autocomplementary. I also show that the SNAP structure includes
the neoclassical durables model as a special case.
T'he structure in Section I I is developed in the context of a perfectly
certain environment. In Section III, I discuss the use of dual repre-
sentations for preferences in an uncertain environment. I adopt the
usual framework that agents maximize expected utility in each period
and replan using all currently available information. I present some
analvsis that causes pessimism about the use of dual representations
in such a framework when there are general intertemporal depen-
dencies in preferences. I then go on to show that the SNAP structure
developed in Section II is tractable if one is willing to assume that
agents have point expectations about rlext-period discounted prices.
Although this is a widely used assumption (usually in terms of the
real rate of interest between the current period and the next period),
it is a real cost that is not needed in Euler equation formulations
based on the direct representation (e.g., Dunn and Singleton 1986;
Hotz et al. 1988). The gain is that one can find flexible closed-form
expressions for multigood demand systems. This section closes with
a brief discussion of estimation strategies for intertemporal models,
including the one used here.
Section IV uses the theory developed in Sections I I and II I to
generate a demand system that nests the almost ideal demand system
of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) as a special case. This generaliza-
tion is reasonably parsimonious: there are as many extra parameters
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as goods. One feature of the formulation is that I treat all goods
symmetrically in the sense that I do not make any prior presumption
that any particular good is durable or habit-forming. I leave such
"decisions" to the data; I regard this as an informal specification test
for the approach. For example, if durables turn out not to display
any intertemporal dependency but food does, then one would regard
this as beíng evidence that something is wrong with the formulation.
In Section V, I apply the model to U.K. aggregate postwar time-
series data on the demand for seven goods. These include physically
durable goods such as durables and clothing as well as possibly habit-
forming goods such as alcoholic beverages and tobacco and also goods
that are usually thought of as not displaying intertemporal dependen-
cies (food, e.g.). My principal finding is that intertemporal additivity
is decisively rejected but that only durables and, to a limited extent,
fuel display any signi6cant autodependency over time. I also find that
I cannot reject homogeneity; this substantiates to some extent the
conjecture in Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a) that the commonly
found rejection of homogeneity may be due to an inappropriate dy-
namic specification. I close this section with a discussion of the price
and expenditure elasticities implied by the parameter estimates. I
find that not taking account of intertemporal dependencies leads to
considerable bias in the estimates of these, even for goods that are
autoindependent.
II. A Simple Nonadditive Preference Structure
To derive the preference structure, I consider first the perfect cer-
tainty case; in the next section I show how to take account of uncer-
tainty. The most widely used structure for the direct representation
of preferences over time is the additive structure
U(q',...,qT) - ~,~(q`), (1)
~-i
where q` is a vector of consumptions (which are equated with pur-
chases) of n goods in time t. The subutility functions v`(.) have time
superscripts to allow for, among other things, discounting and chang-
ing preferences (but note that the latter is exogenous and does not
depend on past or future choices).
Considerable ingenuity has been expended in deriving empirically
tractable generalizations of this structure that allow for temporal de-
pendencies. The best known of these generalizations is the habits
model of Pollak (1970); see also Houthakker and Taylor (1970), Spin-
98
HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR
newyn (1981), and Phlips (1983). The paper by Spinnewyn, in partic-
ular, shows how one may redefine prices, quantities, and wealth so
that preferences can be represented over time by an additive utility
function over redefined qualities ("stocks") that is maximized subject
to an additive (over time) budget constraint (see App. A for a formal
account of this and the following statements on the PollaklSpinnewyn
habits model). This approach has the considerable virtue that it brings
one back to familiar conceptual territory. However, the redefined
quantities in period t depend on current and all past actual quantities,
and the redefined prices depend on current prices and all future
prices. This dependence on infinitely lagged and lead variables raises
obvious problems in empirical implementation.
In practice, two variants of the Pollak-Spinnewyn model have been
almost exclusively employed in empirical models; each of these solves
half of the data problem discussed in the last paragraph. The first
is-ihe- "habits-as-durables' ~~AD~variant-~hisis-zhe- conventionaL
neoclassical model of durables. It gives redefined prices (user costs)
that are weighted sums of current and one-period lead prices. The
alternative "short-memory" model (which is a special case of the struc-
ture considered by Boyer [1983]) gives redefined quantities that are
a weighted sum of current and one-period lagged quantities. To give
two examples: Eichenbaum et al. (1988) estimate a model of con-
sumption and labor supply in which consumptíon is always short-
memory and leisure is either short-memory or HAD. Dunn and Sin-
gleton (1986) estimate a system for durables and nondurables in
which the former is taken (not surprisingly) to have a HAD structure
while the latter is modeled as a short-memory.
I present here a rather different approach that addresses three
criteria directly. First, I wish to find a preference structure that nests
additivity over time in a simple way. This will facilitate testing of
the additivity hypothesis. Second, I shall be explicitly concerned with
parsimony in data from the outset. That is, I shall avoid, as far as
possible, having to take consideration of variables indefinitely far back
or forward. Third, I shall work with dual representations for prefer-
onces (i.e., functions defined on prices and some measure of welfare).
Such representations have proved particularly fruitful in empirical
allocation models that assume intertemporal separability (see, e.g.,
Deaton and bluellbauer 1980b), and it is natural to try to extend them
to the more general case. As an example, it is now well established that
the almost ideal demand system of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a)
provides a good approximation to many demand data sets, but these
preferences do not have a closed-form direct utility function.
There are a number of dual representations that one could begin
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wíth. I choose to work with the profit function representation since
this is the only representation that "inherits" additivity from the direct
utility function. The profit function representation is defined by
~r(p', . . . , pT, r) - max LrU(q~, . . . , qr) -
9
(2)
where p` is a vector of prices in period t discounted to the first period
and p`q` is an inner product; the interpretation of r is given in the
next paragraph. In this formulation, I am implicitly assuming the
existence of a perfect capital market with a single rate of interest.
The profit function is well known from producer theory (see McFad-
den 1978); it was first suggested as a representation for consumer
preferences in Gorman (1976). The profit function is convex and
linear homogeneous in (p~, ..., pT, r); further discussion can be
found in Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985).
The first-order condition for the maximization problem on the
right-hand side of (2) gives an immediate interpretation of r as the
inverse of the marginal utility of expenditure (i.e., the marginal cost
of utility). Applying the envelope theorem to (2), we can derive the
Frisch (or constant marginal utility of expenditure) demand functions
in period t:
q` - -0~-rr(p', . . . , pT, r), (3)
where 0, denotes the gradient of ~r with respect to p`. Frisch demands
are zero homogeneous in all prices and r and are symmetric in the
sense that
s9s - s9~ for all i, j, t, s. (4)
sp; sp;'
This symmetry condition is an integrability requirement; it ensures
that there is a preference ordering behind the Frisch demands. This
is the defining characteristic of rational allocation with intertemporal
dependencies: if the past affects the present, then rational agents will
take account of present actions on future preferences.
Frisch demand functions have been much used in recent vears.
They first appeared in the empirical literature in the habits models
of Houthakker and Taylor (1970) and Phlips (1983). This is no coinci-
dence. As Heckman ( 1974) observes, explicit consideration of inter-
temporal allocation leads naturally to the use of Frisch demand func-
tions. The reason is that such demand functions take the marginal
utilitv of ( discounted) wealth as fixed, and this is what rational agents
themselves are trying to equate over time.
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lf U(~) takes the form given in (1), then the pro6t function defined
in (`?) is also additive:
.rr(p', . . , pT, r) -
and Frisch demands depend only on current prices and r:
q' - - O~Tr`(p', r).
~'(p', r),
(5)
In this case tive h~tve want independence for goods in different years:
Sq;ISp~ - 0 for t ~ s. This property of Frisch demands is necessary
for the intertemporal additivity assumed in (1). Given this, we see
that any demand system that does not have this property must be
derived from nonadditive preferences. Perhaps the simplest weaken-
ing of this is to allow current Frisch demands to depend only on past
and current prices:
9~ Í.r(P; pT t' r)'
~M1'ith (4), however, it is trivial to show that this structure and rational-
itv are equivalent to additivity. Essentially, (6) is a"myopic" structure:
no account of the future is taken when making current decisions
(beyond those working through the budget constraint).
Following this line, however, does give a simple generalization of
intertemporal additivity:
qr - ~.r(Pr-t pr prtl
r) (~)
The following proposition establishes the structure of preferences
that gives this form (proofs of all propositions are given in App. B).
Pttorosrrtoh 1. Frisch demands take the form given in (7) if and
onlv if
.rr(pt, . . , pT, r) - ~`(Pr P`t t r).
r-t
r-1
I shall refer to this structure as a SNAP structure.' Each ~(~) func-
tion is concave and linear homogeneous in (p`, p`}', r) and increasing
in (p` p`t ~); in fact each is itself a"loss" function (i.e., the negative
of a pro6t function).
Applying (3), we see that the imposition of a SNAP structure gives
a specific form to Frisch demands, as stated in the following corollary.
'`ute that a tlrnction has a SNAP structure if and onlv if the Hessian of the function
has a ~block) tridiagonal structure. An nT x nT ma[rix is (block) tridiagonal if each
rr x n block on the cliaKonal and on each side of the diagonat is nonzero and alt other
elements are zeru (see Gravbill 1969).
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CoRt)LLARY 1. The Frisch demands for a SNAP structure are of
the form
qr - Orcpr- ~(Pr- t Pr r) t Or~`(pr Prt ~ r)
Thus current demands can be thought of as being the sum of two
components: a current demand that myopically takes account of the
past and a current demand that ignores the past but takes account of
the effect of current actions on future preferences.
Before we move on to allocation under uncertainty, it may be useful
to give some of the implications of assuming a SNAP structure since
it is a new form. First, note that if we have a SNAP structure, then
total expenditure in period t is given by
X, - r { -h,9r - pt~r~pr- t pr prt t r).,, r (8)
Assume now that total expenditure in period t is "normal" in the
sense that, for given prices, it is an increasing function of lifetime
wealth. Also, if preferences are such that the marginal utility of ex-
penditure (- r- ~) is strictly decreasing in wealth (essentially, if the
lifetime utility function is strictly concave), then x, is a strictly mono-
tone function of r in (8). Thus we can invert on r ín the equation
above and substitute back in (7). This establishes the following cor-
ollary.
CoxoLLARr 2. If we have a SNAP structure and total expenditure
in each period is normal, then Marshallian demands take the form
q` - hr(Pr- ~ Pr prt t xr). (9)
This form for IVfarshallian demands is satisfyingly simple in its tem-
poral structure.2 It will form the basis for our estimates below.
~Ve can also relate our structure to the more familiar Pollak-
Spinnewyn habits structure discussed above.
PROPOSITION 2. Preferences have a SNAP and Pollak-Spinnewyn
structure if and onlv if thev have a HAD structure.
To see this informally, note that if we have a HAD model, then we
can reformulate each ~`(-) in proposition 1 in the following way:
~r(pr Prt t r) - ~r(Pr - Prt t(I - M), r), (10)
where M is a diagonal "memory" matrix with diagonal element unity
for a nondurable good (see App. A). Thus current purchases depend
z Vote, however, that this ís only necessary and not sufficient for SNAP. To see this,
consider preferences that are intertemporallv separable ( but not additive). In this case




on lagged and current user costs. These determine, respectively, the
stock carried over frum period t- l and the stock passed on to
period t f 1. This in turn determines the purchases in the current
period. tiote that SNAP generalizes the neoclassical durables model
since most functions ~(-) cannot be written in the form ~(.) in (10).
Generally, we can classify goods i and j as specific complements,
specific substitutes, or want-independent according to whether the
cross-partial of the (Frisch) demand for good i with respect to the
price of good j is negative, positive, or zero, respectively (see Houth-
akker 1960). Our proposed structure has the property that all goods
are want-independent of all other goods in nonadjacent periods.4
To interpret the StiAP structure further, consider a perfect-
foresight, one-good model.~ To analyze the effect of an anticipated
and permanent change in the price of the good, suppose that up to
time t the price is p and thereafter it is p f Op (where Op is small).
To a first-order approximation, the first differences in demands are
given by - -
t,q~-' - ~,~op,






w"here the ij subscript on the ~'s refers to partial derivatives, all evalu-
ated at (p, p, r), and 0 is the first-difference operator. By concavity,
~;; is negative so that ( 12) implies that the within-period ( Frisch) re-
sponse to a price rise is negative.
Turning to (11) and ( 13), note first that these two responses are
eqt}al. This is an implication of symmetry and the structure given in
corollary 1. This is a strong prediction that can, potentially, be re-
jected by the data. If ~1z is negative, then the good is a(specific)
complement E~or itself in the previous and next periods. I shall refer to
such a good as autocomplementary. Similarly, a good is autosubstitutable
(autorndependent) if ~,z is positive (zero). It is easy to show that in
a neoclassical durables model ( see [ lOJ above), durable goods are
autosubstitutable and habit-forming goods are autocomplementary.
Even if a particular good is not physically durable, it might exhibit
autosubstitutability if, for instance, it is satiating in the sense that high
consumption last period lowers the current marginal utility of the
good.
' That is, Sq;Jp~ - 0 for all s ~ t- l, t, and t t 1.
' This is for convenience only; it means that we can drop the i subscript.
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We can also see that the long-run response to a permanent change
is nonpositive since
~q~-i t~q~ f ~q~t~ -(~ii t~.,2 t 2~i.,)Op, (14)
which is negative if Op is positive since ~(.) is concave.
III. Allocation in an Uncertain Environment
In this section I consider the problem of modeling decision making
under uncertainty using dual representations for preferences. I shall
argue that in the general case of nonadditive preferences we cannot
do this without invoking unacceptably strong assumptions such as
perfect foresight but that we can do it if we assume StiAP. The
environment I have in mind is the familiar one in which an agent
receives new information each period and chooses a current vector
of purchases to maximize expected utility using all the currently avail-
able information. Once again we shall deal with the one-good case.
ln period t the agent has expected utility E~U(q~. ... , q`-~, q`,
qr' i , qT), where E~(.) is the expectations operator conditional on
the information set at time t. The quantities chosen in the past are
(q~, ..., q`-~). The notation z is used to denote that z is a random
variable. The agent chooses q` to maximize this subject to the budget
constraint holding in each state of the world (see, e.g., Epstein 1975).
The familiar Euler equation is
E~(p~~) - E~(p~t~), (lj)
where the subscripts on U refer to partials. l~1ote that all the prices
here are discounted. A more familiar way to write this eyuation is
E~(U~) - E~[(1 f b,)i,',,,], (1j')
where 6, is the (random) real rate of interest between periods t and
t f 1.
It is important to note that if preferences are not additive over
time, then U, is not known at time t ( since it depends on future
random quatitities). Hence we can talk only of the expected marginal
utility of discounted lifetime wealth in period t(- E~[U~Ip']).
Given the utility function U(.), we can define a restricted profit
function representation
~~(p~ , pi-i q p,t, , pr r)




where the maximization is over ( q', ..., q`-', q`}~, ..., qT). This is
just another way of describing the preference over certain outcomes
that are represented by U(.). There is, as yet, no presumption that
the lagged prices in ~(~) are those that actually prevailed in the past
nor that the lead prices are among those that are possible in the
future. We shall interpret r~ below. From the envelope theorem and
(16), we have
~i - rrUi (17)
and
d,~-, - - q'-' s - 1, 2, . . . , t - 1. (18)
This restricted profit function is related to the profit function de-
fined in (2) by
--~'(~~.-. ~~-;~,~`~~}~-.~~~-r~~- max~s~-`-~lÍ.. ~19~ - - - -
9~
The first-order conditions for this maximization are
E~~~ - p`. (20)
Combining (17) and (20), we have r~ '- E~(U,Ip`). Thus the interpre-
tation of r as the inverse of the marginal utility of wealth in the perfect
certainty case carries over for r~ in the uncertainty case, except that
now we must talk of the expected marginal utility (conditional on
information in time t). Note that this expected value is, of course,
known in period t, although the actual value may not be known until
later.
The representation in (19) is potentially useful since, by the enve-
lope theorem, current demands can be derived by differentiation:
q` - - -rri. ( 21)
To be actually useful, however, we need to deal with three issues.
First, r, is not observable. This is a familiar problem; we shall post-
pone discussion of it until the end of this section. The second problem
with using (19) is that the demands defined by (21) depend on all
future (random) prices. Imposing SNAP helps considerably with this
since now q` depends explicitly only on one-period-ahead prices; the
effects of all other future prices are "rolled up" in r~. We shall assume
that agents have point expectations over next-period discounted
prices; let these be given by ap~} 1, where the a superscript denotes
"anticipated."' We shall discuss this assumption further in the empiri-
cal section below.
' This replacement of a nondegenerate density by a degenerate one is strictly valid
onlv if ~r~`` is affine in some known function of lead prices. If this is the case, then when
we take conditional expectations in (19), we are left with an affine function of the
conditional expectation of the function of lead prices. These conditional expectations
would then be genuine "anticipated" variables.
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The third problem with using (19) can be seen by noting that
applying the envelope theorem to (19) and using (18) imply
~r;-5 - Et~~-5 - -q~-5 s - 1, 2, . . . , t - 1. (22)
To ensure that we are taking correct account of past decisions on
current preferences, we need to choose lagged "virtual" prices so that
~~-t - -Q`-S, s - 1, 2, . . . , t - 1. (22')
In general there is nothing to ensure that these virtual prices will be
equal to the actual values of past discounted prices. It is this that
makes us pessimistic about using dual methods in the general analysis
of allocation under uncertainty since these virtual prices are inher-
ently unobservable.s
I shall now show how imposing SNAP and a regularity condition
allows us to circumvent this problem. First I shall show that given
SNAP (and our regularity condition) for any actual (p`, r,), there is a
unique set of virtual prices (pt, p'-2 pr-i) where the one-period
lagged prices are the actual prices observed, such that (22') is satisfied.
Next observe that although the lagged two-period and earlier virtual
prices so defined are unobservable, they do not affect current de-
mands since, by SNAP, these depend on only one-period lagged and
lead prices, current prices, and r~.
If (19) has a SNAP structure, then (by corollary 1) the two-period
lagged virtual price is defined by the implicit relationship
qr-t - tp2(pt-2 pr-t ri) f~t(p`-`,p`,ri). (23)
where, as before, a subscript on a function denotes a partial. Of
course, this is not an actual demand function; rather it is an implicit
inverse demand function. If ~21 is nonzero, then we can invert this
relationship and define pe-z as a function of the actual q`-t chosen
(i.e., q'-t) and the actual (p`-t, pt, r~). If, on the other hand, this
cross-partial is zero, then we are back with the additive model. Thus
our regularity condition is that if a good is autosubstitutable (auto-
complementary) for some set of prices, then it is autosubstitutable
(autocomplementary) for all prices in our domain. Given this, the
virtual price defined by (23) is unique. We can now go on to define
pr-' for s- 2, 3, ... by the recursive implicit relationship
9t-5 - ~2(p`-'-t~p'-',rt) } ~t(p~-5 pt-5tt r~).
b This suggests that the best modeling strategy would be to define a preference
representatíon on lagged quantities and current and lead prices (yet another restricted
profit function!). Unfortunatelv, it can be shown that the demands generated in this
wav must depend either on all future prices or on all past quantities (or be additive).




If we now assume SNAP and our regularity condition and take the
unique virtual prices defined above, then from (21) we have
q` -~~(p`- t~ p`, r~) t~t(p~,
op~t t r~). (24)
Thus if we parameterize ~(.), we can write current demands as a
closed form of lagged and current prices, lead anticipated prices,
and the expected marginal utility of wealth. I end this sectidn with a
discussion of ways of dealing with the unobservability of the latter.
There are three broad schemes for dealing with the fact that r, is
not observed by the econometrician. First, one can use the Euler
equation itself:
Er(ri t) - Ei(rrttl)~ (25)
If we parameterize ~(.) so that some known function of q` in (24) is
additive in some function of r; ~, then we can use the conventional
generalized method of moments technique io estimate the parame-
ters of ~(.).7 Although much used in recent years, this approach is
not without problems. First, one has to maintain the orthogonality
conditions implicit in (25). Ideally one would like to test these, partic-
ularly since tests for any overidentifying orthogonality conditions
usually reject these conditions. Second, it has proved difficult to allow
for measurement errors and taste shocks in such models.
?~ second approach is to treat first differences in r; t as a genuine
latent variable. In Attfield and Browning (1985), it is shown that if we
have a time-separable model and impose a subset of the intratemporal
integrability conditions (homogeneity and symmetry) on a model with
at least three goods in each period, then we can identify all the prefer-
ence parameters in a Frisch system. This then allows us to test all
the orthogonality conditions of the first approach. The cost of this
approach is that we need to maintain integrability conditions that are
usually rejected in demand studies on aggregate data. This brings us
to the final estimation strategy.
The derivation of corollary 2 above showed how we can go from a
system conditioned on prices and the marginal utility of wealth (a
Frisch system) to one conditioned on prices and current total expen-
diture (a Marshallian system). In the latter, all the variables in the
' Starting with the direct utility function, it has been possible to ensure this additivity
in forecast errors onlv by making strong assumptions on preferences. For example,
the preferences used by Dunn and Singleton (1986) are defined on the service flows
from durables and nondurables purchases. The within-period utility function on these
flows is taken to be Cobb-Douglas and hence implies that within-period preferences
are homothetic and additive. As another example, Hotz et al. (1988) use a more flexible
utilitv function. As [hey admit, this dces not lead to an additive forecast error, so they
have to resort to an approximation. In contrast, it has proved possible to find less
restrictive forms that give additivity in forecast errors starting from the profit function,
at least for the [ime-additive case (see Browning et al. 1985).
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system are observable.s The cost of this approach is that not all the
parameters of the Frisch system can be identified from the Mar-
shallian svstem; essentially the mapping from Frisch to Marshallian
is many-one. This is not surprising; we cannot hope to identify all
the parameters governing intertemporal allocation from observing
only intratemporal allocation. On the other hand, we do not need
the strong identifying assumptions implicit in the first two methods
discussed above. In the empirical work I shall adopt this final ap-
proacli. Thus one trades off generality for robustness; I shall discuss
this further once a parameterization for preferences has been
adopted. It is to this that I now turn.
IV. A Nonadditive Demand System
In this section I develop a demand system for many goods that allows
for intertemporal dependencies in preferences. As stated at the end
of the last section, this will be estimated by conditioning on total
expenditure so that it is natural to start with preferences that are
known to fit the data reasonably well. I choose to work with the
almost ideal demand system of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980a). The
procedure is as follows. First, I shall find the profit function for these
preferences under the assumption of intertemporal additivity. Tak-
ing the function for a single period, I shall then add lagged prices to
derive the ~(.) function in proposition 1. Finally, I derive the biar-
shallian budget shares for good i by using (8). Below I sketch only
the details of thís derivation.
Let us start with intertemporally additive preference and assume
that preferences in any period can be represented by the PIGLOG
cost function:
In c(p, u) - ln a(p) t- ub(p), (26)
where a(.) is linear homogeneous and b(-) is zero homogeneous. The
profit function associated with this is
Tr(p, r) - j ln Lb~P)J - ln a(p) - 1 r b(P) (27)
It is critical to note that iln (26) we have taken a plarticular normaliza-
tion for the within-period utility function: if we replaced u by F(u),
where F(.) is strictly increasing, then we would have a different profit
"The great majority of demand studies can thus be thought of as being life cycle
consistent in this sense as well as, e.g., systems of labor supplies and commodin de-
mands as in Blundell and Walker (1986).
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function. We shall return to the implications of this choice for inter-
temporal allocation below.
Let us now introduce lagged prices into (27) to break intertemporal
separability. Let
( r
~(p', p'-', r) -- j ln b(P`)
- ln a(p`) - 1 f ln d(p'-')~ r
b(p')'
(28)
where d(-) is a zero homogeneous function. To derive the demands
in period t, we have
qr - p~~(pr pr- t~ re) ~ p~~(prt t~ pt, rt), (29)
where;-nnte, wt Itave dated r as~equired-in (24~
If we now use (8), we can show that
x, - b(p`) (30)
and use this relationship to substitute for the unobservable r,. This
relationship makes explicit the dependence of total expenditure on
current prices; I shall take account of this endogeneity in the empiri-
cal work below. Returning to the issue of the choice of normalization
in (26), note first that all the values in (30) are stated in discounted
terms. If there is an anticipated change in the nominal interest rate
(or, the same thing, a uniform change in all prices), then r, is held
constant (since the change is anticipated) and b(p`) does not change
(since it is zero homogeneous). Thus x~ is unaffected by such a change.
This means that by assuming the normalization given in ( 26), we are
constraining the intertemporal substitution elasticity to be minus one;
that is, a 1 percent rise in the ( discounted) price of consumption
(which is well defined since all prices move together) leads to no
change in expenditure and a consequent 1 percent fall in consump-
tion. As discussed at the end of the last section, this is the parameter
that we cannot identify from a conditional demand system. We shall
return to this issue yet again below.
In estimation we adopt the following parameterizations:
lna(P)- ~.akln pk}~~2i. i.wktlnpklnpt~ (31)
ln b(p) -~ Rk ln pk, (32)
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and
ln d(p) - 6k 1R pk, (33)
where ~k ak - 1, ~k Rk -~k ek -~k Wtk - 0, and wkl - wtk-
Combining (28)-(33) gives the following budget share function for
good i in period t:
~ x~
w;~ - a; f~ w;k In pk f R; In a(p,)
(34)
,-, - b(p`); ~ 9k lnpk A; b(prt,) .
This is a conventional almost ideal demand system except for the last
two terms, which involve only as many parameters for the system as
a whole as there are goods.9 Intertemporal separability is equivalent
to all the 9's being zero. One feature of this formulation that is impor-
tant to note is that since the R' s and 9's each sum to zero, only relative
prices matter in the indices ln d(p`- t) and b(p`)Ib(p`} t). Thus only
relative price changes from last period to the current one and from
the current period to the next period matter.
We now derive some of the implications of these parameters. To
find the elasticities for a permanent and anticipated price change of
t1p; in the price of good i in period t as in (11)-(13), we use (29)-(33),
holding r constant:
Dlnq;-t R;g;b(p`-t)
~ In p; - w;~- ~b(pt) ,
c~ ln ~Í w;; - R;(a; } 9;) t
`1 }(3;I
`c~ ln x~I
t11n i'; - w;~ w;r O ln pi
(35)
- 1, (36)
0 ln q~t t- R~e; } 1. (37)
O ln p; w;,
g The almost ideal system dces have one theoretical drawback (which is common to
most other budget share systems): if deflated expenditure trends upward indefini[ely,
then for goods with R; ~ 0(G 0) we shall eventually end up predicting budget shares
greater than unity ( less than zero). There are two responses to this. We could choose
an alternative specification for which we can have nonhomothetic preferences that do
not eventually violate the nonnegativity constraints ( see, e.g., Lewbet 1988). Alterna-
tive(y, we could allow for the censoring of the budget shares in the system we use. On
micro data this might be necessary (see Van Soest and Kooreman [1990] for a discus-
sion and references). On aggregate time-series data, it is clear that since all the budget




Taking (36) first, we see that the within-period response to an antici-
pated and permanent price rise depends on the estimated parameters
and on how much the agent changes total expenditure consequent on
the change. This latter is governed by the intertemporal substitution
elasticity, which is not estimated in a Marshallian system.
Although 0 ln xrl0 ln p; is not estimated, we can derive a value for
it if~ we assume a value for the intertemporal substitution elasticity (see
Browning [ 1989] for a derivation of the intertemporal substitution
elasticity in the many-good case). In this case, coherence suggests
taking the consumption function given in (30) for which the elasticity
ís - 1. For this function, 0 ln x,l~ In p ,̀ is equal to -R;. Alternatively,
if we set the change in total expenditure equal to zero, then we have
the conventional Marshallian or uncompensated own-price elasticity.
The relationships (35) and (37) determine whether a particular
good is autocomplementary, autosubstitutable, or autoindependent.
I~iote that since {k~ese have- the s~me sign as (3;8;, thP regularicy condi-
tion defined in the last section is satisfied for these preferences. As
can be seen, a zero value for 9, is sufficient but not necessary for good
i to be autoindependent.
Finally, note that the conventional expenditure elasticity is given
bv
~ ln 9; -
1 t R' . (38)
O ln x~ w;~
Thus good i is a luxury if and only if R; is greater than zero. This
brings out another feature of the specification: if we take the con-
sumption function (30) as governing intertemporal allocation, then a
rise in the price of good i causes total expenditure to rise if and only
if good i is a necessity (see the last paragraph).
V. Results on U.K. Time-Series Data
I estimate the model on U.K. aggregate annual time-series data from
1954 to 1985 (1953 and 1986 are used to create lags and leads); these
data are taken from the Central Statistical Office (1988). I model
seven goods that cover all expenditures except for those on housing;
the latter are excluded since I considered them too heterogeneous to
be usable. A list of the goods modeled can be found in table 1. All
seven goods are, of course, wide composites, and most include items
that are physically durable. As examples (beyond the obvious ones of
durables and clothing), note that "other goods" includes cameras,
jewelry, and toys; "fuel and lighting" includes coal and other storable
fuels. Also, many of the component goods may be habit-forming or
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BUDGET SHARE (~Jc) Loc Px~cE (1980 - 0)
1954 1985 1954 1985
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Durables 7.9 11.2 - 1.43 .15
Food 29.0 I6.1 - 1.70 .26
Alcohol and tobacco 14.5 12.2 - 1.63 .48
Clothing and footwear 10.6 8.0 - 1.29 .19
Fuel and lighting 5.0 10.0 - 2.17 .45
Other goods 10.0 12.1 - 1.68 .31
Services 23.0 30.5 - 2.04 .37
satiable. Apart from the obvious examples of alcohol and tobacco,
one cannot rule out, a priori, that other less obvious things (such as
telephone charges, which are the largest item in services) are also
subject to "ratchet" effects. All of this means that I see no reason to
restrict temporal dependencies to a prespecified collection of goods.
Table 1 also presents some of the data. As can be seen, chere have
been some substantial changes in the structure of expenditures over
the 32 years of the sample. The most important of these are that the
budget shares of fuel and services have increased by 100 percent and
33 percent, respectively, while the food share has fallen by 44 percent.
At the same time, there have also been large changes in relative
prices. As can be seen from columns 3 and 4, all prices have increased
in absolute level, but the range has been quite wide. Thus clothing
and food (log) prices increased by 1.48 and 1.58, while the (log) prices
of services and fuel rose by 2.41 and 2.62, respectively. This translates
into about an annual 2 percent relative price change between clothing
and fuel. Finally, note that real consumption rose by 112 percent
over the sample period. The purpose of a demand system is to bring
these facts together in a coherent way; it is to this that I now turn.
Before I discuss the stochastic specification for the model, I present
some statistics for an almost ideal system with no account taken of
intertemporal dependencies (see table 2). This is (34) without the last
two terms and with an error term added. I have followed previous
investigators and replaced the a(p`) deRator by a budget share-
weighted Stone price index P~ (see Deaton and Muellbauer 1980a).
With this approximation, ordinary least squares is equivalent to full
information maximum likelihood; the estimates given are the ordi-
nary least squares estimates. Thus no account is taken here of the
possible endogeneity of deflated total expenditure; in the SNAP sys-
tem below I shall take account of this.






Good R~ Statistic Homogeneity
Durables- - ~ - - 86 -----1.41 -.S4
Food LOU 1.80 - 2.6~
Alcohol .9l 1.1 S .2~
Clothing .98 1.05 - A7
Fuel .97 .94 .22
Other goods .96 L66 41
Services .99 1.43 1.8t3
many exhibit some sign of dynamic misspecificatior[. Also, note that
homog n i y~i.e., ~,~ - 0)is r~~}ected for f~od. On the other hand, -
these results are rather better than those usually seen for applications
of the almost ideal system to aggregate data. Typically when durables
are not included in the set of goods modeled, homogeneity is rejected
for many goods, and many equations have an R2 that is greater than
the Durbin-Watson statistic. It seems that adding durables to the sys-
tem clears up some problems even if one takes no account of durabil-
ity. Although this is an improvement, there are still clear signs of
problems in the results presented in table 2.
Many ( nonexclusive) reasons have been advanced for the failure of
the simple model. For example, it might be that we simply have the
wrong functional form for preferences. This is strongly supported
by the fact that most aggregate demand data ( including the data used
here) satisfy revealed preference conditions that ensure that there is a
utility function that rationalizes the observed data exactly (see Varian
1982). An alternative reason for the failure is that we are aggregating
across households inappropriately. As the results of Stoker (1986)
indicate, this will typically lead to bias in our parameter estimates and
will induce serial correlation in the errors. A third reason may be that
we are imposing the wrong temporal preference structure on the
data; it is to testing this that I now turn.
I shall begin by rewriting (34) in a slightly more general wav and
by including an additive error term. This error term is intended to
capture taste shifts, measurement error in the dependent variable,
and the effects of left-out variables. Thus we have
w;~ - W,k ln pk t R; ln y~ t ; ~ ek ln pá
t
(39)
-F S; L b(P`P})t) J f e;t, i- 1, 2, . .., n,
113
JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
where y, is deRated total expenditure (- x~IP, - x,la(p`)). This differs
from (34) by the relaxation that the coefficients on the "lead" index
(i.e., the S's) are not necessarily the same as the coefficients on the
lagged index ( i.e., the 9's). The restrictions from the SNAP model
are
current homogeneity: ~ W;,~ - 0 for all i, (40)
k
lagged homogeneity: ~ 9k - 0, (41)
k
intratemporal symmetry: W;~ - W~; for all i, j, (42)
intertemporal symmetry: 9; -- S; for all i. (43)
Of these, ( 43) is of particular interest to us: it embodies the constraint
that the changes in the periods immediately before alid after an antic-
ipated price change are equal; see (11) and (13) and (35) and (37).
One other restriction that we are obviously interested in is
no SNAP: 9; - S; - 0 for all i. (44)
This is, of course, the test for intertemporal additivity.
In a system without (43), we can also test for myopic behavior since
the effect of future variables can be set to zero without símultaneously
setting the lagged index to zero. Thus we have another test for
myopic behavior: S; - 0 for all i. (45)
Since this restriction and SNAP together imply additivity (i.e., [44J),
it is not nested in the SNAP system, so that in our testing below we
may find that neither (43) nor (45) is rejected and yet (44) is. This
would leave us with the familiar situation when faced with nonnested
alternatives of rejecting neither alternative.
Before we can estimate our system, we need to specify the stochastic
properties of the error term in (39) and to take account of the fact
that the index b(p`)Ib(p`t ~) is not known at time t. We shall assume
that the error term is white noise and is uncorrelated with all current
information except y~. The possibility that total expenditure might be
endogenous has been much discussed in the demand study literature
(see Deaton [1983J for a discussion and references). In the context
of our model, there are at least two reasons why we might want to
instrument total expenditure. First, it depends explicitly on demands
(see the derivation of corollary 2). Second, it is measured with error
to the extent that the price index used to deflate expenditure in y is
not equal to a(p). As instruments we use (log) current disposable
income and lagged ln y as well as current and lagged (log) prices.
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Now we need to deal with the fact that the lead price index is not
observed at time t. To do this we shall employ a familiar rational
expectations technique (see, e.g., Cumby, Huizinga, and Obstfeld
1983). We replace 6(p`)Ib(p`} ~) by its expectation and then assume
that the forecast error is orthogonal to all information at time t. This
gives (39) with the realized value of b(p`)~6(p'} ~) and a composite
error term that is, by construction, correlated with this future price
índex. Also, this composite error may have an MA(1) structure if
surprises in the lead index are significant as compared with the
white-noise error term e;~ in (39).~o Noting that the lead price index
depends only on relative prices that change systematically over time,
we use as instruments a trend, the current and lagged levels of prices,
and the change in (log) import prices. Thus our full instrument set
is current and lagged (absolute, log) prices, (log) current disposable
income, Iagge~-(~og)-deflated total expenditurP,-~he iirst difference
in (log) import prices, and a trend.
We shall proceed as follows. We can estimate (39) with (40), (41),
and (43) imposed; with these restrictions the system estimates depend
only on relative prices and are hence invariant to the discount factor
used to discount prices and total expenditure. Since there is no con-
sensus on the proper nominal rate to use, when we are approximating
a world with many assets by one with a single asset, there is an obvious
gain in robustness. We shall not take account of possible autocorrela-
tion (but shall test for it) and shall assume that the forecast error is
conditionally homoscedastic so that we can estimate our system by
nonlinear three-stage least squares. Additionally, with these restric-
tions, the system automatically satisfies adding-up so that we need
to drop one equation from the system; we shall drop the services
equation.
We have two sets of specification tests for these estimates. The
first are "internal" tests for autocorrelation, misspecification in the in-
struments, and homogeneity; these are given in table 3. The
Breusch-Godfrey (1981) statistic is the Lagrange multiplier test statis-
tic for first-order autocorrelation. Under the null hypothesis of no
MA(1), tliese statistics are distributed as a standard normal. As can
be seen, there is no evidence of any significant first-order autocorrela-
tion in any of the equations. In what follows we shall not allow for
any MA(1) structure; this is consistent with the forecast errors on the
future index being small relative to the other errors in the system. ~~
~" The explicit derivations here are standard and are not given for the sake of presen-
tational parsimony.
~~ In an earlier, four-good version of this system, I did estimate allowing for an
;~tA(1) error using conventional Hansen (1982) mechods. I found that the estimates
allowing for an MA(1) were very similar to those with no allowance made. This is
not surprising given the values of the Breusch-Godfrey statistics found.
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TABLE 3





























~orE.-Fiqures in paren[heses arc probabilitiee under the null.
' Four deqrees ol (reedom.
The next column of table 3 presents the Sargan statistics for the
overidentifying restrictions (see Godfrey 1988). Since there are four
more instruments than endogenous variables, this statistic has a x2(4)
distribution under the null hypothesis that the instruments are or-
thogonal to the error term. Essentially this tests whether the instru-
ments should be on the right-hand side of the system. As can be seen,
only the fuel equation seems to have a problem; we shall ignore this
in what follows.
The final column of table 3 records the t-statistic on the (log) price
of services if it is included as a regressor in each equation of the
system. This is equivalent to relasing (40) above. As can be seen,
current homogeneity is not rejected for any good.12 These results
suggest that allowing for a SNAP structure "solves" the problems
displayed by the additive model.
Table 4 presents some "external" specification checks for the SI`AP
system. For these the quasi likelihood ratio test of Gallant and Jorgen-
son (1979) is used. In the first set of tests (less restricted variants) we
relax, in turn, (40), (41), (40) and (41), and (43). All these relaxations
are rejected; that is, we do not reject (40), (41), and (43). The nonre-
jection of (40) simply confirms the inference drawn from column 3
of table 3. For the last of these tests we estimate the system without
(43). This allows us to test for myopic behavior; in fact we find that
1" The specific values for these test statistics depend on the rate of interest used to
discount prices. The use of the absolute prices is equivalent to assuming a constant
nominal rate. Experiments wíth other rates (the 90-day Treasury bill rate and the
consol rate) gave the same qualitative results. This is true for all the tests below in




VARIAK"rS Ot' ~rHE SNAP Svs.reH
`[odrl
Uegrers of -~- X~ ----
Freedom Statistic
Less Restricted Variants
Nn current homo8eneitV --h - -~ ~-
(329c)
tio la};ged homoKeneity I 2. ï
(109c )
`o homogeneity 7 8.2
(32`7c)









none of the coefficients on the lead index has a t-value greater than
one (in absolute value). On the other hand, (43) is not rejected either.
Thus these data do not allow us to discriminate between myopic and
rational habit formation.
When we come to testing more restricted versions of our system,
we see that symmetry is rejected and so is the hypothesis that prefer-
ences are intertemporally additive. To give some idea of which goods
have significant intertemporal dependencies, table 5 presents some
parameter estimates for the system with (40), (41), and (43) imposed.
It also presents the estimates of (3 from the system with no SNAP
(these are with the same instruments as those in the SNAP system).
The estimates for the services equation are derived from the adding-
up restriction.
There are two features of table 5 that should be noted. First, there
are large differences between the values for (i frotn the system that
allows f~or SNAP and those from the system that does not. I shall
return to this below when I discuss elasticities, but at present I shall
simply note that as the lagged price index enters (39) as a"deflator"
for current total real expenditure, it is not surprising from a statistical
point of view that it affects so strongly the coefficient on this variable.
The second thing to note about the estimates in table 5 is that for
most goods the product of R and 9 is insignificant.tj Referring back
~s Since the ~9's are not estimated directly, we must resort to a linear approximation
to find the standard error. In this and any following case. for any function j(k) of
estimated parameters k that have covariance matrix !2, we estimate the variance of j
to be g'i2g, where g is the gradient of f.
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No SNAP. ---- -- ----
R~ a~ a, w„ e~ a,e,
Uurables .62 8.81 - 1 L 1 4.06 -- - 102.3 --~ 9.01 ~
(5.6) (4.1) (66) (3.2) (28.5) (3.89)
Fc~d - 12.7 - 1.19 - 6.2 1 ~.2 - 38. ï .4ti
(3.6) (2.5) (33) (4.5) (22.2) (1.07)
Alcohol 2.`?ti -.77 42.4 4.29 21.1 ;.16
1-'.:~) (L2) (13.6) (1.1) (13.0) (.22)
Clothing 3. i i - 2.20 I6.3 4.2~ - l7. ï .39
(2.2) (1.7) (22.6) (I.l) (14.5) (.49)
Fuel 2.80 - 3.06 67.6 1.91 22.8 -.70
(2.9) (1.3) (]6.i) (1.4) (11.6) (.40)
Other gouds 4.49 - 5.15 70.7 5.36 - I.7 .09
(1.3) (!.7) (22.9) (1.2) (12.3) (.64)
Services - 1.24 3.56 - 102 - 1.86 - 88.1 - 3.14
VoTe.-Scundard crrors are gicen in parentheses. All esiimntes and standerd errors are multiplied bv IW
to the discussion following (37), we see that this implies that most
govds are autoindependent. Indeed only durables and (to a lesser
extent) fuel display any significant auto effect. It is encouraging that
durables are highly autosubstitutable. Fuel, on the other hand, looks
as though it might be autocomplementary (i.e., habit-forming), but
given the results on the Sargan test for this good, I would not want
to push this too far. Although alcohol and clothing have the expected
signs, they are not significant.
Table 6 presents some of the elasticities implied by the SNAP sys-
tem estimates. Columns 1-4 give the responses to a permanent price
shift for the particular good in period t; see (35)-(37). Column 1
gives the effect of a change in price with everything else held constant
(i.e., a Marshallian response). Generally, however, an anticipated
change in relative prices also leads to a change in the allocation of
expenditure between periods. Column 2 gives the price response if
the intertemporal substitution elasticity is minus one. Only for dura-
bles is the difference of any magnitude; for all other goods the dis-
tinction between the two price elasticities is of little importance. Col-
umn 3 of table 6 gives the changes in demand in the periods
preceding and following the price change; see (35) and (37). To eval-
uate these, set w;-t - w,` - w ,̀}' and b(p'-') - b(p`); this makes onlv
insignificant differences in the estimated elasticities. As one would
expect from table 5 and (35) and (37), only durables and fuel show
anv stlch effect.
The final price elasticity in table 6 is the total Frisch effect; this is




PRICE AND EXPET,DITVRE ELASTIC[TIES
PRICE ELASTiCITIES
- --1- 1[Ol
-- - t - 2 to l- I Total EXPENDITL'RE
biarshallian Frisch and t to t t 1 Frisch ELASTICITY
GooD ( l ) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Durables - 1.~4 - 1.69 .81 -07 1.79
(.78) (.71) (.35) ( 1.03) (.37)
Food - . 22 - .21 .02 - . I 6 .94
(.22) (.21) (.O6) (.21) (.13)
Alcohol -.61 -.60 -.O1 -.63 .94
(.08) (.09) (. 02) (.U8) (.10)
Clothing -.48 -.46 .05 -.36 .73
(.18) (.18) (.06) (.21) (.21)
Fuel -.48 -.46 -.OS -.62 .66
(.26) (.26) (. 05) (.24) (.15)
~érvicës ~3- -.~i - -~~-1:09 - ~Y3-------
(.18) (.Iti) (.08) (. 10) (.10)
Xorr:.-Standard errors are given in parentheses. 1980 prices and budget shares are used in the evaluation of
elasticities and standard rrron.
of as the long-run effect of a price change; for an anticipated change
it should be negative. Alcohol, fuel, clothing, and services all display
a negative long-run price response, and these are not very different
from the short-run response (i.e., the goods are autoindependent).
Perhaps the most interesting effect, however, pertains to durables:
although the short-run effects are large and significant, they offset
each other so that the long-run effect of a change in durables prices
on durables purchases is small and insignificant.
Column 5 of table 6 gives the expenditure elasticities computed
from (38). Food, alcohol, and clothing have elasticities that are not
significantly different from unity.14 On the basis of these estimates,
we would categorize durables as a luxury and fuel and other goods
as necessities. This categorization is very different from that implied
by the estimates that ignore intertemporal dependencies (compare
cols. 1 and 2 of table 5).
VI. Conclusions
That preferences over purchases are not separable over time (even
if one takes a time period such as a year) seems to be well established.
~a This finding of a unit elasticity for food on aggregate data is not necessarily at
variance with Engel's law, which has been confirmed in numerous cross-section studies
(see Deaton [ 1985] for a discussion of the apparent contradiction between Engel's law
and the long-run unit elasticity displayed by aggregate data).
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~t'hat is a goc)d deal less obvious is the source of such intertemporal
depenclencies. In this paper 1 have presented a SNAY structure for
preferences that gives closed forms for demands that depend only
on current variables and lead and lagged prices. The principal reser-
vation I have about this formulation is that one needs to assume that
agents have point expectations about next-period (discounted) prices.
1 ha~ e suggested a small number of strategies for estimating the pa-
ran)eters of such preferences and have implemented what seems to
me to be the most robust of them on U.K. aggregate time-series data
for seven goods.
The svstem alluwing for a S;~AP structure seems to do a lot better
at characterizing the aggregate data than the time-separable model
does. However. there are still some outstanding problems. The prin-
cipal of these are that there seems to be more going on in the fuel
equation than is adequately captured by the model (see table 3) and
that s}nlmetrv is rejected. Conditional on my reservations about
these, I present the following conclusions: (1) Time separability is
rejected. (2) Once one allows for intertemporal nonseparabilities, nei-
ther the rational nor the myopic variants of the model are rejected
b~ the data. (3) 1`ot accounting for intertemporal dependencies biases
considerablv the estimates of intratemporal allocation. For example,
the categorization of goods as luxuries or necessities is considerablv
changed by allowing for nonseparabilities over time. (4) The nonsepa-
rabilitv over time is "concentrated" on durables and fuel. All other
goods are autoindependent. This does not, of course, mean that one
can model them in a time-separable svstem that leaves out durables
and fuel. The results above strongly suggest that doing this would
leaci to apparent autodependencies in these goods that are the result
of incorrectl~ excluding the goods that do display some autodepen-
dence. .-~s ~een above, simply including durables in the time-separable
model ~~ith no allowance for durability improves things sornewhat
(see table 2), which suggests that leaving out durables in previous
nwciels has led to bias and dynamic misspecification. 15) For durables,
there is no long-run price effect, but there are significant short-run
effects. I he pattern observed is that purchases fall in the period in
which the price rises but rise in the preceding and following periods
even though the price stays at the new level. Thus anticipated changes
in the price of durables affect the timing of purchases but not their
long-run level. (Fi) There is no evidence that alcoholic beverages and
tobacco as a composite are significantlv habit-forming when one takes
a vear as the consumption period. It is also the case that this compos-
ite is price elastic and has unitarv expenditure elasticitv. (i) There
is ;cm)e e~ idence that fuel is habit-forming. That is, agents reduce
Nun ha~e, c)f fuel in the period preceding a price rise as well as in
the pericxi ot f)igher prices itself~. It may be, ho~tiever, that this effect
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is spurious given that there is some evidence that the fuel equation
is misspecified.
As discussed at the end of Section III, I chose here to model a
conditional (on total expenditure) system. There is, however, no con-
ceptual problem with estimating a full intertemporal model that has
a SNAP structure on the data used here. This effectively involves
estimating a consumption function jointly with the demand system.
Further discussion of this in an intertemporally additive context can
be found in MaCurdy (1983), Anderson and Browning (1989), and
Blundell, Browning, and Meghir (1990).
The use of a SNAP system is not limited to aggregate time-series
demand data. Indeed it seems ideal for use on micro data on de-
mands. The problem with estimating intertemporally nonadditive
models on time series of surveys of family expenditures (such as the
U.K. or the Canadian Family Expenditure Survey) is that families are
surveyed only once, so that one cannot observe lagged purchases.
~ne-does; heweve~,-observe lagged-(~nd-learf)-pr~ees~ar each kousez
hold since this depends only on the sample period. It is also possible
to employ a SNAP structure on models of labor supply on panel data
since lagged and lead wages are observed in such data.
Appendix A
The Pollak-Spinnewyn Model
The most general form of the Pollak-Spinnewyn model is
s` - Mq`-I t (I - M)st-1, (A1)
where q`' ~ are purchases in period t- 1, s` is a vector of "stocks" of the n
goods, and M is a diagonal memory matrix. Preferences are defined over
adjusted quantities:
q` - q` t Hs`, (r12)
where H is a diagonal "habits" matrix. The budgets in each period are linked
by the asset evolution equation
A~t~ - Ae - p`q`. (A3)
where everything is in discounted terms. If preferences over (q~, ..., qT)
are intertemporally additive, then we shall have a standard problem if we
can define adjusted prices (p') and adjusted wealth ( Á,) so that we can write
our asset evolution equations as
Art ~ - Ai - p`q`- (A4)
To do this, premultiply the one-period-ahead version of (AI) by an arbitrary
vector w't ~ and take this from (A3), to define p`:
Art~ - N,i.lsrt~ - A: - prq: - ~rtlMqi - ~it~(I - M)s`
- A` - piqr - ~rt ~(I - M)sr (A5)
- A` - pq~ -[~~t~(I - M) - p~H)s~
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from (A2). Now define Á~ - A~ - w's' so that
Árt ~ - ~r - P`9` - (H.it t(I - M) - p`H - ~lt`]s`. (A6)
Now define p.` recursively by fixing some future Ea`}' and letting
~` - lyrtt(I - M) - p'H. (A7)
This gives Á,~ i- Á, - p'q`, where
q' - q' f H[Mq`- t f(I - M)Mq'-~ .. .] from (A1) and (A2)
and
p` - p` f{x't t M from (A5)
- p` - p`} tHM - p't-H(I - M - MH)M . . . from (A7).
Thus q' depends on all past q's and p` depends on all future prices.
The two special cases mentioned in the text take H-(I - M)M-t (the
HAD model) or M- I (the short-memory model). It is simple to check that
these lead to simple forms for p` and q', respectively, but not for q` and p`,




Sufficíency is obvious; the following proves necessity.
From (3) and (5), we have
q` --a,~(pl, ..., pr r) - gr(pr-i pe prtt r)
and
q`-' - -o,-ta(pi,...,pT,r) -g~-t(p~-2 p~-t p~ r),
By Young's theorem, we have
Q-t~,~(Pi-t P~ Prtt ,) - 0r8`-t(p~-2 p~-t p~ r).
From this we see that all the third cross-partial derivatives of a with respect
to the p ,`'s from different time periods disappear. Thus ~rr is two-additive in
(pt, ..., pT) (see Browning 1983); that is, it is the sum of component func-
tions, each of which depends onlv on prices from any two periods and on r.
Furthermore, any n x n submatrix of the Hessian formed by taking second
partials with respect to p` and p' is zero if s~ t- 1, t, or t f 1. Thus
the corresponding components in the two-additive representation of a(-, r)
disappear, and the profit function has the structure given in the proposition.
Propositioti 2
For the single-good, three-period case, the Pollak-Spinnewyn model intplies




u12 - hm[v2 i- hm(1 - m)v3],
uig - hm(1 - m)v3,
u2~ - v~ f (hm)2vy,
u~3 - hmv y,
where v; denotes the second derivative of v,.
A necessary and sufficient condition for SNAP in the three-period case is
iti~ic2y - u~~u13. Combining the Pollak-Spinnewyn model and SNAP gives
(hm)2v3[v2 -~ hm(1 - m)vj] - hm{1 - mv3[v2 t(hm)2vg]}.
Thus we have hm - 1- m, which is the condition for HAD.
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The four papers presented in this thesis are all concerned with models of the
allocation of work and money over time that can loosely be termed 'life-cycle' models.
A common theme that runs through these papers is the idea that life-cycle agents will
see~to-kee~ the zrranginal-ntilityaf money~orstaTrt-over tune:~Ytong~vitlrsnpple-
mentary assumptions, this provides predictions about both short run (business cy-
cle~high frequency) allocations and long run (life-cyclellow frequency) allocations. For
example, one of the best known long run predictions is that for any individual the life-
cycle path of consumption will be independent of the life-cycle path of income (subject
to the budget constraint and a host of critical assumptions including the absence of
complementaries between leisure and consumption and the existence of perfect capital
markets). On the short-run side, perhaps the most important prediction of the life-
cycle model is that changes in consumption and hours of work should be uncorrelated
with past infonnation (once again, subject to a number of assumptions).
This power to bring all intertemporal decisions into a common framework is the
major strength of the life-cycle approach. It is also, however, a source of potential
weakness: it is entirely plausible that short run and long run plans are made in some
entirely different way. For example, in the empirical section of Chapter 2 it was found
that although the life-cycle model does a fair job of characterising the life-cycle
allocation of hours of work it does not account for the (short run) year to year changes.
Despite this, the gain in theoretical coherence from having a common framework
within which to analyse many sorts of decisions which have both long run and short run
ramifications makes it is is well worth while seeking to 'patch up' the life-cycle frame-
work rather than abandoning it. This is keeping with the my own view that the life-
cycle model provides a framework within which to organise our thoughts rather than a
definite set of propositions.
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The theory of life-cycle allocation using modem theoretical tools is presented in
papers Chapters 2 and 4. This analysis allows for several goods, labour supply by diffe-
rent members of the family and the existence of other conditioning variables. The most
important insight here is to note that if preferences are additive over time then the
marginal utility of money in any period is a'sufficient' statistic for all extra-period
infomtation. Thus it incorporates all of the agent's past experience and all her beliefs
about the future in one variable. Although this variable is not observed by the econo-
metrician, under certain conditions it does follow a known stochastic process which al-
lows the investigator various ways to account for the unobservability. Indeed, if there is
no uncertainty then the marginal utility of money is a constant and can be dealt with
using familiar fixed effect treatments.
Tests of some of the predictions of the simple (additive over time) life-cycle mo-
del using both aggregate data and individual household data are presented in Chapters
2 to 4. Very broadly, there are three sets of conclusions from these investigations:
(i) the aggregate time series data we currently have is virtualiy worthless for
testing the theory. Partly this is because important variables are missing but mainly it
is because the time series that are available do not have the sort of variability that
would be required to discriminate between various theories of intertemporal allocation.
(ii) even the simplest life-cycle model has some explanatory power for the
individual household data. Although there are rejections of some of the predictions of
the simplest model these are not so serious as to lead me to believe that further
investigations along these lines are necessarily doomed to failure.
(iii) many of the failures of the simplest model seem to point in the same di-
rection: behaviour displays too much persistence over time to be consístent with a
model that has additive-over-time preferences and budgets. Thus it seems that we need
to allow for either some intertemporal complementarities in preferences or some
temporal dependence in the budget (or both). One form of the latter is liquidity
constraints: if the borrowing rate of interest is higher than the lending rate then past
consumption (which partly determines current asset levels) affects the price of future
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consumption relative to the price of current consumption. Thus the current budget
constraint depends on past actions.
Conclusion ( iii) above points to the need to develop models of intertemporal
allocation that allow for satiation and habits as well as liquidity constraints. This has
been the focus of extensive study in the past five years. Chapter 5 contributes to this
literature. The main innovation is the introduction of a novel preference structure
(~NAP~tTiatis ~sigrï~ fó~ëcon6métric paisimbny-il-i~is~tra~tu~av~ids-the~tee~-fir
various ad hoc devices that past investigators in the field have found expedient.
Although this new model has its own drawbacks it is possible to parameterise it and
apply it to panel data. In the paper itself the structure is applied to UK aggregate time
series data. Given my reservations about using models of individual behaviour on
aggregate data I regard these results as mainly illustrative.
All of the analysis in these papers is cast in a conventional neo-classical mode.
Households are treated as individuals who have immutable preferences and obey the
expected utility axioms. Although this framework is open to question it does have the
twin virtues of being tractable and of having enough structure to put constraints on the
data. The very simples versions of the life-cycle model do not seem to provide a
convincing characterisation of the data. It is still an open question as to whether
slightly more general versions are adequate and if so, in which ways we need to relax
the simplest models. My own guess is that for the great majority of households in any
market economy simple versions of the life-cycle model will provide an adequate
description of their behaviour over both the short run and over the long run.
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SAMENVATTING
Hoe huishoudens beslissingen nemen over hceveel er moet worden gespaard en
gewerkt staat centraal in veel belangrijke beleidskwesties. De rode draad die door al
deze kwesties loopt, is dat individuen en huishoudens beslissingen moeten nemen die
~evolgen hebben-opdc tange en korte termijn. Het meest gebrvikte raamwerk waarbim
nen economen dergelijke beslissingen analyseren is het levenscyclusmodeL Het
uitgangspunt hierbij is dat huishoudens op elk moment in de tijd hun zaken regelen
teneinde een intertemporele nutsfunctie te maximaliseren onder de voorwaarde van een
intertemporele budgetrestrictie waarbij alle huidige infomiatie zo efficiënt mogelijk
wordt gebruikt. De belangrijkste implicatie van deze vooronderstelling is dat agenten
emaar streven het marginale nut van (verdisconteerde) uitgaven van periode tot
periode constant te houden. Dit is een zeer sterk paradigma, aangezien dit, samen met
extra veronderstellingen, voorspellingen verschaft over het korte-termijn (hoge frequen-
tie~conjunctuurcyclus) en lange-termijn (lage frequentiellevenscyclus) gedrag van
consumptie en arbeidsaanbod (alsmede alle andere levenscyclusbeslissingen zoals
scholing, aantal kinderen, beroepskeuze, omvang en samenstelling van beleggingsporte-
feuilles en pensicen).
Het is cruciaal te beseffen dat het levenscyclusmodel alleen een raamwerk is.
Zonder extra structuur aan te brengen, kunnen we geen voorspellingen doen die
beperkingen leggen op wat we zouden kunnen waarnemen. Dus alle modellen binnen
dit raamwerk (d.w.z. alle levenscyclusmodellen) kunnen worden gekenmerkt door de
gebruikte aanwllende veronderstellingen. Voor dit proefschrift is het noodzakelijk om
vier sets van extra te gebruiken veronderstellingen te onderscheiden. In het meest
eenvoudige geval wordt verondersteld dat agenten "perfect foresight" hebben; preferen-
ties kunnen worden weergegeven door een nutsfunctie die additief is over de tijd en
agenten hebben tcegang tot perfecte kapitaalmarkten. Hoewel zeer onrealistisch, dient
deze versie als een nuttig uitgangspunt. Er zijn verschillende manieren om de veronder-
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stellingen af te zwakken. De minst restrictieve set van veronderstellingen die wordt
gebruikt in de artikelen in dit prcefschrift laat onzekerheid tce (met verwachte
nutsmaximalisatie) en preferenties die niet additief zijn over de tijd.
Het eerste artikel (Hoofdstuk 2, "A Profitable Approach to Labor Supply and
Commodity Demands Over the Life-Cycle", met co-auteurs Angus Deaton and
Margaret Irish) bevat een nieuwe theoretische analyse en enkele empirische resultaten,
gebaseerd op Engelse data. De belangrijkste theoretische vetnieuwing van dit artikel is
het gebruik van een alternatieve weergave van preferenties in plaats van de directe
nutsfunctie. Dit alternatief wordt de winstfunctie benadering genoemd. In de tweede
helft van het hoofdstuk worden resultaten gepresenteerd over arbeidsaanbod en
consumptie waarbij data wordt gebruikt van het zogeheten Family Expenditure Survey
(FES), afkomstig uit het Verenigd Koninkrijk. We implementeren een methode om het
gebrek aan panel data op huishoud-niveau te omzeilen, door tijdreeksen van cross-
secties te gebruiken om quasi-panel data te construeren. De grondgedachte achter deze
procedure is dat, hoewel de steekproef varieert over de tijd, de bevolking dat niet doet
(afgezien van sterfte en migratie), zodat de steekprcefgemiddelden in elke periode
consistente schattingen zijn van het populatiegemiddelde. We tonen vervolgens aan dat
de theorie van toepassing is op de populatiegemiddelden.
In het laatste gedeelte van Hoofdstuk 2 worden de theoretische methoden,
geïntroduceerd in het eerste gedeelte, gebtuikt om een parameterisatie te ontwikkelen
zodat het model kan worden geschat door gebruikmaking van quasi-panel data. We
passen dit toe op het arbeidsaanbod van mannen en op consumptie. De arbeidsaanbod-
data van mannen reproduceren de gestileerde feiten die door anderen zijn gevonden:
voor handarbeiders en niet-handarbeiders is er een duidelijke synchronisatie van
gewerkte uren en verdisconteerd loon over de levenscyclus. Dit is één van de voorspel-
lingen van het eenvoudige levenscyclusmodel. De daaruit voortvlceiende intertemporele
substitutie-elasticiteit is vergelijkbaar met die van studies waarbij gebruik werd gemaakt
van Amerikaanse data. Echter, een nadere beschouwing toont enkele problemen. Ten
eerste is er een duidelijk bewijs dat het model niet voldoende de veranderingen in het
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aantal gewerkte uren van jaar tot jaar verklaart. Dus, alhoewel het model het goed lijkt
te doen over de levenscyclus, doet het dat niet over de conjunctuurcyclus. Het tweede
probleem is dat uit de urenvergelijking lijkt te volgen dat vrije tijd en consumptie
complementen zijn, terwijl ze in de consumptievergelijking substituten zijn. Formeel
impliceert dit een verwerping van de symmetrievoorwaarde die één van de voornaunste
implicaties is van het eenvoudige theorie model.
~iezien~e ~ .~ 'o ~:.1e :n~Ie-esnsumpti~-en-arbeidsaanbedliteratuu~ -is-heL
eenvoudige levenscyclusmodel vele malen getoetst. In Hoofdstuk 3("Eating, Drinking,
Smoking and Testing the Life-Cycle Hypothesis") en Hoofdstuk 4("A Non-Parametric
Test of the Life-Cycle Rational Expectations Model") presenteer ik twee nieuwe
verzamelingen toetsen. De eerste is informeler dan de meeste; de tweede is heel wat
fonneler en vereist niet om de nutsfunctie te specificeren.
In Hoofdstuk 3 is het alternatief voor de levenscyclus hypothese een nogal
slecht gedefinieerd allocatiemodel waarin huishoudens hun 'eerste levensbehoeften' in
elke periode bevredigen en vervolgens overblijvend huidig inkomen ("supernumerary
income") gebruiken voor de aankoop van 'niet-eerste levensbehoeften' en sparen. De
argumentatie die gewoonlijk wordt gegeven voor zo'n model is dat huishoudens zich
graag zouden gedragen als levenscyclus-hypothese-agenten maar dat zij "liquidity
constrained" zijn. Dientengevolge wordt huidige consumptie gelijkgesteld aan huidig
inkomen. Een andere argumentatie zou zijn dat huishoudens zich zo gedragen en óet
levenscyclusmodel simpelweg onjuist is.
Beschouw een huishouden dat van zo'n allocatieprocedure gebtuik maakt en
waar een kind wordt geboren. Dit heeft twee effecten op inkomen en bestedingen. Ten
eerste, één van de ouders verlaat misschien de beroepsbevolking om voor het kind te
gaan zorgen. Dit zal leiden tot een daling van het huidige inkomen. Ten tweede,
'behoeften' nemen toe, omdat kinderen onvermijdelijk kosten met zich meebrengen.
Deze twee effecten samen veroorzaken een daling van het supernumerair inkomen. De
implicatie is dat bestedingen voor goederen, niet behorend tot de eerste levensbehcef-
ten, zoals tabak en alcohol, zullen dalen. Deze conclusie wordt versterkt als we ook
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aannemen dat de preferenties van de ouders zodanig veranderen dat zij minder gaan
drinken en roken ook al kunnen ze zich dat veroorloven. De voorspellingen voor een
'puur levenscyclus' huishouden zijn heel anders. Als agenten vrij kunnen lenen en
uitlenen (en preferenties voor tabak en alcohol zijn additief separabel van andere
goederen en van kinderen) dan zouden we verwachten dat ouders hun eerdere niveau
van alcohol- en tabaksconsumptie handhaven na de geboorte van kinderen. Om dit te
doen zouden ze of lenen of minder sparen.
In het tweede gedeelte van dit artikel worden de quasi-panel data, zoals
ontwikkeld in Hoofdstuk 2, gebruikt om de toets te implementeren. We vinden dat
kinderen geen effect hebben op de tabaksconsumptie en alleen een klein negatief effect
op de alcoholconsumptie. Hoewel onder aanzienlijk voorbehoud, lijkt dit enige
ondersteuning te geven voor de eenvoudige versie van het levenscyclusmodel, waarin
agenten tcegang hebben tot een perfecte kapitaalmarkt en de verwachte waarde van
een intertemporeel additieve nutsfunctie maximaliseren.
Eé n van de zwakheden van alle toetsen van het levenscyclusmodel die in de
literatuur gebruikt zijn, is dat zij een bepaalde parameterisatie voor preferenties
veronderstellen. In Hoofdstuk 4 ontwikkel ik de niet-parametrische (of "revealed
preference") implicaties van het meest eenvoudige ("perfect foresight") levenscyclusmo-
del. De kenmerkende voorwaarde generaliseert de voorspelling voor het één-consump-
tiegoed geval: vraag is een negatieve functie van de verdisconteerde prijs. De generali-
satie naar verschillende goederen leidt tot een verzameling voorwaarden die kan
worden toegepast op elke tijdreeks van aankopen, verdisconteerde prijzen, werkuren en
verdisconteerd loon. Het rentepercentage dat wordt gebruikt om prijzen en loon te
verdisconteren is natuurlijk de enige rentevoet, die verondersteld wordt te gelden in de
perfecte kapitaalmarkt, zoals aangenomen in de veronderstellingen. De verzameling
voorwaarden bevat onder andere Varians GARP niet-parametrische voorwaarden. Dit
is niet verrassend omdat deze vereist zijn voor 'rationaliteit' binnen de periode terwijl
de voorwaarden voor consistentie met het levenscyclusmodel intra- en intertemporele
'rationaliteit' vereisen. Ten slotte wordt aangetoond dat de niet-parametrische voor-
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waarden perfect aggregeten, d.w.z.,als zij op elke agent van [cepassing zijn, dan zijn ze
ook van toepassing op de geaggregeerde data. Deze voorwaarden worden tcegepast op
geaggregeerde Engelse tijdreeksen. Ze worden niet verworpen voor lange sub-periodes.
Als we bovendien rekening houden met 'verrassingen' in het begin van de jaren '70 dan
zijn de niet-parametrische voorwaarden van toepassing op de gehele periode. Dit is van
aanzienliik belang omdat parametrische tcetsen van de levenscvclus hypothese ~
vergelijkbare data over het algemeen sterk worden verworpen. Het niet-verwecpen van
de niet-parametrische voorwaarden duidt erop dat de verwerpingen die in de literatuur
zijn beschreven misschien meer een kwestie zijn van het opleggen van ongeschikte
pazameterisaties dan van het verwerpen van de hypothese op zich.
Hoewel dit er bemoedigend uitziet voor de eenvoudigste vorm van het levenscy-
clusmodel wijzen de specifieke verwerpingen van de niet-parametrische voorwaarden
over de gehele periode in enkele specifieke richtingen. Bijvoorbeeld, in ieder geval
waarin de voorwaazden worden verworpen, gebeurt dat omdat consumptie niet zoveel
daalt als zou volgen uit de theorie. Dit wijst op een 'ratchet'-consumptiemodel zoals
voor het eerst gepresenteerd door Duesenberry aan het eind van de jaren '40. Een
andere mogelijkheid is, dat we de periodes waarvoor de niet-parametrische voorwaar-
den niet gelden, beschouwen als de periodes waarin agenten "liquidity constrained" zijn.
Dit alles geeft aan dat het levenscyclusmodel (met enkele gewoonte-vorming of
kapitaalmarkt-imperfecties) zeer goed de aggregate tijdreeks-data weergeefr. Wat te
denken van het belangrijkste informele alternatief, rtamelijk een 'Keynesiaans' model
waarin we veronderstellen dat huidige totale bestedingen een stijgende functie is van
huidig totaal inkomen en dat agenten deze totale bestedingen alloceren gebruikmakend
van stabiele preferenties. In de laatste paragraaf van Hoofdstuk 4 wordt aangetoond dat
de gebruikte data ook geheel consistent zijn met zo'n hypothese. De slotconclusie is dan
dat de aggregate tijdreeks-data eigenlijk waardeloos zijn voor het toetsen van het
levenscyclusmodel.
Het laatste artikel in dit prcefschrift (Hoofdstuk 5, "A Simple Nonadditive
Preference Structure for Models of Household Behavior Over Time") gaat over
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preferenties die niet additief zijn over tijd. Diverse modellen zijn gesuggereerd voor
ttiet-intertemporele sepazabiliteit. De benadering in Hoofdstuk 5 is om de eenvoudigst
mogelijke generalisatie van addi[iviteit af te leiden, waar 'eenvoudig' slaat op de
databehoeften. Er wordt een preferentiestructuur ontwikkeld, zo dat huidige vraag mag
athangen van prijzen één periode geleden, huidige prijzen en prijzen één periode in de
toekomst. Ik karakteriseer de preferenties die aan deze voorwaarde voldoen en duidt
deze aan als de "Simple Non-Additive Preference" (SNAP) structuur. In de eerste
paragraaf van Hoofdstuk 5 worden enkele van de gevolgen van een SNAP structuur in
een wereld met perfecte zekerheid nagegaan. Er wordt aangetoond dat deze structuur
het standaazd duurzame-consumptiegoederen-geval omvat als een speciaal geval. De
tweede pazagraaf laat zien hce het raamwerk moet worden uitgewerkt om met
onzekerheid rekening te houden. Het belangrijkste resultaat hier is, wil SNAP empi-
risch tcepasbaar zijn, dan mceten we df de preferenties in belangrijke mate beperken
bf we mceten veronderstellen dat agenten puntverwachtingen hebben aangaande
tcekomstige prijzen. In de daaropvolgende twee pazagrafen wordt het SNAP model
tcegepast op enkele geaggregeerde Engelse tijdreeks-data. De in dit geval gekozen
pazameterisatie omvat het "Almost Ideal Demand System" (AIDS) als een speciaal
geval. De SNAP generalisatie introduceert alleen enkele parameters meer (om precies
te zijn, één minder dan het aantal goederen dat in het model voorkomt). Indien
toegepast op Engelse data, blijkt dat intertemporele additiviteit wordt verworpen.
Opmerkelijk is echter dat de intertemporele athankelijkheden grotendeels 'geconcen-
treerd' zijn op duurzame goederen, wat nauwelijks verrassend is. Eigenlijk lijkt het erop
of alle andere goederen (met de mogelijke uitzondering van brandstof die hoe dan ook
problemen oplevert) intertemporeei separabel zijn (volgens de defittitie van het artikel).
Dus het lijkt alsof de meeste van de schijnbaze niet-sepazabiliteiten gevonden in vorige
vraagstudies tcegeschreven kunnen worden aan het niet opnemen van duurzame
goederen in zulke systemen. Omdat de behceften aan andere goederen niet separabel
zijn van duutzartte goederen, leidt dit tot een duidelijke behoefte om rekening te
houden met intertemporele niet-separabiliteiten in, bijvoorbeeld, voedsel of diensten.
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